Office of the Historian

611.84A/7–1654

No. 842
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Burdett)

secret
[Washington,] July 16, 1954.

Subject:

  • Israel

Participants:

  • Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
  • General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff, Israel Defense Forces
  • Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
  • NEA—Mr. Byroade
  • NE—Mr. Burdett

Mr. Byroade welcomed General Dayan to the United States and inquired whether he had any special points to raise. The General [Page 1589] replied that he had come for a tour of military establishments and not to discuss political matters.

Mr. Byroade presented an outline of present United States thinking towards Middle Eastern problems, and expressed hope that Israel would feel able to cooperate with the United States in working towards long term solutions. He mentioned particularly: the increasing communist danger to the area, not through open attack, but through subversion, which almost succeeded in Iran; the concept of the “northern tier”; the growing reaction in Congress to what appeared to be Israel efforts to obstruct the creation of defensive strength in the area; the small quantity of arms going to Iraq, which, as the General knew, could not affect Iraq’s military potential for a considerable period; the United States conviction that Iraq would not use the weapons for aggressive purposes; the necessity for the United States to increase its influence in the Arab states as a prerequisite to encouraging arrangements between them and Israel; the belief that Egypt afforded the best prospects of leading the way towards some sort of an arrangement with Israel; United States opposition to, and the harmful effects of, Israel’s policy of force; the setbacks to prospects for area stability resulting from Qibya; the United States apprehension that Israel at any time might launch a major attack; the deplorable Israeli campaign against the UNTSO, stressing the unfavorable effect in the United States.

The principal points made by General Dayan were as follows:

1.
The United States appeared to be seeking the goodwill of the Arabs at the expense of Israel. The Israel public was worried, not by the positive United States attitude towards the Arabs, but by the negative attitude towards Israel. The United States seemed intent on making Israel weak while making the Arabs strong. An example is United States support for a Jordan River Development Plan which would have the effect of depriving Israel of water which would not benefit the Arabs but merely go to waste in the Dead Sea.
2.
Israel did not anticipate an armed attack by the Arab countries in the immediate future but was concerned over this possibility in five to ten years time. United States arms shipments to Iraq were bad principally because of their psychological effect in the absence of similar shipments to Israel.
3.
The situation on the border has shown definite improvement since Qibya. Only after Qibya did the Jordanians take effective measures to curb infiltration. (The General inferred that the improvement is a result of the Israel policy of force.) The Egyptian border now gives greater concern than the Jordanian. The replacement of Egyptian troops by trained Palestinian refugees has contributed to insecurity.
4.
The General inquired if Israel would be required to pay for the improvement of United States relations with Egypt by giving up a [Page 1590] corridor through the Negev. (Mr. Byroade expressed astonishment at the suggestion.) General Dayan stated that he felt that Egypt should eventually relinquish the Gaza Strip and absorb the refugees since the Strip would always be a cause of friction.

Ambassador Eban mentioned the British statement warning Israel against an attack on Jordan, and stated that no similar firm guarantees which could command public confidence were available to Israel. The Ambassador indicated Israel would welcome a guarantee which could be relied upon. General Dayan expressed concurrence. Mr. Byroade stated that the United States is determined to prevent any Arab effort to eliminate Israel and that he was certain the United States would employ troops if necessary. He added that the question of a guarantee was still under study.

Ambassador Eban asserted that he felt Prime Minister Sharett agreed with the view that Egypt offered the best propsects for some arrangement with the Arab states. However, he thought that a Suez Base agreement, which did not take into account Israel’s interests, would produce an even stronger reaction in Israel than the United States arms agreement with Iraq. The Ambassador said that Israel already had advanced suggestions to the United Kingdom regarding how the effect of the Suez Base agreement on Israel could be minimized. He expressed a desire to discuss this in the near future with the United States. Mr. Byroade voiced concern over a possible outcry in Israel and the hope that Israel would not react in a manner prejudicing the chances of doing business with Egypt. He stated that the United States would be glad to discuss the matter with Israel.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Byroade stated that he hoped to see General Dayan again after his tour.