Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

611.83/11–1552

No. 520
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Funkhouser)

confidential

[Washington,] November 15, 1952.

Subject:

• U.S.–Syrian Relations

Participants:

• H.E. Dr. Zafir Rifai, Syrian Foreign Minister
• H.E. Dr. Farid Zayn al-Din, Syrian UN Delegate and Ambassador Designate to the United States
• Mr. Rafik Asha, UN Delegate and Syrian Minister Chargé, Washington
• Assistant Secretary Byroade—NEA
• Mr. Gardiner—NEA
• Mr. Funkhouser—NE

Following Foreign Minister Rifai’s thirty minute discussion with the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Byroade, during which time the Foreign Minister inconclusively discussed only the Bonn Agreement, it was suggested that further discussion between Assistant Secretary Byroade and the Foreign Minister should be held to cover other outstanding U.S.-Syrian problems.

The Foreign Minister began by stating that although he wished to develop in greater detail his solution to the Bonn reparations problem, there were other important problems facing Syria which he would like to discuss with Assistant Secretary Byroade. Mr. Rifai said that it was extremely difficult to develop Syrian stability in the midst of a basically unstable Middle East. The most important element in the instability was Israel itself. The refugees also created a serious factor of instability and it was necessary to provide compensation for them at the earliest moment.

Mr. Byroade answered that he had spent the whole morning working on the refugee compensation problem and felt that a very good start had been made with respect to the refugees by both the UNRWA and PCC. He expressed the belief that an essential factor in the solution of the refugee problem was that the Syrian Government and the United States Government fully understand each other. He stated that he appreciated the fact that there were emotions in the refugee problem which were probably difficult for Westerners to appreciate fully and which neither dollars nor projects could settle. Nevertheless, improved living conditions in the Arab world seemed to present the only approach to the problem. Assistant Secretary Byroade expressed his belief that dealing with the refugee problem required above all leadership such as the Syrian Government was now providing. He stated that he personally felt that it was “cruel” not to encourage the refugees to establish new homes since the chances of repatriation were exceedingly slight and the existence of false hope could only end in increased bitterness.

The Foreign Minister stated that he agreed with all these points, but added that only “under suitable conditions” and “when compensated” could the refugee problem be removed.

Assistant Secretary Byroade stated that with regard to compensation nothing could take away the legal and moral claim of the refugees. He added that the PCC was actively seeking solution to the compensation problem. He stressed that Arab compensation required important economic resources which Israel at the present time would not appear to have.

Regarding resettlement the Assistant Secretary reiterated that while it was probably true that no American could fully appreciate the full problems involved in the resettlement of an Arab refugee from Palestine, nevertheless the U.S. of course could clearly understand the geographical limitations in refugee resettlement. There was no room for one million Arab refugees in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan. The greatest opportunity for resettlement physically lay in Northern Syria. He expressed the view that the resettlement of the refugees would in the long run work to the benefit of the Syrian economy and added that there was money in the UN which would support an important effort in this direction.

Foreign Minister Rifai stated that the presence of any refugee in Syria created a financial and moral responsibility on the Syrian Government. He added that Ambassador Blandford and Chief of State Selo had developed a misunderstanding on this point.

The Foreign Minister stated that it had been Ambassador Blandford’s theory that refugee resettlement would in itself be a benefit to Syria and that this position had resulted in the impasse which continued in the Shishikli-Blandford discussions. He stated that the Syrian Bedouins were not productive and Syria already had a labor force available to settle on undeveloped Syrian land. He stated that the Syrian agriculture projects would have been handled by the Bedouin if the refugees were not there. The refugees would replace the indigenous Bedouin, resulting in the continuation of a serious problem for the Syrian Government. Despite the existence of this situation, Mr. Rifai stated that the Syrian Government had accepted resettlement of the refugees in Syria for two reasons. One was that the condition of the refugees was deplorable and secondly the total Syrian community would, if steps were not taken, be adversely affected by this large group of refugees living in unsanitary and indigent conditions.

Secretary Byroade stated that Ambassador Blandford had undoubtedly felt that the refugees could in the future be a net asset to Syria—that these refugees, properly housed, clothed, fed, together with the skills which they brought with them and the investment in roads, water, housing undertaken by the UNRWA would over the long run work to the advantage of Syria.

Mr. Rifai stated that this might be possible, but at the present time the refugees were not only a serious burden on the Syrian treasury but also provided a negative value to the Syrian community. For example, the Foreign Minister stated that by providing educational facilities for ten thousand refugees in Syrian schools, ten thousand Syrian students had been displaced. The Foreign Minister stated that to handle the refugee problem required funds greatly in excess of what had already been offered.

Secretary Byroade then stated that whereas it might be true that funds presently allocated might conceivably prove insufficient for the total refugee resettlement problem, he nevertheless felt it was unfortunate that money presently available for resettlement was left unused. The Assistant Secretary referred to the problem of obtaining money for these refugees and referred to a future period in which contributions by the UN members might fall off. He stated that whatever the amount of money required might be, it was essential to make a start with the funds that existed and to improve immediately the condition of as many refugees as possible.

Foreign Minister Rifai stated that Syria also required funds to bolster the Syrian economy itself. These funds would serve to complement UNRWA refugee disbursements. He stated, however, that Syria was moving ahead on resettlement and would in time know how far the funds presently allocated would go to meet the problem. The acceptance of more refugees at this time had been prevented by the conclusion that more refugees would be a greater sacrifice for the Syrian people, and because Ambassador Blandford did not attribute sufficient importance to aid for the Syrian economy.

Secretary Byroade asked the translator to impress upon Foreign Minister Rifai that he was not pressing the Minister to accept more refugees but that he was trying to clarify his understanding of the problems involved in refugee resettlement.

With respect to the overall refugee problem, Secretary Byroade stated that he personally was doing what he could to see that refugee compensation could be arranged. He added that by this statement he was not closing the door even on repatriation, although admittedly it would be extremely difficult to bring about a situation under which any refugees could return to Israel.

The Assistant Secretary further stated that as a practical matter most refugees would not want to go back and live in Israel, even if they could return. He stated that Israel was considerably changed from Mandate days and that most of the refugees would undoubtedly be extremely dissatisfied in Israel.

Foreign Minister Rifai admitted that he and most of his Government shared this opinion. He stated that certain refugees would like to return—not all of them. He suggested that the PCC should be given the positive responsibility of determining which refugees should return as well as wider responsibility in settlement of the compensation problem.

Ambassador-designate Zayn al-Din attempted to summarize the Syrian point of view by stating that the Syrian Government realized that a good part of the refugees should be resettled. This resettlement required sacrifice by the Syrian Government, that for this sacrifice foreign economic assistance was required for the general development of Syria in such a way that the Syrian people would be able to receive a net increase in their standard of living. Mr. Byroade was asked if he conceived of the possibility of substantial economic assistance as a prelude to further development.

Mr. Byroade replied affirmatively that he could conceive of the possibility of economic assistance although he could not at this point concede that the adjective “substantiar” was appropriate. He stated that there were now three sources of funds, and subsequently added a fourth source. These were (1) UNRWA funds, (2) Point IV funds, (3) future possibility of grant aid, and (4) funds available through banking institutions such as IBRD, EXIMBANK, etc.

With respect to (1), the Assistant Secretary referred to the 70% U.S. share of UNRWA funds, the difficulties he faced when asking Congress for this money in view of lack of achievements, the question of how long UN members would continue to contribute to refugee resettlement. Mr. Byroade stated that additional funds would be hard to find in the absence of fullest utilization being made of funds already allocated which were already substantial.

Foreign Minister Rifai expressed his doubt regarding the technical ability of UNRWA authorities to handle refugee resettlement. He mentioned three projects which the Syrian authorities had discussed without results with UNRWA officials. These were the “Autaba Marshes” land drainage scheme, the Baruda River irrigation and land development scheme and the large lake development project near Damascus. The Syrian Government had been disappointed that those projects had not received more attention from UNRWA technicians.

Mr. Byroade commented briefly that he was not worried about the technical problem and that he was confident that he could find the technicians required if this proved to be any handicap to resettlement.

Mr. Byroade then described the basic Point IV philosophy and the immediate and long term benefits which could be realized from this approach. He added that there would appear to be every possibility that Point IV legislation could materially assist in the improvement of the Syrian economy and in the refugee resettlement problem. He stated that there was considerable latitude in the specific form that Point IV assistance might take and that what was required from the Syrian authorities was specific request for assistance and indication by the Syrian Government of what steps they were prepared to take in return for such assistance. Mr. Byroade stated that he did not have the authority at this time to state how far the U.S. Government was prepared to go in making Point IV aid available to Syria and that this determination largely rested with the approach to the U.S. made by the Syrian authorities.

Mr. Byroade then asked the Foreign Minister for any specific comments regarding Syrian views towards the Point IV concept and its application to Syria. The Foreign Minister stated that Point IV, as he understood it, only engaged in “studies” and technicians, that Point IV placed heavy financial obligations on the Syrian treasury, and that public opinion demanded immediate results from foreign assistance. Departmental representatives thereupon proceeded to disabuse the Foreign Minister of the above concepts. Mention was specifically made of the Kasmie project in the Lebanon as an example of sound economic development.

It was also pointed out that no technicians which were unwanted by the Syrian Government would become a part of any Point IV program. It was stated that there was every reason to believe that the short and long term interests of both the United States and Syria might well be served by the Point IV legislation if a full explanation of what the U.S. was prepared to do and particularly what the Syrian Government desired could be developed in detail. The Foreign Minister stated that his ignorance of the U.S.G. economic assistance was perhaps due to his single conversation with Ambassador Locke on this subject and expressed a genuine interest in further exploration of the subject.

Regarding the third source of funds, grant aid, Mr. Byroade stated that although grant aid was not available at this time, it would be a subject for future discussion with Congress. Mr. Byroade then described the difficulties in making a case before Congress for grant assistance to the Middle East. He stated that in general the Department was required to make its own calculations on the basis of incomplete technical facts regarding projects needed in the Middle East; that even if a case could be made, Congress would undoubtedly ask whether Near Eastern states would accept aid if authorized; to this the Assistant Secretary stated his answer would have to be, under existing conditions, “I don’t know”.

Foreign Minister Rifai smilingly admitted that he could understand Mr. Byroade’s problem but stated that Syrian hesitation was due to the fact that assistance offered was so inferior to what Syria was doing for itself. He referred to the 100,000 hectares of land which the Syrian Government had reclaimed by improvision with inferior machinery, inadequate resources, etc. The Foreign Minister added that the Syrian authorities feared being tied too tight by agreements with the United States when they were doing so much more on their own. He then added his view that the “Arab East” should appear more important to the U.S. than Europe for purposes of defense since their weaknesses were so much greater.

Mr. Byroade stated that the Foreign Minister would not have to convince him of that point, but should only assist him in making his work easier. He added that the interpreter should make clear that the United States did not wish to appear too impatient in its desire to do all things in the Middle East and did not wish to overstress the importance of Point IV aid. He added, however, that Point IV was doing and could do an excellent job; Iran, where more Point IV assistance was being requested by the Iranian Government, was given as an example.

The other topics were briefly mentioned and discussed: (a) Renegotiation of the IPC pipeline terms, and (b) the Arab League. Regarding (a) the Foreign Minister stated that the pipeline agreements did not provide Syria with an equitable source of income, that these arrangements had been negotiated by either the French or Husni Zaim to the disadvantage of the Syrian people and that some form of taxation which would earn more money for Syria was being considered. Comparison was made with the oil producing countries in the Middle East which earned high income from the oil wells.

Department officials briefly mentioned (1) that clauses waiving customs duties and taxes were the general rule rather than an exception made by the French Mandate or previous Syrian authorities; (2) that payments in excess of the original contracts had already been made and were the proper subject for commercial negotiation; (3) that pipeline companies were unfairly handicapped by their inability to change site with increasing demands of foreign governments as were other business enterprises. Reference was made to the IPC exploration company in Syria which was forced to terminate its concession when Syrian objections to the original contract became too severe; (4) that it was difficult to determine what a fair transit price should be. The oil companies could only make their decision to construct pipelines on a basis of comparing tanker construction and operating costs with transit agreement and pipeline construction and operating costs. On a basis of these calculations and agreements Syria had not only profited by the IPC pipeline construction in 1935, but by the newest IPC Big Inch construction and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline construction. If the Syrian Government had negotiated too high terms in 1935 the later two pipeline developments might not have been built. It was mentioned that certain oil company experts contested the economic desirability of building the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, supporting instead the use of the same amount of steel in moveable tankers; (5) that failure to respect valid contracts adversely affected other private investment in Syria.

Regarding (b) Mr. Byroade was asked for his views regarding the Arab League and its future. He stated briefly that he had not been able to agree at all times with decisions of the Arab League. He mentioned, however, that he was basically in sympathy with regional cooperation; that he had personally been closely associated with efforts to strengthen European regional associations; he felt that history would show that this had been the era of the development of European Federation, even though some days it appeared that the daily motion was more backward than forward. The Assistant Secretary stated that all countries were now giving up a part of their sovereignty and indeed that the United States had also given up an important measure of its sovereignty. He believed that the Arab League could provide more positive influence than it had to date.

Mr. Byroade asked the Foreign Minister if he could visit Washington for further exploration of these subjects. The Foreign Minister was most receptive to the suggestion and stated that following his return from Mexico in several weeks he hoped to visit Washington. It was stated that this visit might correspond with Zayn al Din’s presentation of his credentials as Syrian Ambassador to the United States. Warm expressions concerning the profitability of the meeting were exchanged.