Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

645W.74/11–2852: Telegram

No. 1039
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret
priority

Washington, November 28, 1952—1:50 p.m.

3645. Dept has read Cairo’s 1315, Nov. 28, rptd Lon 447, with considerable concern. We had hoped, as set forth in Deptel 3117, Nov. 4, to Lon, rptd Cairo 940,² that it wld be possible for UK to arrive at an early understanding with Egypt re Sudan on basis Naguib’s proposals of Nov. 2. Stevenson’s report that negots have now reached point of breakdown is most alarming since it is clear that breakdown wld gravely prejudice all US–UK efforts now in train or under contemplation to create new relationship between Egypt and West. We had been encouraged by talks between Secy and Eden as latter had expressed himself as favorably inclined toward Naguib’s proposals.

Pls express urgently to FonOff Dept’s grave concern re reported impasse and our hope that Brit will do everything in their power to make agmt with Egypt possible. We are certain that if this opportunity for agmt is allowed to slip out of hand, we shall not soon have another opportunity to settle Sudan problem and open way to agmt with Egypt on other matters. We recognize UK desire to have as “tight” an agmt with Egypt as possible, but it will not be possible in practice to produce an agmt which is 100% acceptable to all. Therefore in the interests of reaching agmt with Egypt which wld have so many favorable repercussions, confidence in the Egyptians in the form of concessions wld seem to be indicated.³

Bruce

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1121 and to Khartoum as telegram 8. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.
2. Not printed.
3. In telegram 3152 from London, Dec. 5, not printed. Ambassador Gifford informed the Department that he had spoken to Eden the previous evening along the lines of telegram 3645 and emphasized to him that if the present opportunity were lost, it would be a severe and perhaps fatal setback to Western objectives in Egypt and in the Near East in general. Eden was conscious of these considerations and thought that considerable progress had been made in the negotiations; moreover, Eden was optimistic that an agreement could soon be reached over the Sudan. (645W.74/12–552)