Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

788.00/8–1152: Telegram

No. 198
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Tehran, August 11, 1952—1 p.m.

624. In view rapidity with which polit sit changing we sending new evaluation of sit at this moment:

1. Striking feature of recent Iranian political development has been sharpening of dissensions among NF leaders and their allies. Apparently, as various checks on power NF were eliminated by seeming complete victory symbolized by return of Mosadeq, ambitious leaders in nat movement have begun more openly to quarrel among themselves. Schism which at present seems most threatening to Nat movement is that between Mosadeq and Kashani.

2. Remnants of conservative opposition to NF in Majlis have adopted new technique for purpose of exploiting and making most of frictions within NF. This technique has been to take more extreme position re various issues than NF itself. This technique has been successful (a) at times in making extremism and extremists look ridiculous, and (b) in exploiting and widening rifts among leaders Nat movement. Opposition for instance credited with effecting election Kashani speaker Majlis, development which has angered and embarrassed Mosadeq and increased friction among Nat leaders.

3. Schism between Mosadeq and Kashani wld appear to be primarily due to: (a) pressures being exerted on Mosadeq simply to show latter he powerless without Kashani and that he shld defer to Kashani’s views on essential matters and (b) that Kashani and Mosadeq, both being inflicted with megalomania, are splitting as Kashani openly strives for power to pol leadership of country. Min Court Ala maintains that Shah and Mosadeq are now coop endeavor frustrate Kashani’s aggressive ambitions. It natural Mosadeq and Kashani if rift further deepened, wld try gain support of as many polit grps as possible for themselves. Hence polit importance of Shah, Army and Tudeh might increase. Two most important extremists grps of Nat movement, that under Kashani aegis and that in Iran Party, believed not adverse if expedient to make working alliance with Tudeh. Mosadeq to remain in power might have to choose between alliance with Shah and Army or more close coop with Iran Party and its extremist leaders. If Kashani shld decide to withdraw support from Mosadeq latter might find himself in minority in streets since Kashani and Tudeh together control majority of street fighters. Kashani reps form of nat extremism with which Tudeh might wish temporarily to link itself in order further its aims of eliminating Shah and completely destroying effectiveness of army.

4. Regardless of possible developments within Nat movement this Emb convinced that polit extremism and xenophobia are factors that must be reckoned with for indefinite future regardless of Iran Govt in power. It hardly likely that any Iran Govt in foreseeable future cld agree to discuss arrangements looking toward settlement oil dispute any more conciliatory to Brit interests than that proposed by Dept. Time passing without conciliatory and affirmatory approach from West will only strengthen hand of extremists to detriment West interests.

Henderson

1. Repeated to London.