Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

120.280/6–1754: Telegram

No. 834
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

secret

Cairo, June 17, 1954—1 p.m.

1564. From Johnston.

1. Discussions with Arab committee which started June 13, recessed evening June 16, with confidential agreement they be resumed in Cairo June 24, upon my return from Tel Aviv. Atmosphere has been most cordial throughout. Talks opened with review by Arabs and presentation of Arab plan. I replied by indicating areas of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty between Arab and unified plans. Remaining sessions devoted efforts reconcile two plans.

2. Final session consideration was given to four crucial points in attempt achieve agreement in principle.

a. Allocation of water. It was generally agreed that the quantities of water allocated to the four riparian states would approximate those indicated in unified plan. Adjustments will be made to meet needs of Lebanon on Hasbani and of Syria at Banias, Boteiha, and Yarmuk Plateau as indicated in Arab plan.

b. Use of water outside of watershed. I sought Arab agreement in principle to proposition that once allocations of water had been made, they could be used in places and for purposes determined by the states to which allotted. I insisted that unless I could assure Israel that she would get as much water as provided in the unified plan, and that she could then use it on coastal plain or elsewhere, there was no hope at all of Israel agreement. Consequences would be perilous to all concerned. Arabs continue officially to adhere firmly to position that water must be used in the basin with no export to other areas. Their overt postures could not appear more intransigent. We have had private indications from committee members and top Egyptians, however, that Arabs might give ground on this point if Israel accepts other elements of unified development proposals. There is evidence Arabs feel necessity remain tough on this point now in order enhance their bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel.

c. Storage on Yarmuk. Committee pressed for maximum storage on Yarmuk with only flood waters going into Tiberias. Stated such storage on Yarmuk was essential HKJ security since otherwise with major storage in Tiberias, HKJ in position where Israel could at anytime destroy HKJ crops by denying Tiberias water for relatively brief period. After thorough discussion this point we reached tentative understanding that provision would be made to store sufficient water on Yarmuk to meet HKJ’s desires for emergency irrigation supply. Decision as to location and magnitude of such storage must await engineering determination. We indicated we would think along lines of providing sufficient Yarmuk storage to irrigate lower valley for two to three-week period should emergency arise and Tiberias water denied to HKJ.

d. International supervision. Early in meetings, after Arabs had indicated they would accept some degree of international supervision, we presented them with copies of draft declaration along lines that contained in Department’s briefing paper. This provoked immediate and decidedly negative reaction. Arabs took this as indicating US withdrawing from negotiations and turning project over to UN. Arabs made abundantly plain they had more confidence in motives and integrity of US than in UN which had proved sore disappointment. After discussion tentative understanding reached that as soon as principles and essential elements of a valley development program had been agreed upon with US, the riparian states would take measures, through UN, to establish an international control authority to supervise execution and operation of valley program. In other words Arabs do not wish approach UN until effective agreement has been reached under US aegis.

3. Comment: I leave Cairo much encouraged at prospect obtaining Arab cooperation in integrated valley development. Role of Egyptians in providing effective, sympathetic, and constructive leadership has been most valuable and obviously based on sincere desire be helpful to US in this matter. Now appears unnecessary and undesirable conduct negotiations with Arabs except in Cairo. Expression of committee’s confidence in US in view of past public and press statements also helpful sign.²

Caffery

1. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Baghdad, and Jidda.

2. Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 1565, June 17, as follows:

   “Embtel 1564, June 17 from Johnston failed to include reference made by Arabs to their strong desire that his own leadership in Jordan Valley negotiations continue. This expression is genuine.” (120.280/6–1754)

   Assistant Secretary Byroade sent a copy of telegram 1565 as an attachment to a memorandum to Secretary Dulles of June 19 which reads:

   “Eric Johnston’s discussions with the Arab Committee in Cairo went well, and he is now in Tel Aviv. He expects to return to Cairo for further talks with the Arabs after his meeting with the Israelis.

   “The meeting with the Arabs appears to have been quite successful. The one point that surprised me was Arab concern that the US might withdraw from the negotiations and turn the matter over for further follow up to the Secretary General of the United Nations. They agreed that this was desirable at a later date when an international control authority should be set up but wished the US to carry the ball until that time.

   “The above was a surprise to me as well as the attached cable, which I think you will find interesting.” (120.280/6–1754)