774.5/3–2453: Telegram
No. 1131
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Egypt1
priority
1883. From the Secretary to Caffery. British Embassy delivered note March 21 stating UK considering renewed approach to Egypt on basis “package proposal.”2 Said UK would not seek to define in advance order discussion five points, but would not sign binding agreement pending satisfactory understandings on all. Note emphasized UK belief success approach depends largely on attitude US, and requested US support in following ways:
Verbatim text. “A. By making it plain to the Egyptian Government that they (US) will provide no further economic or military assistance to Egypt unless the Egyptian Government are prepared to open negotiations on the basis set out above;
“B. By making it clear to the Egyptians that they give their full support to the ‘package proposal’ and that they regard agreements on the five points as interdependent;
[Page 2033]“C. By refraining from giving any indication to the Egyptian Government, while the negotiations are in progress, that they believe anything less than ‘Case A’3 to be acceptable;
“D. By not making any further offer of military or economic assistance to the Egyptian Government pending the outcome of the negotiations, except by agreement with H. M. Government.” End verbatim text.
We have informed British that we wish to be of all possible assistance in their forthcoming discussions with Egyptians. Hence we are willing inform Egyptians on a high level of our own interest in successful outcome these negotiations. Specifically we will stress free world need for an available base in Middle East area as well as need for organization for defense of Middle East as a whole. We are willing in this manner to explain to Egyptians why, from our own point of view, various matters coming up for discussion are in fact interrelated. We also willing to take position at appropriate time that such military assistance as US may be able furnish (over and above present commitments) must of necessity be based upon role Egypt is willing to play in defense of area, as well as progress towards peace in area.
British informed that while we thus have common purpose we cannot agree to tactics involved in above note which would cause US to approach Egyptians with threat that no further assistance could come from us unless they agreed open negotiations. We consider such an approach would retard rather than advance possibility successful negotiations. This should not imply that US has any intentions of offering further assistance to Egypt at this stage. Besides disagreeing with British in principle such approach, it would certainly be awkward to threaten withhold something we don’t plan give in any event. Other side of the coin is that such an approach would imply that if Egyptians opened talks US assistance would be immediately forthcoming. US Government in no position give this impression at present time. He could also not agree in point D to give British veto over our future actions. Here again do not believe there is real difference between us but do not consider any nation should be asked to give up freedom of action in a situation where no one can tell trend of future events.
We have also informed British that we understand their point C in above note implies no change in previous US–UK agreement regarding flexibility on Base problem.
I believe success depends in large part on personal efforts by you in informal behind-scenes conversations to induce Egyptians to consider entire UK presentation, and once negotiations underway, to [Page 2034] reconcile conflicting viewpoints. I know therefore you will make maximum effort, endeavoring especially prevent any hasty Egyptian rejection proposals. Prior formal British action and at earliest feasible moment, request you call on Naguib and present letter from President, text of which will be transmitted in subsequent telegram. I wish you would verbally indicate that US Government has reasons to believe UK prepared open discussions with Egypt in immediate future. US convinced sincerity Birtish intention remove their garrison from the Canal Zone and their wish complete this movement as soon as possible. Problem lies in carrying out this intention in manner consistent with area defense and under circumstances which will not suggest to widespread elements of British opinion that a retreat has been made in face of a challenge, rather than an honorable agreement reached on basis of friendly understanding.
I realize there are involved in these discussions difficult political and public relations problems for both principals but am convinced that frank discussion and statesmanship can see matter through. You should also elaborate upon the President’s message as to why in our opinion there is an inescapable link between what happens as regards evacuation and arrangements for the base and the defense of that area as well as of whole Middle East.
If things go well, it is my hope that at some stage a favorable opportunity may arise to introduce subject of Egyptian-Israeli peace.
- Repeated priority to London as telegram 6341 and by pouch to Paris and Ankara. Drafted and approved by Byroade for transmission after obtaining clearance in draft from the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 1082.↩
- See Document 1061.↩