Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

784A.00/1–2853: Telegram

No. 551
The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Tel Aviv, January 28, 1953—8 p.m.

1209. Embtel 1183.² In light recent developments, it is believed ME problems require some redefinition. It seems quite clear that we are confronted by something more serious than mere “Arab prejudice” toward Israel that presumably could be overcome by a few minor territorial adjustments, resettlement of refugees, payment of compensation, etc. All these are important but do not seem to represent a basis on which Arab leadership is now prepared to move toward peace. These problems could no doubt be largely resolved by means of direct negotiations, lifting of blockade and establishing of normal relations, but Embassy knows of no instances where Arab leaders have found it feasible to advocate such measures publicly; and it recalls the cases of two who tried secretly to reach settlements and failed, viz King Abdullah, and Tuquan Bey of Jordan (Embtel 105).³ It is hoped the Syrian–Israel conversation now in progress may prove to be an exception (Embtels 1198⁴ and 779⁵ and Damascus Embtel 345 to Department.⁶)

Judging from contacts with and reports from colleagues in Arab countries, public positions and attitudes of leaders seem to be controlled largely by the extremists who aim at nothing less than destruction of Israel. Plain facts are that Israel’s economic condition is more precarious than is generally realized, and that it could not now withstand the blockade without outside assistance. It is obvious to the Arabs that private and public aid from US is all-important factor in defeating their purpose. Hence, we incur resentment which may be expected to result in measures against our interests, such as boycott of firms doing business in Israel, harassment of petroleum companies, and perhaps even effort ultimately to deprive West of ME oil.

Use of word “impartial” to describe our policy is inexact as to fact and unfortunate psychologically. It is too negative to describe our attitude of interest in and friendliness toward all the countries of ME, in first place; and it is susceptible of interpretation as committing us to an unrealistic equality in distributing aid. Our policy is to prevent economic collapse of any ME country, and blockade necessitates greater aid to Israel than would otherwise be necessary. In present circumstances, if aid to Israel were suddenly withdrawn or drastically reduced it would bring almost immediate financial collapse with far-reaching political consequences.

In view of seriousness of threat to our interests in whole region, Embassy recognizes great potential importance of leaders who have some realistic conception of Russian danger and show signs of readiness to cooperate with West. If we find it advisable support Naguib, and possibly Shishikli, as best means of preventing loss of ME, it will be important bring Tripartite declaration of May 1950 into accord with such policy, and take steps oviate danger of renewal Arab-Israel hostilities. We should not lose sight of possibility that such hostilities, if they occur may be precipitated as result of economic warfare and would be sporadic in early phases with both sides endeavoring to place other in position of being technical “aggressor”.

In reformulation of policy it will be of greatest importance to relate settlement of Palestine question to general problem of area defense. There may be some temptation to develop latter without taking sufficiently into account that realization of our principal policy objectives of achieving political stability, economic improvement and area defense will depend largely on our success in liquidating Arab-Israel conflict. Giving aid to Arabs conditional upon prior peace with Israelis recognized as unrealistic and self-defeating at present. But it is believed program of aid should include steps designed to encourage at some stage constructive attitudes toward easing of tensions and ultimate settlement, as confidence in and dependence upon us increases. In meantime it will be important to make our policy abundantly clear to both sides, so that they will have no doubt that while ready and willing to render aid to and build up strength in area, we are committed to prevent destruction or over-running of any free country and that we regard prolongation of conflict within area as unnecessary, and harmful to parties themselves, region and the free world.

Success of policy will be jeopardized if psychology of desperation and panic should develop in Israel. At best it would cause intensive lobbying and publicity campaign that would be unnecessary and harmful; and at worst it might result in acts of desperation that would endanger area peace. It was possible to avoid such reaction at time Egypt was invited to join proposed MEC, and it should be again with timely explanations at high level, assurances that forcible changes in frontiers will not be tolerated, and practical indications that we recognize the importance of Israel to any scheme of regional defense.

Davis

1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
2. Document 547.
3. Document 458.
4. Dated Jan. 27, not printed.
5. Document 516.
6. Document 509.