780.5/6–854
No. 831
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Affairs (Byroade)
Subject:
- Israeli matters
Participants:
- Ambassador Eban
- Minister Shiloah
- Mr. Byroade—NEA
I called upon the Ambassador and Mr. Shiloah at the Ambassador’s residence at 5:00 P.M. on June 8th. His request to see me was based upon the desire to know more about our policy thinking in view of the Istanbul Conference.
I explained to Eban rather fully the feeling of the conference on defense matters as reported in the Istanbul paper. The Ambassador seemed somewhat reassured by my remarks as it indicated that we do not plan to grant armed assistance indiscriminately to Arab States regardless of their intentions upon joining a defense organization in the Middle East. I explained that Egypt was of course an exception as we were publicly committed at the highest level to give Egypt some assistance subsequent to their agreement with the British.
The Ambassador stated that he had spoken to Prime Minister Menderes about these problems during the latter’s recent visit here. What Menderes had told him fitted closely with my remarks and he assumed therefore that the US and Turkey were in close agreement on these matters. The Prime Minister had indicated to Eban that it was not Turkey’s intention to ignore the defense potential of Israel when that could be arranged. It was only a tactical matter of the moment which led them to believe any open participation by Israel would be a mistake. Eban asked if this reflected our views. I stated that it did.
Turning to the Arab-Israeli problem, I indicated our concern at the situation along the border and told Eban that we and the British, and perhaps the French, were going to endeavor to do what we could with the parties concerned outside the United Nations. Certain discussions with Jordan on technical matters as to how to improve the actual border situation had already taken place and Israel would probably be contacted in the near future. Eban stated that the British Ambassador had informed him of this fact. I declined to respond to Eban’s request for any details as to our talks with Jordan.
Eban stated that Menderes had also stated that Turkey was considering joining in the tripartite declaration at the invitation of the United States. Eban apparently felt that a development in this regard was imminent and seemed pleased at the thought that Turkey might join in a guarantee of the status quo. I told Eban that the invitation had not come from us but that Turkey had in fact expressed a willingness to join in such a move. This was under consideration but no positive steps had been taken as yet.
[Page 1575]Ambassador Eban asked what our reaction was to the purchase by Israel of 24 F–86 jet aircraft. I informed him that we had made a decision as a Government that it would not be possible for us to accede to this request at this time. The Ambassador stated that they did not wish to make such a huge outlay of money for aircraft that were already partially obsolete, such as British Meteors or Swedish aircraft. Would we therefore object if they purchased the aircraft through Canada with Canadian export licenses? I replied that these particular aircraft were made by an American subsidiary and I would assume the export licenses would have to be from the United States. Eban stated he did not believe this to be the case but that he knew the Canadian Government would request the views of the US. He did not wish, therefore, to approach the Canadian Government without knowing our views. I told him I would look into the matter and let him know.
Mr. Shiloah then raised the question of guarantees on the Suez Canal and the possible activation of the Suez Base to be used against Israel if the British pull their forces out of Egypt. I told him the agreement between the UK and Egypt was a technical one with the exception of a possible short preamble which already included a reference to the Suez Canal. I stated I would be strongly opposed to any attempt to inject new issues into that agreement itself at this time. If the Israelis had specified suggestions as to how their concern could be handled outside of the agreement itself, I would be glad to study them. Mr. Shiloah said they did have such specific suggestions, which they had already passed to the British and that he would like to discuss them with me next week. I agreed to set up a time.
Ambassador Eban then referred to their disappointment over the low level of our illustrative aid presented to Congress for the next fiscal year. He stated that he agreed that economic progress had been made in Israel but thought they could prove upon economic grounds the wisdom of continuing the aid at least at the same level for the next fiscal year. I told Eban that we had arrived at our illustrative figure solely upon economic grounds and not political. I stated in general our desire to get away from what now appears to be the policy of equality of assistance to Israel on the one hand and the rest of the Middle East on the other, but that our decision had not been based upon this political viewpoint. He stated he and his economic people wished to make a presentation to Stassen to attempt to justify more assistance next year on economic grounds. I stated we would be interested in hearing such a presentation.