Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110
No. 982
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African
Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of
State
Subject:
- Anglo-Egyptian Situation: Proposed Approach to the British on the Sudan
Discussion:
We have been informed by Ambassador Caffery that both the King and the Prime Minister have stated to him that the Sudan formula which was presented by Sir Ralph Stevenson will be rejected but that the door will not be closed to further negotiations. It had been anticipated that the rejection would be given to the British on Monday, May 12, but so far this has not been confirmed. However, it is believed that we should consider what further steps we should take once rejection has been definitely confirmed. It should be noted that even though the door may not be closed to negotiation, in practice it is doubtful there will be anything on which to negotiate until the question of the title is settled. The expected rejection of the formula will confirm once more that nothing short of recognition by the United Kingdom of the King of Egypt’s title as King of the Sudan will be acceptable to Egypt as the “price” of negotiations on the base question.
Since Egypt is apparently unwilling to negotiate on the base question or on the Sudan without a formula acceptable to it (which means recognition) and since the British will not consider recognition without consulting the Sudanese which they hold can only be done after negotiations with Egypt on the intent and implications of recognition, it would appear that the Anglo-Egyptian conversations are at an impasse. This problem of recognition has become the one easily discernible and fairly well defined obstacle in the Anglo-Egyptian talks and it would therefore seem imperative that this obstacle be eliminated if progress is to be made. It is not only possible but likely that other obstacles to settlement will arise as we go along but we believe that every effort should be made to eliminate each obstacle as it becomes discernible and defined, such as in the case of the recognition of the title.
For the time being the question of a formula is in abeyance since no agreement on the Sudan can be reached. Consequently one of the parties will have to take action to move the problem off dead center. The British insist that they must have prior consultation [Page 1802] with the Sudanese on any change of status of the Sudan and they state that recognition of the title constitutes such a change. However, the obligation to consult with the Sudanese is one which the British have unilaterally assumed and they are in no way bound to obtain Egyptian agreement to consultation. It would seem logical therefore that the British should move forward at once (regardless of whether or not the Egyptians agree to commence negotiations) to consult the Sudanese in order to discharge to their own satisfaction this unilateral obligation. They can make clear to the Sudanese during the process of consultation that recognition of the title would only be accorded within the framework of self-determination and irreducible minimum of other guarantees necessary to safeguard constitutional development in the Sudan. In connection with consultation it should be noted that if it is to be left to the Sudan Government, i.e. Sir Robert Howe, the Governor General, or Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary, it is doubtful that the desired results would be obtained. We are anxious that the consultations be carried on in an even-handed manner—not weighted against recognition.
Prior to the presentation of the Sudan formula to the Egyptians we suggested to the British the idea of immediate consultation with the Sudanese without further discussion of a formula or guarantees. To this Mr. Eden replied that unless it was possible to go to the Sudanese with firm guarantees, they (the Sudanese) would demand much more than involved in the attached list and than the Egyptians would be prepared to accept. While there may be justification for this position, we do not believe that the critical state of the negotiations permits this type of bargaining. It must be borne in mind that if the British did obtain Sudanese consent to recognition, it would still be conditioned on the Egyptian guarantees.
If as a result of immediate consultation with the Sudanese the British are able to offer recognition of the title to Egypt, then we may be able to move forward on the critical negotiations with respect to the Suez Canal base. On the other hand if the British state after consultation that they can under no circumstances recognize the title, then we shall have to face squarely the serious implications of a probable complete breakdown of negotiations.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that we go back to the British, preferably in Washington by you through talking with Sir Oliver Franks, along the following lines:
The Sudanese formula has now been rejected by the Egyptians. Ambassador Caffery did what he could in his talk with the King on May 8th to get the Egyptians to realize the limitations which [Page 1803] would have to be reflected in any formula which the United Kingdom presented. He also urged that if the formula could not be accepted, then they should go ahead with the negotiations. These approaches have not been successful and we seem to be approaching an impasse.
We discussed the other day the possibility that the United Kingdom might proceed with consultations with the Sudanese without holding discussions with the Egyptians on the questions of guarantees. While we recall Mr. Eden’s belief that it would be useless to consult the Sudanese without guarantees, we come back to the idea that the repidly developing impasse makes it desirable to offer recognition directly to the Egyptians requesting at that time such guarantees as may be considered essential to safeguard constitutional development in the Sudan and self-determination. This would mean immediate consultation by the United Kingdom with the Sudanese.
We believe that if consultations are carried out in a sincere and earnest manner, it should prove possible to convince the Independence-Front Sudanese that symbolic recognition of the title would not be prejudicial to their future since it would only be accorded under certain specified conditions. It is clear that the UK has strong influence in the Sudan which might be brought to bear in the interest of reaching settlement with Egypt which could be just as important to the Sudanese as to anybody else.
As to the method of consultation and who might do it, that is something for determination by the UK. However, it is essential that it be done in such a way to inspire confidence not only in the UK and Sudan but also in Egypt. We recall that Mr. Eden had thought of going to the Sudan and that might work very well. The thought also occurs to us that a distinguished British personage not politically committed, and with a reputation for impartiality might undertake the task. We are interested to learn that the Foreign Office feels that the consultation could take place with a representative group of Sudanese leaders rather than through more formal means, such as a Constituen Assembly or even a plebiscite.
We are convinced that the removal of this obstacle is very urgent and that every effort should be made to get ahead with consultations as quickly as possible in a manner which will result in an offer to the Egyptians on recognition. We are greatly concerned by what may happen if we do not remove this obstacle, for according to our information the King and the present Prime Minister are not limitless in their ability to maintain law and order.
Without sounding too pessimistic a note at this juncture we would be interested in the views of the Foreign Office as to how it envisages the situation developing should negotiations break down.
[Page 1804]