745W.00/2–353: Telegram
No. 1090
The Charge in the United Kingdom
(Holmes)
to the Department of State1
4288. Embassy today discussed Sudan problem with Foreign Office in light Deptel 5104 February 2. On basis this and other recent conversations, following Embassy comments may clarify specific points raised by Department:
- 1.
- Department’s understanding “Sudanization” issue essentially
correct as stated Department’s reference telegram. Reasons for
British stand are three-fold:
- (a)
- They do not feel that situation should be created whereby Sudanese would be debarred from retaining experienced British officials at time of self-determination, even though Sudanese might desire keep them. To some extent, British position ties in with problem of south since it is in this area that they feel there will be greatest need for qualified personnel.
- (b)
- British suspect that main reason for Egyptian insistence on removal all British officials is to pave way for Egyptian hegemony at time of self-determination.
- (c)
- For prestige reasons, British would find it most difficult to agree to procedure which would in fact be discriminatory against British nationals by making it impossible for them to continue service with Sudanese Government.
- 2.
- British admit that many and perhaps most Sudan civil servants would not be willing remain after self-determination. Extent to which this would be true would depend in large measure on Sudan’s future status. Closer association to Egypt, less likely British officials would desire remain. Nevertheless, this consideration does not destroy in British eyes validity points set forth (1) above.
- 3.
- In British minds, Sudanization has always been point of approximately vital importance to that of south. Main emphasis has been on south merely because it had appeared earlier that Egyptians [Page 1977] did not have strong views on Sudanization and that problems could probably be worked out (Embtel 3164, December 5).2 With re-statement of hardened Egyptian attitude in recent note, these earlier hopes have been somewhat dissipated and Sudanization problem now seems as difficult of solution as south.
- 4.
-
British indicate concern re possibility violence in Sudan in event breakdown negotiations and have this danger clearly in mind in studying problem. They are also perturbed re possibility outbreaks in south if Governor General’s special responsibilities are given up.
Following additional points also emerged from conversation today:
- 5.
- British encouraged by progress being made in drafting committee on minor points contained in Egyptian note (Cairo’s 1773, February 2).2 Stevenson regards this and other indications as evidence that Naguib sincerely desirous of reaching agreement and Foreign Office inclined agree with Stevenson.
- 6.
- Fawzi has been most helpful in connection subcommittee conversations and in number of other recent problems arising from negotiations. For example, he recently helped obtain recall Commanding Officer Egyptian Forces Sudan for statement inciting Sudanese to violence in event agreement not reached between UK and Egypt.
- 7.
- Howe has now completed first phase his conversations with Sudanese leaders re Egyptian note and re British position (Embtel 4242, January 31).3 Foreign Office says results of consultations are unclear, as expected. SRP leaders appear have considerable doubts re wisdom Agreement, UMMA some doubts and pro-Egyptian parties no doubts at all. Most leaders seem to feel that there would be no problem for Sudanese to obtain subsequent changes in agreement if present provisions do not work. Howe pointed out that this might be difficult since agreement would be between UK and Egypt and Sudanese would not be parties to it.
- 8.
- Egyptian note has been considered by two recent Cabinet sessions here and is before Cabinet again today at which time it will be decided whether send Stevenson new instructions now or whether await results Howe’s further consultations Sudanese leaders.5
In response our inquiry, Foreign Office official to whom we spoke said in greatest confidence that while he could not speak with certainty prior Cabinet decision, he thought it likely UK would find it possible make some further adjustments toward Egyptian point of view.
- Repeated to Cairo as telegram 225 and to Khartoum as telegram 15.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In telegram 4242 from London, Jan. 31, not printed, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office reiterated its assessment that Sudanization and the South Sudan problems represented the two major obstacles to the Sudan settlement. Moreover, the Foreign Office repeated that the principle at stake was whether the Sudanese should be consulted through their own representative Parliament regarding these two points at issue, and the Foreign Office felt strongly that they should. However, the matter was still being studied, no new instructions had been sent to Stevenson, and it was unlikely that any would until Sir James Howe had consulted the Sudanese leaders. (745W.00/1–3153)↩
- Ambassador Caffery reported on Feb. 4 in telegram 1784 from Cairo, not printed, that Stevenson had just received further instructions on the Sudan and had requested a meeting with the Egyptians. According to the British Embassy official, Stevenson was “authorized accept Egyptian version of ‘Sudanization’ with proviso that self-determination shall take place under ‘international supervision.’ In return British will insist on Egyptian acceptance of their proposal on southern safeguards”. (745W.00/2–453)↩