Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/6–153: Telegram

No. 1176
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Cairo, June 1, 1953—6 p.m.

2512. Following refers to questions raised Deptel 2278.

1. (a) While it is possible that formal Egyptian commitment on defense arrangements may be obtainable in course of negotiations it will depend on whether US–UK tactics are successful in instilling confidence in Egyptians and creating atmosphere which will enable RCC to cooperate publicly with West powers. We must, however, face the fact that any “package deal”² is out of the question. Evacuation must not be made to appear conditional on area defense commitments from Egypt.

(b) I have every confidence that if problem is approached in this way the RCC will prove reasonable particularly as they will be anxious to qualify for military and economic assistance. The other contingency could in any case be provided for, e.g., British could begin withdrawal of combat forces as soon as agreement reached on evacuation and base maintenance but could halt withdrawal short of point of no return if Egyptians proved intransigent. Assuming evacuation phased over some months there would be substantial period in which safely to test RCC intentions and capabilities.

2. (a) Statement in my telegram 999 from Amman was that approaching RCC on bases suggested Deptel 2251³ would utterly destroy existing confidence in US with resultant repudiation their present offer regarding the base.

(b) In elaboration on this statement I should like to remind Department that in eyes of RCC and virtually every Egyptian, continued presence of British Forces on Egyptian soil constitutes illegal aggression (Egyptians consider that 1936 treaty has been repeatedly violated by UK). Russia seems remote and until an Anglo-Egyptian settlement based upon realization of British evacuation is reached British will continue to be enemy number one. In the light of this and other Arab grievances toward the West Egyptians do not feel moral or ideological compulsion to insure Western security requirements nor can they be bought by promises of financial assistance. They are at present interested only in the realization of “national sovereignty.” Those not for them are against them; hence proposed move by US would be seen as US taking sides against them.

(c) US and UK can only win Egyptian cooperation by a combination of adroit psychology and political and (less importantly) material inducements. Since proposal outlined in Deptel 2251 in effect would ask Egypt to concede in advance all the Western desiderata in return for a vague offer of economic and military aid it would simply have convinced the RCC that US and UK speak with one mouth and are not prepared to offer anything like the minimum political and material inducements required.

(d) The RCC has made it clear that extended delay or continued intransigence on part of UK would require them to withdraw their offer for base maintenance and availability as outlined before and during Secretary’s visit and to stand on demand for literally unconditional evacuation. It is my estimate that an approach by me along the lines suggested would destroy the RCC’s hopes for a settlement on terms acceptable to Egyptian Nationalist opinion and have the result predicted in my telegram 999 from Amman.

3. The Egyptians are allergic to any written commitment of any kind at this time. The objective would be to create the political conditions under which the RCC could and would enter into formal commitments with the West. For the US to attempt to push them into written commitments at this juncture would drive the RCC rapidly to a neutralist position.

On the other hand, the officials point out that by agreeing to maintain the base they are effectively putting Egypt on the side of the West. They reiterate their offer to initiate joint staff planning with the US and UK and have said that many practical questions could be settled at that level with avoidance of publicity.

Caffery

1. Repeated to London as telegram 809.
2. See footnote 3, Document 1082.
3. Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.