774.5/11–2852
No. 1037
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge
of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Affairs (Byroade)
Subject:
- Arms Assistance for Egypt
I talked with Frank Nash and General Olmsted this morning on the arms list which has been submitted to us by General Naguib. I told Mr. Nash that it is important from a political point of view that a small interim program of arms assistance for Egypt be developed [Page 1899] as quickly as possible. I told him that we realized that the development of a large scale program would depend upon more careful analysis of the Naguib list,1 but that we believed a sensible interim program in the magnitude of $10,000,000 could be devised. I suggested that the major share of such an interim program be cash reimbursable but that a small portion should be grant. In this connection I indicated that if Defense could draw up an interim program we could then go to the Egyptians with that and the suggestion that 511(a) agreement be signed.
Mr. Nash instructed General Olmsted to have OFMA draw up as quickly as possible a list of equipment which could be made available within the next several months in the amount of approximately $10,000,000. It was agreed that the important thing is to produce equipment which would have a psychological effect on Egypt, i.e., tanks as opposed to hand grenades. It was also agreed that this Department would send over as soon as possible a letter requesting that Egypt be found eligible for grant assistance. It was suggested that we propose grant assistance for the present fiscal year in the amount of approximately $5,000,000. Mr. Nash said that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would give strong support to such a finding. It was also agreed that it might be necessary to send one or two Ordnance Officers to Cairo to confer with the Embassy and Military Attaché there in connection with the interim program.
With regard to a larger scale program of military assistance, it was felt that either an Egyptian mission should come here or we should send a mission to Egypt to survey more closely Egyptian requirements. General Olmsted suggested that we follow somewhat the same pattern as was followed in drawing up the Yugoslav program. I said that such procedure might be all right in connection with a larger scale program but that to follow this procedure with respect to the immediate program would cause long delays which I did not believe we could afford if the Naguib regime is to be strengthened.
Mr. Nash and General Olmsted felt that more could be done in connection with the Egyptian Army list than with the Air Force list. However, it was agreed that the Air Force people would study the possibilities of some assistance.
With respect to the British, I told Mr. Nash we would hope to work in close coordination with the British and that we would, of course, consult with them in connection with any interim stop-gap program we might devise. I told him that the British seem anxious that we take care of the Egyptian economic problems while the United Kingdom would be responsible for the military program. I [Page 1900] told him that we could not agree to splitting responsibility and that we would hope to deal with economic and military assistance on an integrated basis.
I also raised with Mr. Nash the problem of cotton purchases for our stockpiling program. I explained to him the problem and the urgency of getting some economic aid to Egypt. He gave the necessary instructions that this question be explored immediately with the Munitions Division. I hope to have an answer either today or Monday.
- See Document 1028.↩