Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

784A.00/1–953: Telegram

No. 562
The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State¹

confidential
NIACT

Tel Aviv, February 9, 1953—7 p.m.

1265. Deptel 753.² In response request for comment and analysis Cabinet decision and Foreign Minister’s statement reported Embtel 1247,³ Embassy regards latter as intemperate, but fairly accurate reflection present IG state of mind, induced in part by worsening relations with Jordan, but more by factors of much broader character. Present emergency is serious mainly because it may detonate larger explosions ME and it would be mistake, therefore, to attempt to deal with it as new or isolated problem. Israel is rapidly becoming convinced that her basic interests are in jeopardy and that unless she asserts herself in time policies may be adopted, which will threaten her continued existence.

Principal factors contributing to growing apprehension of IG and public were outlined in Embtels 1183⁴ and 1209.⁵ Always highly subjective, Israelis have not fully grasped harm which has been done their interests by their attitude in early cases of Huleh controversy 1951, acts of reprisal committed a little over a year ago, notorious and unnecessary “barrel-barrel” episode, delay in compliance with Riley request re Mt. Scopus, and recent incursions into neighboring territory pursuant aggressive effort curb infiltration. They feel strongly, however, that refusal of Arab countries to make peace as contemplated by UN at time armistice agreements were negotiated is matter of overriding importance as compared with other instances of failure both sides to implement UN decisions.

Infiltration has long been highly troublesome problem in Israel–Jordan relations, which has reached near solution at times only to deteriorate again. It will be recalled that Amman telegram 244, February 29, 1952 to Department reported that Ahmad Tuzan, Jordan’s former MAC representative, expressed view Israelis have legitimate grievance against large-scale Arab infiltration, but reprisals not warranted. He favored measures which worked “surprisingly well” and felt improvements might lead to broadening base of settlement with Israel. One of reasons Tuzan gave for resigning (Jerusalem Consulate General telegram 136, May 29 to Department)⁶ was inability to get Jordan Government to agree to pass stronger anti-infiltration legislation. Jordan’s failure to approve Latrun agreement and other adverse factors noted in Embtel 105⁷ marked early stages present deterioration in Israel–Jordan affairs. IG is especially sensitive to developments in Jordan: It has noted with misgiving appointment of former member of Mufti Government in Gaza as chairman Jordan MAC and placing of MAC affairs under supervision of Palestinian Arabs (Jerusalem Consulate General telegram 15, July 26 to Department;⁶ and more recently press reports that Rhodes agreement again under attack in Jordan Parliament. IG has been especially disturbed by possibility that Jordan behavior may be part of concerted Arab effort growing out of decisions taken by joint meetings of Arab MAC delegates.

There is no question but what there has been a deterioration in border relations since middle of last year and the infiltration problem has assumed major proportions. Statistics for 1952 on loss of life and property by Israelis at hands of armed marauders were provided by Foreign Minister Sharett (Embtel 1200).⁸ Figures did not include casualties inflicted on Jordanians but toll there also was high. There has been fault on part of both parties to dispute, and it is believed that US interests will not be served by concentrating to too great an extent on assessing blame or by seeming to take sides. Our major efforts should rather be devoted to bringing about renewal of cooperation essential to maintaining peace. While we must necessarily be realistic about sharp conflict in views, we should refuse to regard situation as hopeless, and be firm in our support of UNTSO pressure on both sides to keep the peace.

While present tension already is diminishing, real solution of basic problem will have to be on a regional basis and directed at primary policy objectives of achieving political and economic stability and building up area defense potential. Because of importance of regional peace to these policy objectives, it is believed that another major effort to effect peace should be made after prior consultation on policy among parties to tripartite agreement. Believe approach should make no secret of fact that real peace is objective but hold forth worthwhile advantages. These could include uncertainty military as well as economic aid, and involve compensation to refugees on adequate scale. It might be helpful to find a person of proven ability and considerable prestige in region to undertake coordination of plan.

In present circumstances it may be difficult to get Israel’s cooperation on plan involving regional arms build-up. This difficulty will be increased if Israeli Government feels that its interests and security are being neglected, or that this country is not being kept informed of area plans and developments. It will be recalled that Israeli Government originally had misgivings about MEC plan and expressed them in private, but later did not oppose invitation being extended to Egypt to be charter member of Command and kept press criticism at minimum. She was however kept informed of developments and was given assurance that her interests would not be disregarded.

Davis

1. Sent in two sections; repeated to Amman and Jerusalem.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 557.
3. Document 557.
4. Document 547.
5. Document 551.
6. Not printed.
7. Document 458.
6. Not printed.
8. Document 550.