Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

611.80/5–953

No. 609
Department of State Position Paper¹

secret
STA D-1/4

[Washington, May 7, 1953.]

Arab-Israeli Relations

Arab-Israel differences and the part played by the United States in the establishment and support of Israel contribute very substantially to (a) continued and increasing anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world, (b) Western inability to create an atmosphere of confidence, (c) lack of progress in strengthening the defense of the Near East, and (d) delay in improving the fundamental economic and social conditions of the area. The Arab states continue to believe that U.S. policy in the Near East is partial to Israel although they are hopeful that the change in Administration in the United States will bring a change in this. They believe that Israel harbors additional territorial ambitions and they fear continued immigration into Israel will stimulate the desire for more territory. A genuine conflict of interest does exist between the Arab states and Israel. If the United States is to be successful in removing Arab suspicions it will be necessary to make substantial efforts in the political, economic and psychological fields. In addition military assistance will have to be made available to the Arab states irrespective of whether Israel likes it or not. Finally it will undoubtedly be necessary for the United States to exert considerable influence on Israel to secure a modification in certain of its policies. This is not an easy matter. Before undertaking any such steps or indeed before making any significant moves which affect the Arab-Israel problem the Executive branch should be assured of substantial support from the Congress and American public.

Israel is unquestionably a vigorous and progressive body politic. Although small and surrounded by hostile neighbors, it looks to a combination of its own prodigious efforts and continued American aid to survive and develop strength. Israel is dependent on U.N. public and private aid and moves from month to month on the verge of financial default. Up to this time, Israel has preferred to consolidate everything it has gained through U.N. resolutions, American support, and force of arms. It has not shown enough real disposition to settle its differences with the Arab world, even though its future well-being depends on establishing satisfactory relations with the states in the area. Israel’s attitude toward the Arab refugees is an example in point. It has taken few of them back, has made no provisions for compensation, and has no evident intention of giving up any territory which would support some of them. On the other hand, the Israelis are highly literate, industrious, and relatively free from the diseases which handicap other peoples of the area. In relation to their proportion they are capable of contributing substantial and effective numbers to a fighting force.

Any effort to turn back the clock on the existence of Israel would be unrealistic, politically impracticable, and morally dubious. To date, however, the American partnership with Israel has been a lopsided arrangement, with the United States giving massive aid and support while receiving little or nothing in return. One reason for this situation is the existence of heavy and effective Zionist pressure which has been brought to bear on both the Executive and Legislative branches of the American Government. Courses of action designed to strengthen the overall position of the United States in the Near East have been sidetracked or so cluttered up with “compensating favors” that they have not brought the desired improvement. This imbalance in United States-Israel relationships is the more remarkable since Israel actually has nowhere else to turn save towards the West and cannot, therefore, develop diplomatic counterbalances in its foreign policy.

In order to progress towards a settlement of the principal problems in the Arab-Israel situation, the United States must be prepared to follow policies which do not temporize on the essential issues yet which provide a realistic basis for courses of action on the part of both sides. The principal problems which require an early solution are: (a) the future of the 850,000 Arab refugees; (b) the question of further Jewish immigration to Israel; (c) territorial settlement; (d) the future of the city of Jerusalem; (e) Arab blockade of Israel, and (f) regional defense.

(a) Arab Refugees

There is no single answer to the Arab refugee problem, but by pursuing a series of interrelated policies we may be able to reduce the problem to manageable proportions. We are urging Israel to release blocked Arab accounts and compensate for property left by the refugees. We are seeking to settle as many of the refugees as possible in surrounding Arab territory and are providing some financial assistance for them through UNRWA. We also hope that some refugees may return to Israel and others may be able to immigrate to the Western Hemisphere.

(See Regional Paper on Refugees D-l/2,² and Israel Paper³ on Refugees D-3, Tab 4)

(b) Further Immigration to Israel

Large scale Jewish immigration into Israel would jeopardize any chances of Arab-Israeli settlement. If the potential emigration from the Soviet Union takes place, we should seek to absorb those refugees elsewhere than in Israel.

(See Israel Paper on Immigration D-3, Tab 7)

(c) Territorial Settlement

Solution of this extremely complex problem is at an impasse, since the Arab states unrealistically wish to return to the partition boundaries of November 1947, while Israel wants to retain every bit of land she won through the hostilities of 1948. Although there is no question of accepting the Arab point of view, we think Israel must be prepared to make some concessions. This problem is considered too technical for discussion on this trip.

(d) Future of Jerusalem

An international regime for Jerusalem could not be imposed without the use of force. Israel prefers a settlement along the present de facto lines, and the Arab states might accept such an arrangement if they were to receive certain concessions in return. (For example, Egypt might accept a road link with Jordan.) As a minimum there should be freedom of access to the Holy Places and arrangements should be made to reestablish circulation of goods and people between the two parts of the city.

(See Israel Paper on Jerusalem D-3, Tab 5)

(e) Arab Blockade of Israel

We oppose this blockade, whether it takes form of halting of pipeline operations, blocking Israel-bound traffic in Suez, blacklisting tankers, boycotting airlines or other measures and have urged relaxation of those by the Arab states. We recognize, however, that this blockade is a symptom of the Arab-Israeli tension, and that lasting progress in this question depends upon resolving other, more basic differences.

(See Israel Country Paper on the Arab League D-3, Tab 8 and Egyptian Country Paper D-2, Tab 2⁴)

(f) Regional Defense

If the difficulties between the Western powers and the Arab states concerning the development of regional defense are imposed directly on the differences already existing between Israel and the Arab states, the prospects of resolving either of these issues are slight. It is our policy, therefore, to keep these problems apart. We are seeking to establish a Middle East defense organization based initially upon Egypt. At the same time we are trying to maintain the present uneasy balance of military forces between Israel and the Arab states, so that Israel will not feel impelled to engage in an arms race and the Arabs will not let their traditional hostility toward Israel block cooperation with the West.

We are working on the theory that a settlement of the Anglo–Egyptian dispute and the establishment of a Middle East defense organization will place us in a much better position from which to move on the problem of Arab-Israel peace. The Israelis, however, are very vocally taking the position that Arab-Israel peace must be a pre-condition of the other moves, and will doubtless resort to every possible expedient in order to further this policy.

(See Regional Paper on Defense of Middle East D-1/3⁴)

1. One of a series of position papers on regional problems in the Near East prepared for the briefing book for the Secretary’s trip to the Middle East and South Asia; see footnote 1, Document 604.
2. Not printed; see the revised paper, STA D-I/2a, infra.
3. Reference is to the Department of State Position Paper, STA D-3, and its Tabs 1–8, Document 605.
4. Not printed.
4. Not printed.