780.022/7–2753
No. 1530
The Acting Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Salisbury) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Foster: I have been giving very careful thought to the views which President Eisenhower and you expressed to me in Washington on the subject of our frontier dispute with Saudi Arabia: and I have now had an opportunity of reporting your views personally to my Cabinet colleagues and of discussing them fully, with every desire to help.
In reaching our conclusions we have been influenced by the following considerations. In our view, Turki has no right to be in Hamasa; the village is one of those belonging to the Sultan of Muscat, who, with the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, objected most strongly to Turki’s incursion into the Buraimi Oasis. Ibn Saud should not in the first place have made a forward move for which there is absolutely no legal justification. In view of the obligations which he now puts upon you by virtue of President Truman’s letter of October 1950, I do not understand how he ever contemplated such a step without seeking your advice and support. I have little doubt in my own mind that he deliberately meant to face us both with a fait accompli. It was a carefully calculated bluff, to which we could not submit without the most serious repercussions on the local rulers, whose legitimate rights we are by treaty bound to support.
We had indeed every right to remove Turki many months ago. But as you know, in the interests of us all, we restrained the Sultan of Muscat from using force against him, and in the Buraimi Standstill Agreement we acquiesced in his remaining in the Oasis temporarily until, as we hoped, and agreement was reached in regard to arbitration. I can assure you that in both these actions we were to a large measure influenced by the wish to spare you embarrassment. As a result of these decisions and because of Turki’s subsequent improper activities, we have allowed our own and our friends’ interests to suffer in no small measure. For there can be no doubt that Turki is doing his best, not without success, to disrupt the pattern of tribal allegiance in this area, by the simple process of bribery: nor, I am afraid, would a neutral commission have any chance of checking this process. In these circumstances, we feel most strongly that to allow Turki to remain in Hamasa during the arbitration, with no check on his activities except the supervision of a neutral commission, will have a disastrous effect [Page 2560] on our relations with our old and tried friends. The local people will miss the significance of an agreement to arbitrate, and seeing Turki unrestrained, they will feel that we have deserted them. I could not advise my colleagues to put themselves in this position. Moreover, it might easily result in the arbitration being unfairly influenced by a situation which has been only recently created, and improperly at that. I doubt very much whether, in these circumstances, we could persuade the Sultan of Muscat to swallow such a manifestly unfair process, supposing for a moment that we wished to ask him to do so.
In short, our view is that the presence of Turki in Hamasa is the crux of the whole problem and that any compromise in this respect which entails our accepting that he should remain there with no proper check on his activities, will seriously prejudice the issue. And it is not only our friends in the Trucial Coast and the Sultan of Muscat who will be affected. Throughout the Persian Gulf the same attitude may be adopted and our position in the more important Gulf States, on which large joint interests depend, may be fatally called in question. You will, I am sure, understand if I say that this is a risk which my colleagues and I do not feel able to take. Our position in the Persian Gulf States has been carefully built up, we are trusted there, and to weaken it now would be detrimental both to you and to us. It is quite certain that, should we lose our position there, there will be many claims for the reversion, and I hardly think that any of these would be as valuable to you, in peace or war, in this important area, as we ourselves.
I know how close your relations with Ibn Saud are, and I know too how strong a position you have with him. If you felt able to urge on him the plan for mutual withdrawal combined with neutral supervision which I have suggested to you, all my information is that your advice would be accepted. If however, after consideration of what I say you still feel that it is impossible for you to do this, I am afraid that the only alternative will be for the situation to be allowed to continue as it is for the time being. This is, I know, far from ideal from your, or indeed from our own, point of view, but I really do not see any other course we could pursue.
Yours ever