645W.74/11–2852: Telegram
No. 1038
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State1
1315. Brit Amb has sent very lengthy reports rptd to Brit Emb Washington re his discussions on Nov 26 with Naguib on Sudan.
In tel sent yesterday Stevenson informs his govt that negots have now reached point of breakdown unless some concessions can be made on Brit side. This wld have incalculable repercussions not only in Egypt and Sudan but in ME generally. He represents Naguib as convinced that he can make no basic concessions on governor’s advisory commission in view of Egypt public opinion. Naguib insists that he made major prior concession in jettisoning concept of “unity of Nile Valley under Egypt crown” and that, in consequence, he must have at least some public recognition that Egypt control of Sudanese affairs has been restored to position occupied before 1924.2
Brit Amb feels that compromise can be worked out on question of governor’s special powers in case of breakdown of law and order and that Egypts will in substance accept principle of governor’s special powers to protect Sudan. However, Egypts refuse mention south in any public document as special region requiring special treatment as they claim this will vitiate concept of unity of Sudan.
[Page 1901]Brit Amb feels that if his govt will go along a compromise can be reached on formula which wld in effect give veto power to either one of co-domini over actions or recommendations of governor’s commission which might run contrary to governor’s own decisions. Formula wld run that in case where act of governor was overruled by commission or Sudanese Parliament fact of difference in view wld be notified to co-domini and dissenting opinion of advisory commission or Parliament wld not be sustained unless both co-domini agreed.
Another point at issue is phraseology on Egypt proposals of Nov 2 under which self-determination of Sudanese is limited to one of two alternatives: (a) complete independence, or (b) union with Egypt. Brit feel that this is too restrictive and advocate wording which is merely silent on various alternatives of self-determination.
A point yet to be discussed is so-called Sudanization commission proposed by Egypts.
Stevenson urges that his govt yield in its apparently very rigid views on restricting governor’s commission to advisory powers only and that it accept formula outlined above. On point raised by FonOff, London that there has been no consultation with Sudanese as required by previous Brit statements, he advances Egypt argument that in effect, under Article 101 of draft statute, Sudanese Parliament has right to review position and to express its assent or dissent to Anglo-Egypt arrangements for self-govt and self-determination. We have suggested to Brit Emb that possibly an even stronger point is that in effect Naguib has already consulted virtually all shades of Sudanese polit opinion and that he can claim before international opinion that Sudanese were for first time really consulted before Egypt proposals were made to Brit.
Stevenson agrees with me that “it is now or never” for Brit on Sudan. If they allow negots to break down their situation in Sudan will steadily deteriorate and there will be trouble, followed by eventual forced withdrawal.
- Repeated to London as telegram 447, to Khartoum as telegram 25, and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, and to Ankara and the Arab capitals.↩
- In 1924 the British Governor General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was murdered in Cairo (Nov. 19). In swift retaliation the British among other things caused all Egyptian military forces and officers to be withdrawn from the Sudan, and virtually eliminated all Egyptian personnel from the civil administration.↩