Office of the Historian

641.74/8–454: Telegram

No. 851
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel1

secret
Washington, August 4, 1954—7:20 p.m.

61. During call on Secretary August 4 Israeli Ambassador made following points:

1.
Suez Base Agreement was of revolutionary importance for Israel as well as Near East as whole and IG felt obliged discuss repercussions with US and UK. Circumstances settlement along with other recent developments had produced mood deep concern and apprehension in Israel.
2.
Israel however did not oppose Suez Agreement in principle. Considered it triumph of negotiation and could understand its welcome in Egypt, US and UK. Nevertheless it could have by-products damaging to Israel:
a.
On military side fact evacuation of Canal Zone by British removed existing restraint on Egyptian forces and destroyed utility Sinai area as buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore inheritance by Egypt of base facilities would increase her military power. This would be accentuated if Egypt received military aid from US. Such aid would be especially disturbing following on heels military aid agreement with Iraq.
b.
On political side settlement occurs at time when Egyptians have become more threatening toward Israel and high officials [Page 1601] have made statements that settlement freed their hands regarding Israel.
3.

Settlement being made without obtaining any assurance Egypt would desist from illegal Suez blockade of Israeli trade.

Most troublesome element is that proposed military aid to Egypt and other US actions favoring Arabs being taken without any compensating move favoring Israel. When US promised arms to Pakistan we offered discuss similar arrangement with India. No such offer being made in present case. Furthermore Israel was totally lacking in any sort of reliable guarantee. Could not take tripartite declaration as adequate because it lacks any specific obligation on parties. Is not binding and is already undermined by change in balance being brought about through military assistance to Iraq and Egypt.

5.
If Israel left facing hostile neighbors and US continues present negative attitude Israel likely become nervous embattled armed camp obsessed with military preparedness at expense economic and social progress.
6.

Israel thinks it reasonable ask for at least three things:

a) Grant military aid to balance that given Arabs; b) firmer guarantees against aggression; and c) lifting of Suez blockade.

Secretary replied as follows to Eban’s remarks:

1.
Could understand why Israel might feel disturbed over developments but she should realize that while we trying to help achieve Suez settlement we never intended it to prejudice position of Israel. Situation in Egypt had been alarming, close to war. Its perpetuation would have produced evils in much of world.
2.
At first sight certain by-products of settlement might not seem favorable to Israel but anticipated dangers not immediate. British evacuation would take about two years.
3.
Israel should be aware of US concern for her future which was such we would not for one moment tolerate action by her neighbors to injure her. According our information Israel today is much stronger than her combined neighbors. We do not intend alter ratio to make them stronger than Israel.
4.
US intends stand back of tripartite declaration. We prepared honor it and react under it against aggression. Even though it is not possible commit ourselves in advance to military action without consent of Congress financial and economic measures are within power of Executive. Israel can be confident we would take such measures if necessary and would consider further action. We probably could do no more even if we had treaty with Israel.
5.
Basic friendship American people for Israel is well known and unique so far as Near East concerned. Nothing has happened to change that friendship. Israel need not feel alone or abandoned.
6.
It is true removal of strains on Arab states may strengthen them but Israel cannot expect us perpetuate those strains just to keep Arabs weak vis-à-vis Israel. Our program of arms for Iraq designed promote situation in area basically favorable to Israel. Secretary emphasized this to Jamali recently. We will carefully examine proposed arms program for Egypt, which is likely to be minor in character and will not shift power balance.

Secretary promised give further study points made by Ambassador and suggested they have another meeting before Eban’s departure. (This meeting scheduled August 7.)

Dulles
  1. Sent by pouch to London, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad.↩