Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/5–1952

No. 983
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, May 19, 1952.

Subject:

• Anglo-Egyptian Situation: Proposed Approach to the British on the Sudan.

Discussion:

In NEA’s memorandum of May 14 it was recommended that you call in Sir Oliver Franks and suggest that since Egypt had turned down the Sudan formula, the British should undertake consultation immediately with the Sudanese. This recommendation was based on the belief that the Egyptian rejection would be handed to the British on May 14 or 15 and on the assumption that Sir Oliver Franks would be in Washington. It is now learned that the Egyptian reply will not be handed to Mr. Eden until May 20 and that Sir Oliver Franks will be out of Washington until May 24.¹

In view of the timing of the delivery of the Egyptian reply, your imminent departure for Europe and Sir Oliver’s absence from Washington, it would not seem desirable for the approach to be made in Washington.

EUR and NEA have read the draft telegram from you to Ambassador Gifford and believe that it sets forth exactly the points which should be made to the British. However, we consider that the approach would have far greater impact if you made these points directly to Mr. Eden.² In addition, there is the practical question of whether Mr. Gifford would be able to see Mr. Eden after the Egyptian reply is presented and before Mr. Eden leaves for the Continent.³

While it would not be desirable for Mr. Gifford to tell Mr. Eden the substance of your proposed comments, it might be useful for him to forearm Mr. Eden that you intend to raise the Sudan problem. Besides giving Mr. Eden the opportunity to prepare himself, this might also lessen the chances of a statement by the United Kingdom following the Egyptian reply which might make further moves more difficult.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1. you sign the attached telegram to ambassador gifford (tab a);⁴

2. you speak directly to mr. eden along the lines of the attached paper (tab b).

[Tab B]

Position to be Presented to Mr. Eden

The latest British gambit in Egypt has been played out. The result is stalemate. We see the situation this way:

1) The issues of the canal and defence cannot be settled without some solution of the Sudan—the King’s title. Caffery and Stevenson have no doubt of this.

2) The British can agree to nothing on the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese and getting their acquiescence on the basis of conditions and guarantees safeguarding self-determination.

3) The British want the Egyptians to accept the conditions and guarantees first, since this would facilitate consultation with the Sudanese and might make their demands less.

4) The Egyptians refuse, and demand recognition of the title first. The British refuse this.

5) Result: An impasse which may well produce a renewal of militancy in Egypt, governmental collapse, weakening of the army’s loyalty, of the authority of the King—another five-alarm fire in the Arab world.

6) Underlying all of this are undoubtedly real differences of intentions about the meaning of recognition of the King’s title, and the meaning of self-determination for the Sudan. And these are founded, in part, on mutual distrust.

7) In this situation, is there any alternative to drift to disaster. We think that there may be one possibility. But it is only a possibility if it is seized promptly and pursued with the zeal and solemnity which comes from recognizing it as “the last clear chance.”

8) This possibility is prompt British consultation with the Sudanese designed to bring about acceptance of the title in the pre-self determination period on a basis which in fact does safeguard the right of the Sudanese to decide their own future. These conditions should also make plain to the world an offer to associate the Egyptians in the constitution-making process or/and to provide some disinterested observation in order to meet the charges of mutual distrust.

9) This consultation—if it is to accomplish anything to aid solution of the problem—cannot be done by the Administration in the Sudan. It can only be done by some British person or persons, so eminent and detached that the British public, the Sudanese, the free foreign public, and even the Egyptians, will be impressed and reassured by the sincerity and objectivity of the effort.

10) This is a hard thing for the British to do. It can only be done on their own initiative. But the alternative—the drift towards general breakup in Egypt—will be harder. Harder not only for the British but for us too. For, as in Indo-China, these problems always come back to weaken the combined strength we are all trying to create. And they come back also, as in Iran, Tunisia and Morocco, to weaken an asset, which is not ours alone but belongs to all the West—the belief that the interests of the U.S. are broad enough to include those of other peoples. We have, I hope, demonstrated this to our British and French allies. We need imaginative and energetic help from them along the same lines.

1. Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2066 from Cairo, May 20, not printed, that the Egyptian Ambassador in London had earlier in the day handed Eden a note in which the Egyptian Government formally rejected the British draft formula on the Sudan and alternatively presented Eden with the following text of three Sudan formulas which were acceptable to Egypt:

   • “1. The two govts will enter into negots to settle the question of the Sudan within the framework of unity under the Egyptian crown. Her Majesty’s Govt welcome the assurance of the Egypt Govt that the Sudanese shall have the right to decide their future status.”
   • “2. The policy which the high contracting parties undertake to follow in the Sudan (within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt. will have for its essential objectives to assure the well being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-govt and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan.”

   • “3. Text which the Brit Amb was instructed by Mr. Eden to submit to the Min FonAff on 5 April, 1952, as modified by the Egypt Govt.

     “The two govts agree to discuss the question of the Sudan on the following basis: Both govts agree that the Sudanese shall have the right freely to decide their future status. The Egypt Govt having declared that His Majesty King Farouk holds the title of King of Egypt and the Sudan, Her Majesty’s Govt reaffirm that they do not oppose the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown.” (745W.00/5–2052)

2. In the margin appears the following remark from H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State: “I concur HFM”.
3. Regarding Acheson’s and Eden’s trip to Europe, see footnote 1, infra.
4. not printed; secretary acheson signed the cable under reference, and it was transmitted to london as telegram 6027, may 19. in essence, ambassador gifford was instructed to inform the foreign office or foreign secretary eden that while the secretary of state was willing to give brief attention to the proposed british agenda items for tripartite discussions, he intended to raise bilaterally only the question of egypt-sudan and possibly iran and preferred to focus his attention on these two subjects. (396.1 st/5–1652)