Office of the Historian

641.74/5–2353: Telegram

No. 1170
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

top secret
niact
Washington, May 23, 1953—2:52 p.m.

1665. For Secretary. Number 7. Noforn. In compliance Secretary’s instructions2 Department attempting formulate recommendations on Egyptian problem for consideration Secretary on his return. Following tentative approach now under working level consideration here. While we fully appreciate opposition this approach might arouse from different viewpoints both London and Cairo, as Secretary has pointed out dangers in present situation call for exploration of new measures to break deadlock and reverse continuing deterioration.

Agreement on basis “package proposals” seems unobtainable.3 Maximum Egypt appears willing accept is base arrangement equivalent to little more than Case C.4 At same time Western security requirements would not be met by evacuation of base in accordance with Case C trusting in vague assurances hitherto given by RCC that it will subsequently conclude agreements required by defense needs of West. Essential smoke out intentions RCC. Request for RCC assurances willingness undertake defense planning with US at this time might be used for this purpose.

In face above following moves suggested:

1)
Prior discussion with UK to obtain its approval procedure outline below.
2)
Approach to Egypt by Caffery requesting explicit written commitment to negotiate and conclude with UK and US, after evacuation British troops agreed to and has started, agreement on following lines:
a)
Full Egyptian cooperation with West in event of war.
b)
Immediate reactivation Suez Canal base in case of war and right of forces of Western powers make full use of base.
c)
Maintenance in peacetime by Western personnel facilities considered essential by JCS and British General Staff for immediate use at outbreak of war.
d)
Facilities and Western personnel involved to be kept to minimum and every effort made train Egyptian personnel. Western personnel to be assigned in guise of training missions.
e)
Commitment to be secret but provide that formal agreement be concluded on above lines before evacuation of British troops.
3)
Resumption and conclusion UK–Egyptian talks on evacuation and future of base in accordance Secretary’s formula (being sent separate telegram to London).5 Start of evacuation UK combat troops.
4)
Conclusion of open agreement covering points listed under 2 but ostensibly unconnected to evacuation. This sequence will provide RCC major political victory and meet its slogan of “unconditional evacuation”.
5)
US economic and military aid to Egypt dependent on conclusion both agreements, and of course on Congressional authorization.
6)
Deferment efforts obtain multilateral Middle East Defense Organization.

Cairo and London comments requested.

Smith
  1. Repeated to Istanbul as telegram 1304, to London as telegram 7550, and to Cairo as telegram 2251. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan.↩
  2. In telegram 4189 from New Delhi, May 20, not printed, the Secretary of State instructed the Department to try to formulate recommendations on the Egyptian problem for his consideration upon his return. (641.74/5–2053)↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 1082.↩
  4. See Document 1061.↩
  5. Secretary of State Dulles’ formula transmitted to London in telegram 7551, May 23, not printed (641.74/5–2353) was the same proposal that he had advanced in telegram 2422 from Cairo, Document 1162.↩