Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

784A.00/1–2353: Telegram

No. 547
The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Tel Aviv, January 23, 1953—8 p.m.

1183. During past 3 months, Israel has suffered series of shocks that have affected profoundly public thinking and morale. Roughly in order of importance, adverse factors have been: 1, Prague trials and subsequent developments making Russian bloc’s change of policy from one of no racial discrimination to one frankly exploiting anti-Semitism and unfriendliness toward Israel; 2, Intensification of Arab collective action against Israel; 3, Success of latter in increasing Israel’s economic difficulties, notably by delaying and jeopardizing German reparations agreement; 4, Action of UK in supplying Arab countries jet planes in numbers Israel cannot hope to match; 5, Fear this presages change in Western arms policy from that enunciated in tripartite declaration 1950.

Embassy believes that above developments will have far reaching effects and that continued deterioration in Arab-Israel relations could bring about what would be precisely to Russia’s advantage, namely renewal of Arab-Israel hostilities with serious consequences to Western powers in general and tripartite countries in particular. There is no question of Israel’s desiring such development. On contrary last thing government and great majority of people here want is war with their neighbors. Danger lies in possibility that Israelis may become convinced they have no chance of peace, their financial position is hopeless, and their existence is in imminent peril; and that as a consequence some untoward event may precipitate active hostilities.

Their faith and determination are still strong but the discouraging developments alluded to above and lack of any favorable reaction to their efforts to improve relations as reported Embtel 665, October 23 have resulted in some feeling of disillusionment (Deptel 673² and Embtel 1174³). Israelis are especially disappointed that both Shishikli and Naguib, with whose efforts to improve conditions in their own countries they are in sympathy and from whom they hoped for some constructive move toward area peace, should apparently have given way to pressure for increased Arab action against Israel. They felt especially keenly Naguib’s public action against German reparations agreement, which diminished their hopes for rapprochement with Egypt under his leadership. Defeat of eight power resolution in GA and deterioration in relations with Jordan have served to intensify earlier disappointments.

In circumstances prospects for progress toward area stability have lessened and potential dangers of explosive situation such as that developing with Jordan have increased. One impression gained during and since my trip to neighboring countries in December is that Arab attitude toward Israel has hardened due in part at least to feeling that blockade has Israel in critical situation. Another impression gained from colleagues in Arab countries was that altho question of compensation of refugees important, Arabs unlikely to ease blockade to make compensation payments possible, since to do so would be inconsistent with Arab hopes to bring Israel to knees by means of economic measures and common policy of making no separate agreement with this country.

It is obvious that Russian influence can be counted on to do utmost to prevent local, national or area agreements that would improve Arab-Israel relations. Russian techniques already observable include creation of popular demand for imposition unattainable conditions as prerequisite for negotiations, stigmatizing as traitor any one disposed to settle difficulties, incitement of students, use of “anti-imperialism” propaganda, and exploitation of xenophobia in general.

Depcirtel 586⁴ outlines constructive approach, believe new developments call for review of immediate policy objectives and methods. Recommendations follow.

Davis

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem; sent by pouch to Ankara and Jidda.
2. See footnote 2, Document 545.
3. Document 545.
4. Not printed.