611.80/5–953
No. 608
Department of State Position
Paper1
secret
STA D-6
[Washington, May 5, 1953.]
Lebanon
Summary Paper2
- 1.
- Internal Political Situation: Decree law
“civil service” cabinet has completed program and resigned April 27.
New parliamentary cabinet had been formed, recently by Saab Salaam, and will implement
reform measures, initiate new ones, and continue general program
started after bloodless coup of September 1952. Cabinet must try to
restore confidence in parliamentary system, and silence critics who
maintain reform program not going fast enough.
- 2.
- Palestine Question: Lebanese resent
creation of Israel, but not quite as do other Arab states.
Officially, however, Lebanon must adhere strictly to Arab League
position. Refuses give permanent residence to 125,000 refugees now
in country.
- 3.
- Area Defense Arrangements and United States Arms
Aid: Lebanese leaders privately favor a MEDO; cannot openly advocate in face
of public opinion locally and in other Arab states. President
Chamoun has made good-will
visits to Arab capitals and secretly tried use influence in
promoting regional defense with West. Lebanon has signed necessary
assurances to United States, can now receive cash reimbursable
military aid; would prefer grant aid, however.
- 4.
- Future of United States Technical
Assistance: Technical assistance program finally reached
firm ground in December 1952-January 1953. Largest staffed program
in Arab states. Lebanese now appreciate its long range aspects, but
also will want grant assistance to finance major development
program, e.g., Litani River Development, which United States has
surveyed.
- 5.
- Lebanon’s Share in Pipeline Earnings:
Lebanon infected by agitation elsewhere and convinced oil companies
making excessive profits. Lebanese pressing for renegotiation of
Tapline (United States)
agreement in order obtain increased revenues.
- 6.
- Boycott of Blacklisted Tankers: Lebanon is
thinking of boycotting foreign-owned tankers which call at Haifa
after loading at Lebanese ports. We disapprove this action.
[Tab 1]
Internal Political Situation
Background
After nine years of rule Lebanon’s first President, Beshara ElKhouri,
discredited by charges of corruption, was ousted without violence in
what Lebanese call their Constitutional or September (1952)
revolution. The new President, Camilla Chamoun, is honest and industrious and was one of an
eight-man group which led the attack on Khouri. However, he has been
under attack by former allies whose political aspirations have not
been satiated, by those who are dissatisfied because a millenium has
not issued forth, and by those who suffer from the general negative
nature of Arab mentality.
During the six months decree law authority, a civil service cabinet
promulgated nearly 100 reform measures, including a controversial
electoral law. This cabinet resigned on April 27, and is now being
replaced by one composed of Deputies and headed by Saab Salaam, a former Premier.
Salaam must try to restore
confidence in the parliamentary system and see that reforms are
carried through and are supplemented. He faces a trying opponent in
Kemal Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialists. Jumblatt
advocates a Third Force, a socialist administration, and a program
far removed from moderation and compromise; he is gaining
considerable following.
Common agreement on the necessity for religious equilibrium helps
political stability, however. Other elements furthering stability
are a mercantile mentality, stemming from Lebanon’s Phoenician
ancestry, and a high literacy rate owing to well developed
educational institutions. There is not much danger that Lebanon will
become fanatical like Iran or Egypt. There is some feudalism, but
democratic government has a broader base in Lebanon than elsewhere
in the Arab world.
[Page 1212]
[Tab 2]
Palestine Question
Background
Lebanese, like other Arabs, resent the creation of Israel, although
some Christian leaders are privately not unhappy at establishment of
another enclave against the Moslem world. Trade with Israel is also
a thought which the mercantile Lebanese consider not uninviting.
Officially, Lebanese have no choice but to follow other Arabs on the
Palestine issue, and certainly the emotions of the street can arise
on the question as easily as in more fanatical countries.
The immense United States reservoir of good will was heavily drained
in Lebanon by our support of Israel. Exhortation by the United
States and other outsiders for peace with Israel is like waving a
red flag to a bull. Moreover, Lebanon refuses adamantly to give
residence to 125,000 Palestine refugees now in the country, because
they are 80% Moslems and their presence constitutes a threat to
Christian supremacy. Without refugees there is unemployment in the
Lebanon.
Probable Lebanese
Position
It is less rigid than in other Arab states, but many Lebanese
unofficially believe eventual peace is attainable with Israel if
Israel: (a) guarantees present frontiers with possible minor
rectifications in Western Galilee; (b) offers the refugees either
repatriation or adequate compensation; (c) agrees to
internationalization of Jerusalem.
United States Position
See regional paper.3
[Tab 3]
Area Defense Arrangements and U.S. Arms
Aid
Background
While Lebanese leaders privately favor a MEDO, they are powerless to take any step in that
direction because popular feeling can be easily stirred against
it—particularly as long as Palestine and Egyptian problems exist as
overriding irritants.
However, Lebanon has expressed specific interest in securing limited
arms aid from the U.S.; to that end, Lebanon has been declared
[Page 1213]
eligible for cash
reimbursable military aid, and has signed the necessary assurances,
although grant aid would be preferred. Moreover, in a conversation
with the American Chargé in October 1952, President Chamoun said “If it ever came to war
with the Soviets, Lebanon would be 100 per cent on the side of the
West, our harbors would be open to your ships, our airfields to your
planes, whether or not we have any kind of treaty or agreement in
writing.” Of late President Chamoun has made a number of good-will visits around
the Near East, during which he has sounded out other leaders and
tried to use his influence in promoting a regional defense
arrangement with the West, probably within the scope of the Arab
Collective Security Pact.
Probable Lebanese
Position
See regional paper. President Chamoun has stated also that Israeli, Turkish or
French troops would never be allowed in Lebanon, nor could Lebanese
soldiers leave their own territory.
U.S. Position
See regional paper. The Department of Defense is studying a Lebanese
shipping list of arms, preparatory to seeing what items might be
made available on a cash reimbursable basis.
[Tab 4]
Future United States Technical
Assistance
Background
Besides military aid, Lebanon seeks technical and economic assistance
from the United States on a grant basis. The Technical Assistance
program got off to a slow start, but since the inauguration of a
“hard to get” policy by the United States last December, we have
received good Lebanese cooperation. The program has the largest
staff of any in the Arab States—70 technicians—and the projects are
varied and numerous. Of particular importance are the engineering
survey of the Litani River basin for hydroelectric and irrigation
development; the Kasmie Irrigation and Rural Improvement Projects,
and the Agricultural Extension Program.
Probable Lebanese
Position
The Lebanese now appreciate the long range aspects of technical
assistance, and as time passes and benefits appear more frequently,
they may request an even larger program. However, they do not
possess oil revenues or other substantial capital sources, and they
will inevitably seek economic assistance from the United States, as
well as from IBRD and other
sources, in order to finance aspects of
[Page 1214]
their development program resulting from
surveys and other technical advice.
United States Position
Our policy has been to discourage the Lebanese from looking for a
handout, while encouraging them to find means of self-financing and
to utilize international banking institutions. Simultaneously, we
urge the Lebanese to make the best possible use of our technical
assistance.
[Tab 5]
Lebanon’s Share in Pipeline
Earnings
Background
Lebanon is a major oil terminal for Saudi Arabian and Iraqi crude oil
pipelines. No transit or tanker payments were received from pipeline
companies during the mandate period. Pipeline payments were
initiated after World War II and have been subject to continual
controversy since that time. Lebanon now receives approximately one
cent a barrel from each of the two companies (Iraq Petroleum Company
and Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company), or a total of 2½ million
dollars a year.
Probable Lebanese
Position
Lebanese officials continue to demand more from the companies.
Ambassador Malik has
requested $10,000,000 per year; Foreign Minister Hakim has asked for 50 percent of
the net profits; the Lebanese discuss the problem sporadically with
the oil companies, the United States and United Kingdom Governments,
as well as with the other Arab states involved.
United States Position
The problem has not deteriorated to the point where the political
aspects override the commercial, and consequently, the United States
Government considers the matter one for direct discussion between
the oil companies and the Lebanese Government. Respect for
negotiated agreements on the part of the Lebanese Government should
be the best inducement for further attraction of foreign capital
into the Lebanon.
[Page 1215]
[Tab 6]
Boycott of Blacklisted Tankers
Background
Foreign Minister Hakim is
Lebanon’s protagonist in enforcing the Arab League boycott of
Israel. Efforts are reportedly being made to prevent foreign-owned
tankers which have called at Haifa from loading at Lebanese ports.
Concurrently, the Lebanese Government is attempting to enforce the
boycott by requesting all airlines to discontinue their services to
Israel.
Probable Lebanese
Position
Lebanese officials will probably avoid discussion of the boycott.
Defense would be along traditional lines that Arabs are still at war
with Israel, and that Lebanese are taking advantage of sovereign
rights similar to those invoked by United States in China
embargo.
United States Position
Advantage should be taken of every appropriate occasion to make clear
United States disapproval of Arab boycott measures which make
solution of Arab-Israel problems more difficult. Concessions from
Israel are more remote in face of increased Arab efforts to strangle
Israel economically.
