Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

745W.00/1–1653: Telegram

No. 1079
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

top secret

London, January 16, 1953—9 p.m.

3927. Eyes only Secretary and Jernegan. In short farewell conversation with Byroade this evening, Eden expressed strong hope Caffery could be instructed to support Stevenson re latest alternative British suggestions for handling problem of South Sudan. Byroade said we would be glad give careful consideration Eden’s request and asked that formulas be given Embassy officer in further detail than necessarily brief terms in which Eden outlined them.

Foreign Office subsequently outlined to Embassy officer Stevenson’s current instructions as follows:

1. In his meeting with Naguib tomorrow, Stevenson should initially make every effort obtain agreement to formula re South contained latest British draft agreement, text of which we understand British Embassy in Washington has given Department.¹

2. If Naguib unwilling accept (1), Stevenson should suggest that British proposal re South remain as in latest UK draft agreement, but that Sudanese Parliament when convened should make any amendments which it might desire to Article 100 by procedure contained Article 101, i.e., by three-fourths majority vote.

3. If (2) not acceptable to Naguib, Stevenson should suggest that Article 100 be left blank and no special responsibilities for South provided for in draft constitution, but that Sudan Parliament should be asked when convened to write in whatever special safeguards it wants for South, employing Article 101 procedure. Parliament resolution would then be referred back to two governments, each of which must give answer within one month. Unless both agree to contrary, Governor-General shall then make an order amending draft statute in accordance Parliamentary resolutions.

4. If (3) is not acceptable to Naguib, then Stevenson should inform him that in circumstances UK feels it will be necessary to leave any Anglo-Egyptian agreement aside for present and that Governor-General will have to call conference between Northern and Southern leaders to find out what they want.

Alternatives (2) and (4) have not been reduced to texts, but (3) has and can be obtained by the Department from British Embassy Washington.²

Gifford

1. See footnote 2, Document 1074.
2. On Jan. 19, the Department, in telegram 1450 to Cairo, not printed, reported that it had considered alternatives (1), (2), and (3) and believed it was possible for the Egyptians to agree without too much difficulty to one of them. The Department also assumed that Caffery would continue to urge the Egyptians to consider carefully the British proposals and suggested that he hint that Naguib’s request for assistance would be prejudiced by the lack of a Sudan agreement based upon one of these three alternatives. (745W.00/1–1653)