641.74/5–2553: Telegram
No. 1171
The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to the
Department of State1
niact
999. Following from Caffery. In working up tentative recommendations on Egyptian problem (Deptel 2251 to Cairo)2 Department appears not to have taken sufficient account of following considerations:
- 1.
- Although Western stock is at a low ebb in the Middle East considerable hope now prevails (at least in Egypt) that as result of Secretary’s visit United States will adopt a new role of leadership in this area.
- 2.
- The first and in many ways the crucial test of the incipient renaissance of faith in United States leadership will come in Egypt where the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives is [Page 2079] greatly complicated by the exacerbated state of Egypt’s long-standing dispute with our principal ally.
- 3.
- It is axiomatic that unless UK and US are prepared to contemplate indefinite retention British base facilities by force, Western security requirements can be met only by agreement based on restoration of confidence. Although Egyptians retain some confidence and considerable hope in United States, they have none in Britain. We therefore have double task of confidence-building.
Although I fully agree that Western defense needs cannot be met by “vague assurances” of RCC intentions, it is equally certain that RCC will not and can not give at this juncture written commitment of nature envisaged in Deptel. Approaching them on basis suggested would utterly destroy their existing confidence in the United States the immediate result would be repudiation by the RCC of thier present offer to assure the continued functioning and instant availability of the base. They would then insist on literally unconditional evacuation.
I believe the only productive course will be to proceed with effort to persuade British accept principles contained in Secretary’s original formula with a view to getting Anglo-Egyptian discussions restarted. Any attempt to get written Egyptian commitment on details of defense arrangements before some improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations would merely prejudice hopes for development of satisfactory arrangement in course of future discussions (repeat in course of future discussions).
In other words, I agree fully with Department’s objectives but the only possible way of achieving them is to restart negotiations on basis of Secretary’s original formula, endeavor to recreate measure of confidence between Britain and Egyptians and then at opportune moment work into practical means of arriving kind of arrangements we require.