Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

745W.00/1–3053: Telegram

No. 1089
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret
priority

Washington, February 2, 1953—1:28 p.m.

5104. Re Cairo’s telegram 1742 Jan 29² and London’s telegram 4215 Jan 30.³ “Sudanization” issue as understood here shapes up in essence as Egypt wanting all Brit officials removed from Sudan Govt by end of three year period preceding Sudanese self-determination while UK maintains that should govt posts not filled by Sudanese at end of three years still be held by Brit officials at time of self-determination, Sudanese should then be free decide whether or not retain these officials.

If above correct (your comments welcomed) it then appears that Egyptian position, undoubtedly based on suspicion of Brit motives is unreasonable since it appears undertake make decision which Sudanese Parliament should make. On other hand Brit position if we understand it does not seem realistic to us since they have often made the point that few Brit officials would care to remain in Sudan once political control no longer their’s, since Brit professional future would then be uncertain.

Foreign Office views on importance to final settlement of “Sudanization” issue would be received with interest here as Dept had been under impression that rights of South Sudan were main UK preoccupation.

Increasing reports from Sudan tend to confirm possibility of outbreak of violence in Sudan in event of rupture in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Effect such an outbreak would have in Egypt and Canal Zone not difficult to visualize and our hopes for speedy settlement Anglo-Egyptian problem would be seriously set back. Dept therefore hopes that Embassies London and Cairo will continue to exert every effort prevent failure Sudan negotiations. Embassy London should advise Foreign Office our concern re possibility violence Sudan.

Ambassador Caffery’s effective intervention with Egyptians re Brit compromise formula on South has been valuable. Dept hopes he will be able to continue urge moderation and reasonableness upon Egyptians.

Matthews

1. Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 1561 and repeated to Khartoum as telegram 34.
2. In telegram 1742 from Cairo, Jan. 29, not printed, Caffery reported that Naguib had agreed to examine the formula outlined in paragraph 3 of telegram 3927 from London, Document 1079, as a possible way out of the impasse over the South Sudan. This was a hopeful sign, but Caffery reported that Sudanization was now an equally crucial issue for the British, according to British Ambassador Stevenson. (745W.00/1–2953)
3. The Embassy in London transmitted approximately the same information to the Department in telegram 4215, Jan. 30, not printed, that Caffery had in telegram 1742. (745W.00/1–3053)