Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/8–1053: Telegram

No. 1532
The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State¹

secret

Jidda, August 10, 1953—2 p.m.

45. Embassy believes proposals contained Deptel 30, August 7² would not be acceptable to Saudis. As Department is aware, salient points Saudi position are as follows:

(1) That Turki remain Buraimi, presumably until arbitration proceedings concluded;

(2) That arbitration commission be appointed immediately with responsibility observe developments Buraimi area or, as alternative, immediate establishment neutral observation commission and of arbitration commission when terms of reference agreed by two parties;

(3) That equality forces Buraimi area be established before arbitration proceedings initiated.

Department’s proposals Deptel 30 fail satisfy first two foregoing points, on both of which Saudis have clearly shown they feel strongly. While it is realized that Department’s proposals regarding mutual withdrawal were drafted with intent overcoming previously expressed Saudi objections thereto, Embassy doubts that this aspect of proposal would be sufficient in Saudi opinion to provide equality of position they desire. It is likely that Saudis would consider that number of British and British controlled forces in Trucial coast area prior August 20, 1952, with their easier access Buraimi area, would have result of giving superior position to British.

Even if King saw no alternative but to accept proposals, which Embassy considers doubtful, there would still remain problems of substance. For example, who would make determination that withdrawal of British and Muscat personnel in accordance proposals has been carried out? Saudis would be unwilling accept unilateral assurance British this complicated question. Moreover, if Saudis agreed Turki would be withdrawn upon arrival Iraq arbitration body, they would tend draw out negotiations for arbitration, including those regarding terms of reference arbitration body, in order delay evil day Turki’s withdrawal. During this period, present unsatisfactory situation would continue whereby there is no neutral body to minimize friction leading to incidents between opposing groups.

While Embassy still believes its recommendations contained Embassy telegram 3, July 5³ and 7, July 7⁴ provide most effective approach towards solving question it will of course exert every effort obtain Saudi acceptance of proposals if Department decides proceed with them. We strongly recommend however Saudi views be ascertained before formal recommendations by President to both sides are made but, if Department wishes, after British views are obtained. Otherwise, use of high channel of message from President for presentation of proposals, which at very least are certain to be unpalatable to Saudis, would in Embassy’s opinion adversely affect whole fabric US relations with Saudi Arabia, including military cooperation.

Jones

1. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. Printed as telegram 682 to London, supra.
3. Document 1524.
4. Not printed. The Embassy reported it agreed with the Department of State that it would be futile to suggest the British plan of mutual withdrawal to Saudi Arabia, since the Deputy Foreign Minister claimed it would be impossible for the Saudis to ask Turki to withdraw and leave the area under British domination. (780.022/7–753)