Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.2553/8–2852

No. 212
President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

personal and secret

[Washington,] August 28, 1952.

Thank you for your message of this morning.¹ After reading the account from our representatives of the fantastic conversation which they had with Mosadeq, I personally feel that they acted wisely in temporarily withdrawing our message until they could seek our further advice. Furthermore, I consider their drafting changes² well-advised, although I would suggest that on the first point the following wording would be preferable:

There shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice the question of compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalization of the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran. The validity of the nationalization law shall not be brought into question by either party. The Court in deciding the question of compensation shall take into consideration claims and counter-claims of both parties. If it should appear that the two parties in preparing their respective claims and counter-claims have different views with regard to the legal situation prevailing in Iran prior to nationalization, the Court shall be at liberty to decide for itself what that situation was.

I understand that you would prefer not to adopt the suggested changes.³ If you insist, I shall stick to our original text and agree that our representatives in Tehran be instructed to present our proposal formally to Dr. Mosadeq.

Our proposal is a fair one and its publication will serve to clarify the complicated issues in the oil dispute. I would strongly urge you, however, to give sympathetic consideration to the proposed changes, which I am convinced would make our public position even better.

Whatever version is adopted, I believe that the message should be made public immediately after delivery in London, Washington, and Tehran. The State Department will concert with your Foreign Office on the time of delivery and the release of the text and will suggest a line which we intend to take in explaining the message to the press.⁴

With warm regards.

Harry

1. See footnote 6, supra.

2. In telegram 901 from Tehran, Aug. 28, Henderson and Middleton jointly advised their governments to agree to their recommendations to make the following textual changes in the joint message if they were to hand it to Mosadeq:

   “Paragraph 1 of proposals be changed to read: ‘There shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice the question of compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalization of the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co in Iran. The Court in deciding the question of compensation shall take into consideration claims and counter-claims of both parties. If it should appear that the two parties in preparing their respective claims and counter-claims have different views with regard to legal situation prevailing in Iran prior to nationalization, the Court shall be at liberty to decide for itself what that situation was. The validity of the nationalization law shall not however, be brought into question by either party’.

   “Paragraph 3(C) be altered to read as follows:

   “‘If the Iranian Govt should find itself in urgent need of funds during the period between the acceptance of the proposals and the resumption of revenues derived from the sale of oil, the US Govt will be prepared to extend to the Iranian Govt, if the latter should so desire, financial assistance of a temporary character’ “. (888.2553/8–2852)

3. According to a memorandum drafted by Acting Secretary of State Bruce of his conversation with President Truman on the morning of Aug. 28, the President’s first inclination was to agree with the Prime Minister and publish the original note. However, he instructed Bruce to consult with the interested parties within the Department of State and to notify him later that day as to the Department recommendation on this matter. (788.00/8–2852)
4. Prime Minister Churchill’s reply to the President on Aug. 29, said that he and his government strongly believed that there should be no textual changes in the joint message. (888.2553/8–2952) For the reasons which the British expressed regarding this matter, see footnote 2, infra.