Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 1169
Memorandum of Discussion at the
145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May
20, 1953
eyes only
Present at the 145th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the United States Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, USA (Ret.) (for item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for item 3); the Chief of Naval Operations (for item 3); General Twining for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for item 3); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA (for item 2); Lt. Col. Edward Black, USA (for item 2); Col. Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence informed the Council that the situation in Egypt had lately taken a critical turn. Since Naguib had announced the break-up of the conversations with the [Page 2075] British in a highly inflammatory speech,1 Mr. Dulles feared that the situation might get out of hand before Secretary Dulles could get back from his trip and a decision be reached as to what the United States could do. The essence of the difficulty was the pressure which the extremists were bringing to bear on Naguib, which forced him into positions which he might otherwise avoid. His difficulties were compounded by failure thus far to institute any significant land reforms and by the drop in world-wide cotton prices.
Mr. Dulles then informed the Council of the relative military capabilities of the British and of the Egyptians in the Suez area. It was made clear that, from a strictly military point of view, the British position was much stronger. Their problem was how to protect some 20,000 of their nationals in Egypt in the event of guerrilla warfare and mob action. To make matters worse, the Soviets were assuring the Egyptian Government of all possible support against the “Anglo-American imperialists”. The Ambassador of India in Cairo, Pannikar, was adding to the Russian mischief. The British position in a nutshell, concluded Mr. Dulles, was that their forces in the Suez area constituted the last stronghold of the Western powers in the Middle East. Accordingly, it must be held at all costs. There seemed slight possibility that the British would recede from their position or that Naguib could recede from his. An explosion could therefore occur at any time.
Mr. Dulles also noted that, by court decree of recent date, the Tudeh Party in Iran had become a legal political party. This development indicated further deterioration for the interests of the free world in Iran.2
At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ briefing, the President inquired whether any members of the Council had any idea or inkling of what could be done to save the situation in Egypt.
Secretary Smith replied that at the State Department was preparing an alternative approach which might at least delay an explosion and violence in Egypt.3 It was another package deal involving further concessions to Egypt with respect to the evacuation of British forces. Secretary Smith was far from optimistic that either the British or the Egyptians would buy this new alternative. Indeed, the British were at the moment blaming the United States for failure to join with them at the beginning in negotiations with [Page 2076] the Egyptians on evacuation. They contended, although falsely, that had we joined with them the Egyptians would have been compelled to accept their terms.
The President then inquired whether any plans had been worked out by this Government with regard to what would happen after the British withdrew from Egypt if indeed they did withdraw. Do we expect the Russians to take over? Would the Russians supply the Egyptians with arms? Would we blockade Egyptian ports to prevent these arms from reaching Egypt?
To this and other questions Secretary Smith replied that at the present time the United States had no option but to support the British vis-à-vis the Egyptians. Indeed, our relations with the British Government were at the moment worse than at any time since Pearl Harbor. . . . Moreover, Secretary Smith agreed that the 70,000 British troops in the Suez base and zone represented the only effective fighting force for the free world in the Middle East. Accordingly, we would have to play along with the British for the time being, and take the beating which would inevitably result through our association with an ally whom the Egyptians and other Arab states hated as imperialists.
Reverting to the difficulties this Government was encountering with Mr. Churchill and the serious decline in Anglo-American relations, Secretary Smith stated his belief that Mr. Churchill had had some kind of contact with Moscow, and that as a result of these initiatives in Moscow we might well be confronted in the next few weeks with a Soviet invitation for high-level talks including the French as well as the British and ourselves.
In this contingency, the President replied, it would perhaps be best for us to extend the first invitation and schedule a meeting in Iceland or Greenland. The temperatures there would moderate the heat of the meeting.
The National Security Council:
Discussed the situation in Egypt in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, which also incuded reference to the legalizing of the Tudeh party in Iran.
[Here follow discussion of the volunteer Freedom Corps, an analysis of possible courses of action in Korea, and a report on negotiations with Spain.]
- See telegram 5966 from London, Document 1154, and telegram 2156 to Cairo, Document 1155. Materials regarding these events are in Department of State files 641.74 and 774.00.↩
- Documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the situation in Iran and American interest in the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute is scheduled for publication in volume x.↩
- See telegram 1665, May 23, infra.↩