611.80/5–953
No. 607
Department of State Position
Paper1
secret
STA D-5
[Washington, May 5, 1953.]
Syria
Summary Paper2
- 1.
- Internal Political Situation: General
Shishikli’s dictatorship apparently well established and now
entering eighteenth month. Announcement new draft constitution
imminent, with publication text and popular referendum this summer.
Elections possible in autumn. Confused reform by decree law
continues. Internal and external plotting against State so far
unsuccessful.
- 2.
- Palestine Question: Shishikli has quietly
authorized settlement 80,000 Arab refugees in Syria; is conducting
secret negotiations Israel for revision common border. Privately
admits desirability
[Page 1205]
“modus vivendi” with Israel, although publicly still calls for full
implementation United Nations resolutions by Israel.
- 3.
- Area Defense Arrangements: Shishikli does
not regard Russia as major and imminent threat to Syria (Near East).
Israel viewed as main and almost exclusive enemy. Therefore area
defense seen as protection against Israel, as well as being
primarily function of Arab states, who should be included from
inception in any plans for a MEDO.
- 4.
-
United States Military and Economic Aid:
United States offer of cash reimbursable aid not taken up;
Shishikli wants grant military aid of the sort extended to
Turkey. His willingness meet United States proposals on
Palestine and MEDO is directly
proportional to amount military aid United States willing give
Syria. Syrian Army incapable more than limited defensive
operations, is principally effective for internal control.
TCA not accepted by Syria.
Economic aid considered secondary to military aid, but Shishikli
would like economic program of Turkish type, with grant
assistance for development projects. Return must justify
political risk to Shishikli of signing agreement which likely to
be labeled “treasonable” by street.
- 5.
- Fear of Hashemite Expansion: Shishikli
fearful of possible Iraqi attempts unite Syria, Jordan, Iraq under
Faisal II’s Hashemite
crown. Recent plotting against Shishikli by ex-Syrian officers on
Iraqi soil lends credence his fears. Tripartite Declaration May 1950
could deter this threat under certain conditions.
[Tab 1]
Internal Political Situation
Background
By a bloodless coup from November 29-December 1, 1951, General (then
Colonel) Shishikli took over the Government of Syria, dissolved the
Parliament, dismissed a day-old cabinet, and began ruling by
executive decree through his front man and Head of State, General
Fawsi Selo. A
rubber-stamp cabinet later was created and encouragement given to
organization of a “national” party, the Arab Liberation Movement. A
multitude of reforms and autarchic measures have been decreed, but
in the pressure of vested interests and the confusion of amateur
government, many decrees have never left paper.
Signs have multiplied recently that Shishikli will soon end the
“period of transition” and allow Syria to return to parliamentary
forms of government. Officials have been preparing a draft
constitution
[Page 1206]
which
reportedly vests strong powers in the President. The contemplated
changes in form should not modify Shishikli’s control. In fact he is
likely to become the President, with a legislature composed of
sympathetic deputies. Elections will take place in the autumn at the
earliest.
Political parties are officially dissolved, whereas the Arab
Liberation Movement has not developed as hoped. In fact Shishikli
appears disgusted with his “test-tube” party and is leaning more to
his old favorite, the Syrian Social National Party, which though
covert is well organized, patriotic, anti-communist and cast as a
loyal opposition. The SSNP, however, cavils at any alteration of its
platform by Shishikli.
There is considerable discontent in Syria at Shishikli’s regime, as
manifested by an abortive coup, arrests and plots (see Tab 5).
However, no united opposition has developed which would be capable
of successful revolt, and by and large the populace is apathetic.
Mean-while, Shishikli has shown how firm a control he has over the
country, and the people at least compare his regime favorably with
those of the pre-coup, filibustering parliaments.
United States Position
While Shishikli is not pro-Western in a full sense, he has been
fairly cooperative with the United States, at least more so than his
predecessors. There is no successor in sight who would be more
inclined towards the United States; in fact his disappearance could
well herald a very anti-Western regime. Moreover, since he is firmly
anti-communist we should do what we can to give his regime
encouragement.
[Tab 2]
Palestine Question
(See Regional Paper on Arab-Israeli question.)3
Probable Syrian Position
Much of General Shishikli’s thought may focus upon this problem, the
responsibility for which he will of course attribute to the U.S. at
least in part. Privately he has recognized that Israel will be a
factor in the area for a long time. He might refer to the
possibility of “peace”, but he will make it conditional upon U.S.
pressure on Israel to: (a) arrange a better frontier with Syria; (b)
accept limited repatriation of Palestine refugees; (c) grant refugee
compensation;
[Page 1207]
(d) agree
to Jerusalem’s internationalization; (e) limit Jewish immigration
into Israel.
While General Shishikli is reluctant to use such terms of finality as
“peace” and “resettlement”, he has paid them somewhat more than lip
service. He had authorized resettlement on Syrian soil of 80,000
Palestine refugees now in that country; UNRWA accordingly will expend $30 million to assist the
resettlement. His representatives are negotiating secretly with the
Israelis, under the aegis of the UN
Mixed Armistice Committee, for a frontier modus
vivendi and a resolution of the Demilitarized Zone. Both
resettlement and frontier questions are, however, far from fully
resolved. Moreover, Shishikli is marking time on them until he sees
how much less “favorable” a policy the new U.S. Administration will
have towards Israel vis-à-vis the Arab states.
U.S. Position
The U.S. believes that resettlement of refugees and adjustment of
border anomalies are to Syria’s advantage regardless of how much
U.S. support and aid is or is not forthcoming. Syria needs the
manpower for economic development and can absorb the bodies without
upsetting its economy. A continued spirit of compromise with Israel
on border revision talks can mean removal of a prime friction source
and allow Syria to concentrate more on important internal
development problems.
[Tab 3]
Area Defense Arrangements
(See Regional Paper on Defense of the Middle
East.)4
Probable Foreign Position
While Shishikli is cognizant of Soviet designs, he does not regard
Russia as the primary threat to peace in the area. That role is
assigned almost exclusively to Israel. Therefore area defense is
conceived of as defense against Israel (the Arab Collective Security
Pact), and Shishikli is less concerned with defense arrangements of
the Western powers against Soviet aggression. Should Shishikli
mention this subject, he will emphasize that area defense is
primarily a function of the Near Eastern people (Arab), and that all
Arab States should be included in area defense plans from inception.
At present, however, he considers that the U.S. has not offered
sufficient inducement for Syria to cooperate with the West on
[Page 1208]
either Palestine or area
defense. He will probably indicate to the Secretary that Syrian
cooperation on these matters will only come after U.S. offers of
more liberal proportions than orthodox technical assistance or cash
reimbursable military aid, both of which his country has already
rejected or shelved (see Tab 4).
U.S. Position
See regional paper.
[Tab 4]
U.S. Military and Economic Aid
Background
The U.S. has offered Syria technical assistance under Point IV and
cash reimbursable military aid. Neither has been accepted. (See
Regional Paper on Aid to the Near East.)5
Probable Syrian Position
General Shishikli is very likely to renew his demand for more modern
military equipment, and to explain that this should not be
forthcoming in the limited, cash reimbursable form now offered, but
rather in quantities and as a grant, along the lines of U.S. aid to
Turkey. Shishikli particularly prefers American equipment to the
hodge podge of antiquities he receives presently from France and
Britain. Moreover, he will probably try to show why Syria merits
special treatment. Both he and General Selo have indicated that Syria would be willing to
give consequent assurances that it has no aggressive designs on
Israel. The fact that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been declared
eligible for grant aid, while Jordan is subsidized by the UK, only
strengthens Shishikli’s conviction that Syria is unjustly being left
out.
General Shishikli views economic development as secondary in
importance to increased military strength. However, he describes
Syria as a poor country which would welcome the “right” type (i.e.
U.S. grant aid to Turkey) of economic aid. He does not expect quite
the volume extended to Turkey, but wants money to execute a number
of development projects in land reclamation, irrigation, housing and
transport. He maintains that he is weary of surveys, and wants to
see actual construction. He insists that he must receive enough aid
to justify the political risk of signing an economic agreement with
the U.S.; the street elements will otherwise succeed in shouts of a
“sellout to the imperialists”. Shishikli has dallied
[Page 1209]
with thoughts of UN and IBRD financial aid, but nothing has materialized except
for the as yet unexpended $30 million UNRWA grant for resettlement of the 80,000
refugees.
U.S. Position
See regional papers on defense arrangements and economic
assistance.6
[Tab 5]
Fear of Hashemite Expansion
Background
The Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan has long dreamt of
Jordanian-Iraqi-Syrian political unity as the “Fertile Crescent”,
under a Hashemite crown naturally. King Abdullah cherished the scheme while he ruled Jordan,
and the Regent of Iraq leads the advocates in his country. Rumors
still persist that Iraq is plotting to absorb Syria and Jordan,
particularly since the Regent is technically out of a job in Iraq
since May 2nd. Recently some credence has been lent to these rumors
by substantiated reports that disaffected Syrian Army Officers are
plotting (on Iraqi and/or Lebanese territory) against General
Shishikli. Reportedly the Iraqi palace is financing the
plotters.
Probable Syrian Position
Obviously General Shishikli does not subscribe to these ideas. He has
asked if the United States through the United Kingdom can induce
Iraq to restrain the Syrian officers.
United States Position
The United States wants as full a confirmation of these reports as is
ascertainable, before and if any representations are made to Iraq.
We do not adjudge the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration applicable,
unless irrefutable facts show that a state is actively supporting,
sanctioning or participating in aggressive international military
action. However, Ambassador Moose has assured Shishikli that the United States
would regard with concern any activities by a Near Eastern state
which were directed clearly towards infringement of any other
state’s sovereignty.
