Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/7–1654: Telegram

No. 843
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

confidential

Washington, July 23, 1954—8:10 p.m.

41. Banat Yaacov Embassy’s 62.² We concur in suggestion your last paragraph you approach Sharett informally re recommencement project in demilitarized zone. We assume you will wish couch approach in terms of effect recommencement work in demilitarized zone on our hopes for success Johnston negotiations. For your guidance however and for use your discretion when and if necessary our views on resumption demilitarized zone work and steps we would have to take if work resumed are as follows:

1. While we feel it in Israel’s and the area’s best interest not have any work on project going on for time being our major concern is that Israel not attempt recommence any work in demilitarized zone. Israel’s good faith in attempting cooperate with Johnston Mission reach Jordan Valley accord can be most clearly demonstrated by indication it does not propose attempt any work in demilitarized zone for some time.

2. Obviously work already done in demilitarized zone is designed for substantial Jordan diversion out of basin as well as for hydroelectric development. Israelis and Arabs both know we maintain country is entitled to divert its allotted waters out of basin if it so desires. We have reason hope Arabs will eventually agree this point but resumption now or in near future would impair or destroy this possibility.

3. Resumption work in demilitarized zone can only be undertaken with permission Chief of Staff of UNTSO or SC or through agreement between Syria and Israel. Recommencing work in absence such permission would be as Israelis know serious blow to Johnston Mission. Accordingly if it were undertaken US could legitimately assume recommencement done in full appreciation consequences. Implicit in such action would be decision by Israel to jeopardize deliberately chances Jordan Valley agreement.

4. While SC’s examination Banat Yaacov case not now “urgent” it clear to us purpose October 27 resolution was work in demilitarized zone should be suspended pending SC debate. Since SC still seized with case we believe Israel must consider itself bound by resolution. However even were case no longer before SC work could proceed only with permission Chief of Staff UNTSO. October 27 resolution would require Chief of Staff report unauthorized work recommencement to SC, with certain result of renewed “urgent” examination of case.

5. If work is recommenced in the demilitarized zone without conditions in 3 above being met US will be left no alternative but view Israel as defying SC and Chief of Staff. Accordingly we would be forced take this position publicly in SC support any SC action which enforced its authority and give consideration to other measures.

Dulles

1. Repeated to New York; sent by pouch to Damascus.
2. Telegram 62 from Tel Aviv, July 16, described a visit to Banat Yaacov by a U.S. Operations Mission water expert, and described factors which might motivate Israel to resume construction in the demilitarized zone. The last paragraph of telegram 61 stated that “on balance, Embassy believes possibility of IG moving to raise issue or of surprise commencement of work in demilitarized zone is sufficient to warrant informal approach to Prime Minister with expression of hope that IG will not deal blow to prospects of agreement on regional plan by such action.” (683.84A322/71654)