684A.85322/6–254
No. 829
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Politico-Economic Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs (Gardiner)
Subject:
- Jordan Valley Developments
Participants:
- At the Office of the Secretary General of the UN:
- The Secretary General of the United Nations
- Mr. Andrew Cordier
- Assistant Secretary Byroade
- Ambassador Wadsworth
- Ambassador Johnston
- Mr. Gardiner, State
- Mr. Barnes, FOA
Mr. Johnston in opening the meeting suggested, if it were possible to obtain agreement in principle to the Unified Plan, that the subject be turned over to the United Nations for further detailed negotiations, and hoped that the Secretary General would agree to this course. Mr. Johnston defined “agreement in principle” to mean statements by the countries concerned that the water from the Jordan River should be shared by the countries through which it flows, on an equitable basis. The United States and Mr. Johnston would continue to be prepared to do all that could be done to further this project. Mr. Johnston also hoped that progress would result from the Cairo and Tel Aviv talks.
The Secretary General personally stated that a direct reply was difficult, as the United States appeared to be making a new tactical approach. The basic concern of the United Nations at this time arises over the issues involving the dispute over the diversion at Jisr Banat Yaqub. This faces the UN with certain political as well as practical problems. The Secretary General considered that an agreement of this kind mentioned by Mr. Johnston could be rated to the issues involving Jisr Banat Yaqub, and considered that Mr. Johnston’s proposals might ease the situation rather than confuse it. The Secretary General, however, was skeptical of the possibility of any considerable achievement at this time, particularly as the ideas of the Arabs were so negative.
In response, Mr. Johnston reaffirmed that there was more optimism in U.S. circles, as there seemed to be a basis for negotiations, and both sides, Israel and Arab, had indicated the desire to explore possibilities.
The Secretary General replied that his pessimism ran into the UN role as a whole in the area, rather than to manipulating the TVA plan. On the point of bringing such an issue to the UN, the Secretary General had no objection, but said that he must add a note of pessimism in view of the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations in the Security Council and General Assembly. On the other hand, he saw no other agency available to tackle the problem of the Jordan waters, agreed that the solution must be an international one, and, while skeptical of the ability of the UN to follow it through, considered the UN the only possible agency to get any result.
At the Secretary General’s request, Mr. Cordier stated that he thought the analysis of the Secretary General was correct, and that the problem was to find a basis for an appeal to the consciences of the states concerned without exacerbating present political tensions. Mr. Cordier asked about the attitude of the Israelis.
[Page 1569]In response to this inquiry, Mr. Johnston referred to a recent conversation he had had with Ambassador Eban. The Israelis advised him that they were proposing an alternative plan based on the combining of Jordan and Litani waters. When Mr. Johnston advised Mr. Eban that we could not consider such a proposal, Mr. Eban stated that Israel might be prepared to modify this position.
Mr. Byroade then stated that he shared Mr. Hammarskjold’s concern about unfortunate international politics in UN discussions relating to the Arab-Israeli problem. This was a source of great worry to him. However Mr. Byroade felt that if Mr. Johnston could convince both parties to request UN supervision of Jordan waters, a great advance might be made. This would help the UN solve the problem at Jisr Banat Yaqub as well as at Adasiya.
The Secretary General agreed with Mr. Byroade. No sound solution for the Jisr Banat Yaqub issue could be found unless it fell within the framework of general proposals acceptable to all concerned.
Mr. Byroade remarked that Jisr Banat Yaqub was something like the Saar. The problem could not be solved except in a broader context.
The Secretary General went on to state that he saw no contradiction between Mr. Johnston’s proposed approach and the various concerns of the UN; insofar as Jisr Banat Yaqub is concerned, the UN has a plan in mind; as far as Israel is concerned, the only factors holding back the Israelis from further work in the demilitarized zone are the temporary promises given to Mr. Johnston and to the UN. The Israelis are prepared to continue their activity as soon as the time is ripe. On the other hand, the Arabs had reacted most violently on June 1 when the Secretary General presented them with a note of the Banat Yaqub issue (which presumably contained a statement of terms on which the Israelis might continue with their diversion plan at this point). This reaction made it clear to the Secretary General how intense Arab feelings still were. However, he felt that after the talks in Cairo it might be possible to proceed to discussions on Jisr Banat Yaqub provided certain UN guarantees regarding the operation of the diversion were given. His recent difficulties with Israel had led him to make a sober appraisal of the risks involved. As far as the Arabs are concerned, it is going to be very difficult to handle them, as their gains from the development at Adasiya did not appear sufficient to save their loss of face over Jisr Banat Yaqub.
The Secretary General then asked Mr. Johnston how he thought Jisr Banat Yaqub might be handled if the Cairo conference were successful.
[Page 1570]In response, Mr. Johnston thought that the issue might fade in the background and that the Israelis might agree to abandon the irrigation aspect of Jisr Banat Yaqub in view of the fact that they prefer the high-level canal as proposed in the Unified Plan.
Mr. Byroade thought that the Israelis would not abandon Jisr Banat Yaqub and that if agreement were reached on the proposals in Cairo, and Israel accepted the Jisr Banat Yaqub diversion in lieu of the high-level canal, the Jisr Banat Yaqub project might go ahead.
At this point, Mr. Barnes observed that Mr. Johnston had asked Mr. Eban which alternative Israel preferred. The Israelis had indicated that they would like to have the high-level canal for irrigation, reserving the Jisr Banat Yaqub diversion for power.
The Secretary General observed that the canal now being dug was too big for power alone. Mr. Byroade observed that the problems facing the U.S. and the UN were much the same, as if the Israelis start work again on the diversion in the demilitarized zone both the U.S. and the UN would be forced to take a public stand again.
The Secretary General then spoke about the military implications of the Jisr Banat Yaqub canal. He had believed that it might serve as a protection for Israeli’s flank in the event of warfare in the north, and he asked Mr. Byroade whether we had any considered views on this issue. Mr. Byroade stated that we had not made a precise military appraisal.
Mr. Johnston then stated that he felt it was important to note the changing attitude on the part of the Israelis regarding Jisr Banat Yaqub, which should be carefully evaluated. He also felt that the Arab position of outright opposition might change. Mr. Byroade noted that the favorable Arab reaction to the Unified Plan is putting Israel in a difficult position and that if the Cairo meeting results in an agreement, the position of Jisr Banat Yaqub would be facilitated.
The Secretary General agreed with Mr. Byroade, and noted that at least until the conclusion of Mr. Johnston’s talks in Israel this issue would probably not arise again in the UN. The idea of international supervision would provide a new medium for a settlement, and he would like to give as much support as possible to means of providing such supervision.
At this point Mr. Johnston asked the Secretary General whether he would attach a UN observer for the talks in Cairo. Mr. Hammarskjold was hesitant on this point as there seemed to be no practical basis for discussions of the immediate issue facing the UN, that of the Jisr Banat Yaqub dispute.
[Page 1571]Mr. Gardiner suggested that what was required was not an officer especially qualified to consider the current dispute, but one who could help establish a constitution for a UN control body.
Mr. Hammarskjold observed that this was a new field for the UN and that the Secretariat had not given much thought to it yet. On the other hand, he quite agreed that if the basic idea were accepted, and led to a request of the Secretary General, he would be very interested. However, discussion of the details of such an authority would be very time-consuming, and as far as the Cairo meeting was concerned, he felt that its central theme should be international control and that details should be left to later.
Mr. Byroade hoped we were in a stage of transition so that the UN could take a leading role in these matters. This idea appealed to the Secretary General. He stated that Mr. Carver should be available at Cairo to consult with Johnston, but not to take part in formal talks with the Arabs.
Mr. Byroade indicated that Mr. Carver expected to be present, and suggested that it might be helpful if UNRWA’s legal adviser, Lalive, were also present.
Mr. Johnston, in summarizing the position, thought the situation was very clear. The Cairo meeting he considered as a transition leading to the time when the UN could take the project over, with full backing from the U.S.
The Secretary General fully agreed on the need to get the parties together somehow. He did not wish to endorse the TVA plan in detail, and furthermore it was necessary for him to avoid as much as possible confusing Near East politics with the politics of the cold war. The Soviet propaganda, which the Soviets were beginning to believe themselves, had tacked the label of “U.S. imperialism” on the TVA Plan. It was therefore advantageous to keep the UN uncommitted on the details of its implementation.
Mr. Johnston suggested that a further meeting might be held in New York on June 10, prior to the departure of his mission for Cairo. The Secretary General agreed that this might be helpful and undertook to reserve time on that day. He hoped that Mr. Byroade would attend this meeting as well.