784A.5/8–754: Telegram
No. 854
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Israel1
72. Resumed conversation between Secretary and Israeli Ambassador today (re Deptel 61)2 covered following ground:
- 1.
-
Secretary said he had been impressed by Ambassador’s statements regarding Israel’s isolation. He wondered if it would be any advantage to Israel to have an exchange of notes with US in which we would reiterate our policy, which had been approved by NSC, of being prepared cut off all military or economic assistance to any country in Near East area undertaking aggression and would say that if any military imbalance should develop endangering Israel we would be prepared at least to consider military aid program for her and to seek funds from Congress for that purpose. Eban said he would have to think about this and would wish consult his Government during his forthcoming consultations in Israel. Offhand, he thought such exchange would be helpful provided it contained some concrete assurance that military aid to Arabs would be balanced by military aid to Israel. Ideally, Israel would like have promise aid negotiations would begin simultaneously or nearly so with Egyptian negotiations. Such promise need not be made publicly.
Secretary said he did not exclude possibility asking next Congress for military aid funds for Israel provided by that time we convinced military imbalance was developing. Emphasized he had not had time discuss suggested exchange of notes with President, or military or Congressional leaders. Thought it might be possible include something more than mere restatement generalities regarding our policy.
- 2.
- Eban said he had communicated with Sharett and was authorized say it incorrect assume Israel presently equal to Arabs in military equipment. Israel had been very careful avoid letting this be known since it was obviously to its advantage have Arabs believe in Israeli military superiority, and he asked that we keep this information very confidential. Asserted that in aircraft, artillery and tanks, Israel was inferior to Egypt alone. If all Arab States taken together, disparity much greater. For example, Arabs had three times as much artillery. Anything at all given to Egypt would add [Page 1605] to already existing imbalance. Ambassador admitted Israel had some advantage in greater efficiency her forces and some psychological advantage in Arab fear of her strength but said this not sufficient protection.
- 3.
- Secretary emphasized his personal conviction that policy US following in Near East is to benefit of Israel. He believed policy is being successful in softening Arab attitudes towards Israel. Contrary to Ambassador’s statements, he found no evidence of increasing hostility in Egypt. Latest statements by Naser disclaimed hostile intentions. Secretary wanted Israel Government to know US Administration will not consider its Near East policies successful unless they result in Arab-Israel peace. Israelis may disagree with our methods and might prefer that we adopt more direct approach. This would be honest difference of opinion. He hoped, however, Israeli’s would accept his statement of our motives and objectives. Eban replied he did not question aim of our policy but only wisdom of certain actions. Did not ask that we change policy but only that we preserve Israel’s faith in West by balancing favors to Arabs with acts favorable to Israel.
- 4.
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Ambassador raised question of Suez blockade with specific reference to harm done Israel by cutting-off of oil supplies to Haifa refinery. Recalled past arguments that this was academic because Arab producing states would not permit oil to flow to Haifa even if Canal blockade raised. Said this situation altered by signing of Iranian oil agreement. Israel believed Iran would sell oil to her. In this light could not US take this up with Egypt? Need not be connected with Suez Base Agreement and Egyptian action to relax restrictions need not be publicly announced. US should insist on this as condition to starting proposed new economic aid program to Egypt. Would be illogical to launch program to strengthen economy of area while at same time permitting Egypt continue practice which weakened area economy.
Secretary said we might be able do something on this score but could not make it condition to extending economic aid to Egypt. We had promised such aid more than year ago if Suez settlement reached. Could not now go back on that promise.
- 5.
- Jernegan observed US Government could find no evidence whatsoever of any intent on part of any Arab State to reopen hostilities with Israel in near future. Said this diminished urgency of any action re military imbalance which Israelis feared. Eban agreed Israelis own estimates showed no early danger of military attack but argued that announcements of military aid to Arabs justified fears for future and created immediate politico-psychological crisis and need for re-assurance.
After leaving Secretary’s office, Eban remarked he was encouraged by this conversation.
- Sent by pouch to London, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad.↩
- Document 851.↩