784A.5622/6–354
No. 830
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State
Subject:
- Israel request to purchase American jet aircraft.
Some time ago the Israelis approached me with a request that we allow them to make a commercial purchase of 24 F–86 jet fighters. The only act required by the United States Government would be to grant export licenses.
The Israelis explained their desire to purchase these aircraft as part of a modernization of equipment scheme for their airforce. They propose to dispose of 80 obsolete aircraft presently being maintained. In view of budget restrictions they envisaged actually receiving the 24 new aircraft over an extended period of time.
In response to my query they stated the transaction would be of a secret military character and they could guarantee that no initial publicity would result.
My first reaction to this proposition was that we should give our approval. I have been in fact searching for some way to reassure the Israelis and was therefore tempted to go ahead. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I cannot conscientiously recommend such a course to you, as I believe it clearly against United States over-all interests in the Middle East. This I believe to be true for the following reasons:
- (a)
- Grant of permission to Israel to purchase American jets at this time might seriously compromise the possibilities of ultimately achieving the political objectives of our Iraq program, i.e. Iraqi participation in Middle East defense and the break up of the negativism of the Arab League.
- (b)
- I do not trust the Israelis as regards publicity and it would appear to the area that Israel by different methods was going to receive more potent weapons than we planned to give Iraq under our new agreement.
- (c)
- The United States contemplates no jet aircraft in its military assistance to the Middle East. If we should change our mind in this regard the Israel request should, of course, be reconsidered.
- (d)
- Even with the disposal of obsolete aircraft in greater numbers, 24 F–86’s would materially increase Israel’s potential. Israel’s present airforce capability probably exceeds the capabilities of all the Arab states put together.
- (e)
- At the recent conference of Ambassadors at Istanbul, our feeling was confirmed that the real danger today lies in some foolish move on the part of Israel. The Ambassadors saw no evidence whatsoever that an Arab move was in the cards.
- (f)
- The Israel military authorities have maintained and to some extent increased a deliberate policy of retaliation which is not overruled by the civil government.
I transmitted the Israeli request to the Pentagon where it is still under discussion. My letter of transmittal indicated that the State Department would probably desire to comply with the Israeli request for political reasons. Conversation with officials at the Pentagon however indicates that they are quite opposed. The military objection is in fact more political than military. They feel that this move would react against us in the Middle East and specifically they feel it may affect the matter of present and prospective base rights in the area, including Saudi Arabia and Libya. They will probably leave a loop-hole in their reply to us however so that we can overrule them on political grounds if we feel it necessary to do so. Unfortunately I have concluded that our own political evaluation, except of course from the viewpoint of Israel itself, coincides with rather than differs from the military point of view.
In view of the above I request that I be authorized to inform the Israel Ambassador that the United States cannot grant approval to this request at this time. They will thereupon purchase jets elsewhere, probably from the Swedes or the British. Our refusal will not mean, therefore, that Israel will be denied these weapons, but it will mean that the United States will not suffer throughout the Middle East from this sale.
If you agree with the above I will try to find other ways of satisfying, to some extent, the feeling of the Israelis that we do not wish to work with them on military matters. They have asked for certain less dangerous weapons which I believe we can go ahead with. When General Dayan visits here in the near future we will try to see that he does not leave with the impression that we are uninterested in their military capabilities on the side of the West, etc.1
- Secretary Dulles initialed his approval of this memorandum.↩