Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/8–1053: Telegram

No. 1533
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, August 10, 1953—6 p.m.

577. Following are Embassy’s comments Deptel 682:²

1. Embassy assumes paragraph 1 Department’s new formula means only Aden levies would be withdrawn to Bahrein and that Trucial levies would return Trucial states. If this case, suggest clarification this paragraph since present wording appears capable interpretation that presence in Buraimi area of any Trucial levies at any time since August 20, 1952 necessitates 350 mile withdrawal.

In this connection, Embassy strongly doubts British would agree any withdrawal Trucial levies to Bahrein.

2. Similar problem to foregoing would seem arise re administrative personnel. Is it, for instance, Department’s intention that British political officer Sharja, who only recently arrived there and who has travelled in Buraimi area, should be withdrawn?

3. British will certainly welcome emphasis on withdrawal but may find difficulty in accepting provision which debars them so specifically from maintaining certain military forces (e.g. Aden levies) all mainland areas of their Persian Gulf territories. This, they may argue, is unfair, particularly given their views re responsibility for origin of dispute.

4. Embassy feels there is another contingency that should be taken into account in any formula, i.e. that after mutual withdrawal there might be trouble among tribes resulting breakdown law and order.

5. Formula also appears raise problems when applied to Muscat. Does “Buraimi area”, for example, embrace Dhank, Ibri, etc., and, if so, would Muscati officials in those places have [to] be withdrawn to Batinah coast?

6. Embassy recognizes that Department’s formula evolved in effort meet part way very valid Saudi point that mutual withdrawal would place British in preferable military position due close proximity their forces after withdrawal. Embassy wonders, however, whether Saudi fears this respect could not be overcome by formula along following lines:

a. Withdrawal to undisputed territory of all Saudi, British and Muscati controlled administrative and military personnel who have entered Buraimi and adjacent disputed areas since August 20, 1952. In case of disagreement as to what constitutes undisputed territory, views of commission, as provided for below, shall prevail. All parties to undertake not to redeploy these or any other forces of administrative personnel in disputed areas except as they may be called upon by commission for forces in circumstances outlined below.

b. Establishment commission in Buraimi composed of one Saudi, one British and one neutral to ensure compliance with this agreement, to undertake such investigations as may be required by arbitration body and to be responsible for good government and security Buraimi area until conclusion arbitration award.

c. In event of situation developing in Buraimi involving breakdown of law and order, or threat thereof, commission may call upon Saudi and British Governments to furnish forces, such forces to function under commission’s instructions and to withdraw again when, in commission’s judgment, situation permits.

d. All parties to refrain from propaganda and other means of influencing local inhabitants from date of signature this agreement.

e. Same as Department’s 2.

f. Implementation withdrawal mentioned above upon arrival in region of Buraimi commission.

7. If paragraph 6(a) above does not appear practical from standpoint Saudi acceptance, Embassy inclined think British might be more disposed accept formula which simply provides for mutual withdrawal to pre-August 20, 1952 dispositions than one which so obviously debars their forces from all their mainland territories, even though return of Aden levies to Aden Protectorate would be involved in first case. In other words, they could publicly present withdrawal to Aden as natural consequences liquidation of dispute. On other hand, maintaining levies Bahrein creates presumption their presence in area deemed necessary from military standpoint and, in such circumstances, British would appear hard put defend their agreement to stationing them on island 350 miles away.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.
2. Document 1531.