Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

611.80/6–1754

No. 835
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Dorsey)¹

confidential

[Washington,] June 17, 1954.

Subject:

• (1) Statements of U.S. Policy in the Near East, (2) The Tripartite Declaration, and (3) Israeli Purchase of Jets

Participants:

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
• Mr. Meier Sherman, Director, Israel Government Economic Services in U.S.
• NEA—Mr. Byroade
• NE—Mr. Dorsey

I. Following his request that the present rate of aid be maintained during F. Y. 1955, Ambassador Eban asked that Mr. Byroade consider the grave implications of repeated statements to the effect that population pressures will bring about an expansion of Israeli territory. He said that it has been said that responsible Israeli leaders claim the population should increase to four million within the next several years. Although Mr. Byroade in his Philadelphia speech had mentioned Arab fears of an expansion of Israeli territory, he had also said that in his opinion this fear was not realistic. Too many others, he added, emphasized the Arab fears without Mr. Byroade’s important qualification and referred specifically to Mr. Gardiner’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Ambassador Eban emphasized that these official statements implied a lack of trust in Israel’s commitment to the “boundaries” set forth in the Armistice Agreement. This lack of trust is grotesque, he said, when Israel is willing to sign a peace treaty tomorrow and the Arabs are not. They, on the contrary, have a serious desire to reduce the size of Israel. The Ambassador went on to say that the claim that Israel cannot expand to two or three million persons within its present territory shows a lack of knowledge of the rudimentaries of economics. The extensive, empty regions of the country and potential greater per capita production make practical Israel’s ability to support the larger population. Israel, after all, is in no way as densely populated as Denmark and Belgium. “To invite the Arabs to fear Israel is to invite them to hate Israel,” he said.

Mr. Byroade replied that he had no regrets with regard to his own statement, which he had listed both Israeli intentions and the facts as he knew them as reasons why he did not believe Arab fears were justified. As to the other statements, he would take steps to see that nothing was said on this subject in the future without his personal clearance.

Ambassador Eban said that he hoped Mr. Byroade would find it possible to say that Israel’s population density is not a serious problem and that the U.S. believes Israel is sincere in its intention to maintain the integrity of the frontier as an international demarcation line. He also felt that in any future statements of U.S. policy before Committees of the Congress that balance will be maintained so that it will not appear that as far as the U.S. is concerned Israel must make all the efforts toward peace while nothing is required of the Arabs.

II. Mr. Eban then stated that there had been recent indications in the press that this Government might be giving consideration to a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Tripartite Declaration. He said that he would like to present his own thinking on the matter which could be considered as authentic, subject of course to Cabinet discussion and findings. Mr. Byroade replied that there had been no discussions of the matter other than those in Ankara which he had mentioned both to Ambassador Eban and to the British. He did not know where the original press story from Ankara originated. He did, however, find the idea of reaffirmation and strengthening attractive and had hoped that Ambassador Eban would have a similar reaction.

Ambassador Eban then stated that there were two alternative possibilities: 1) to restate the Tripartite Declaration as is, and 2) to go beyond it and indicate that armed force would be used in support of the Declaration. These, he said, are two very different matters. As for the first, he doubted that reiteration strengthened the original Declaration. Actually, a repetition probably weakened it somewhat. Moreover, if the U.S. considered reaffirmation as a balance against arming the Arab States, Israel would have to reject the concept. “Arms for the Arabs and assurances for Israel” hardly result in a decent equilibrium. The second alternative, on the other hand, is a revolutionary step which he felt could not be effective if it were done unilaterally without consultation with the interested parties. Furthermore, he pointed out, a treaty is involved—the Charter of the UN. Under that treaty intervention is subject to two conditions: first, the invitation of the country which has been attacked, and secondly, the request of the UN under the enforcement provisions of the Charter. The Secretary of State recently gave these conditions as a basis for intervention in Indo-China and in the Ambassador’s opinion they certainly presented far broader implications.

He believed that the Israeli reaction to such a proposal would be positive, but only within the proper framework. If you are thinking of a security guarantee, he said, you are thinking about a treaty and the international judicial repercussions must be fully considered. Mr. Byroade then said that we had never had any idea of ignoring the UN and he had only recently discussed the importance of maintaining peace in the area with the Secretary General. Ambassador Eban commented that he was sure that the goal of a security guarantee was a good one, but how to do it presented a dilemma. Mr. Byroade asked whether Mr. Eban envisaged some sort of document, to which Ambassador Eban replied that some sort of instrument between the guarantors and other directly interested parties was essential. Mr. Byroade stated that he was sure that the U.S. would have no trouble arriving at such an instrument with Israel. How to attain it with the other interested parties presented greater difficulties. His own thought was that the document must be something which would be approved by Congress. Mr. Eban then stated that he had heard of another possibility—the specific mention of the use of economic measures alone. He said that the very exclusion of any reference to force might give the impression that the guarantors were not willing to go so far as to use force.

Mr. Byroade then assured the Ambassador that we were not about to take any action without talking to the Israel Government and he urged him to give further thought to the matter and to give him the benefit of any ideas which he might have.

III. The Ambassador then indicated to Mr. Byroade that his Government had located a Canadian manufacturer of the jet airplanes which they wished to purchase in Canada and then the Canadian Government was expected to make no objection to the sale. Since the U.S. would not make the sale itself, would it obstruct any action by Canada? Mr. Byroade stated that if Canada and Israel could make a deal it is a matter of their concern—he felt that he must avoid any positive acts by this Government. If Canada informs us that they are manufacturing the jet planes, he would be disposed not to reply to their letter. Mr. Byroade added that basically he felt this was an excessive expenditure for military matériel—a point of view with which Israel disagreed. If Israel can make the expenditure without positive action by this Government, that is Israel’s business. Ambassador Eban pointed out that aircraft did not last forever and that if replacements must be made, Israel wished to make them the most effective possible. Mr. Byroade commented that he believed the planes in which Israel was interested were also manufactured under license in Australia and perhaps other Commonwealth countries. Mr. Shiloah then asked whether our refusal to make planes available to Israel applied only to jets. Mr. Byroade replied that this whole conversation applied only to the present issue of F–86 jets.

1. Drafted also by Assistant Secretary Byroade.