780.022/8–2853

No. 1534
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Salisbury) 1

confidential

Dear Bobbety: I have given most careful consideration to your frank exposition of your views regarding the problem of Buraimi in your letter of July 27.2 To be equally frank, we are disappointed and concerned that you and your Cabinet could not accept the approach to this problem which we suggested last month.

As I see the present position, our respective estimates of the situation differ in certain important respects.

You state that any compromise which entails your accepting that Turki should remain in Hamasa with no proper check on his activities will seriously prejudice the issue. We, however, consider that our proposals would meet your difficulty by providing for a definite [Page 2566] restraint on Turki’s possible . . . activities before and during the arbitration process.

You also state that all your information is that, if we urged on Ibn Saud your plan for mutual withdrawal combined with neutral supervision, our advice would be accepted. We, on the other hand, are convinced, on the basis of discussions Ambassador Hare has had with Ibn Saud in which the Ambassador unofficially and informally mentioned the possibility of withdrawal, that the Saudis would not accept such a proposal. My own conversations with the King last May have persuaded me that this must be accepted as a fact. During our talks last month I indicated our belief that the King could not be persuaded to move any further on the matter of withdrawal. In view of our understanding of the situation, we do not feel able to urge your plan upon King Ibn Saud.

You will recall that, after your Government proposed arbitration, we strongly supported the principle with Prince Faisal and the Saudi Government. I believe you will recognize that this support was largely responsible for Saudi acceptance of this procedure. Perhaps you were not aware, however, of the strain which our support imposed upon our friendly relationship with King Ibn Saud. I am sure you will agree that Saudi Arabia is assuming an increasingly important position in the pattern of our common defense. While recognizing the importance of your position in the Persian Gulf, I feel strongly that in the days ahead of us it will be of paramount importance to both of us to have the friendship and confidence of the ruler of Saudi Arabia.

I judge from your letter that we may not have made sufficiently clear, during our conversations in July, the seriousness with which we view the situation and the importance we attach to finding some means of settling the dispute which would have greater chance of being accepted by the Saudi Government than those you have put forward. I feel that the possible consequences of inaction are so serious that I again urge your reconsideration of our proposals in the light of our understanding of the situation as I have set it forth above. I would add that we feel an oligation to reply as soon as possible to a letter from King Ibn Saud to President Eisenhower which we will delay answering pending further word from you.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles
  1. This letter was drafted by Fritzlan and Beale, Aug. 17–25, and was cleared by NEA, EUR, S/S, G, and C.

    Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary, recommending that he sign the letter to Lord Salisbury. The memorandum advised the Secretary that, since Lord Salisbury’s letter of July 27 revealed the British were persisting in their “tough” attitude, the Department of State should frankly register its disappointment and hope the British would give further consideration to the Department’s previous suggestions. (780.022/8–2553)

    Telegram 984 from London, Sept. 5, informed the Department of State the Embassy had delivered the letter to Lord Salisbury on that date. (780.022/9–553)

  2. Document 1530.