Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

783.00/11–1552: Telegram

No. 521
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

secret

Washington, November 15, 1952—3:42 p.m.

316. Re Deptel 265 Oct 24. Dept has studied with interest responses from Damascus (Embtel 345 Nov 6) and Tel Aviv (Embtel 779 Nov 13). Dept has reached certain conclusions and suggests that if these have concurrence of field, they be used as points reference in event Shishikli–Davis–Moose meeting (Damascus 353 Nov 11 sent Tel Aviv 34),² besides being presented to Israel Fon Off.

1. Dept agrees with first sentence Tel Aviv reftel as to “crux of difficulty”. Semantics hamstring any Syrian-Israel negots, not only in re procedure but also in relation very substance. Israel wants conversations lead towards peace, Syr wants conversations lead towards reduction tension.

2. US understands and supports Israeli viewpoint, for peace between Israel and Arab States is one of cardinal points in US Near East policy. Moreover, as reported by Tel Aviv tel 665 Oct 23 genuine desire for better relations with Arab neighbors has taken hold in Israeli minds, with consequent diminution of “lebensraum” school.

3. However, Syr approach seems more realistic in light present Arab-Israeli overall relations. To expect relatively temperate Arab leaders to add Israel peace issue to touchy subjects of nationalism, xenophobia and internal reform is asking them court downfall before already saturated public emotion. On other hand, Syr-Israel modus vivendi might not have peace in mind when made, but if reasonably well designed and executed it shld by nature encourage future peace simply thru removal frictions which made it necessary.

4. Both parties shld be urged by US continue direct and earnest negots (inside or outside Armistice Agreement framework). Israel shld be counseled give serious consideration any Syr proposals which might eliminate frictions, whether or not those proposals mean only first hesitant steps towards far distant peace. Shishikli shld be advised take more positive and courageous approach towards meeting Israeli proposals and signing Israeli agreements per se, to soft-pedal bellicose statements about “revenge”, and in general behave publicly in manner less likely put Israelis on defensive.³

Bruce

1. Sent also to Tel Aviv; repeated to Amman.
2. In telegram 353 from Damascus, Nov. 11 (repeated to Tel Aviv as 34), Ambassador Moose welcomed the opportunity to consult with Ambassador Davis in Damascus. Moose stated that in view of his comments to Shishikli regarding Davis’ opinion of Israel’s conciliatory attitude (referring to telegram 345 from Damascus, Document 509), and Shishikli’s present position as Acting Foreign Minister, he might wish to talk with Davis. The Embassy would not take the initiative to seek an appointment, but Moose believed Davis should be prepared to talk to Shishikli if the latter so desired. (711.5880/11–1152)
3. In telegram 323 to Damascus, Nov. 19 (repeated to Tel Aviv as 519), the Department recommended that the Embassies urge the reconvention of the Oct. 8 Mixed Armistice Commission group to discuss specifically the delimitation of the demilitarized zone and, if possible, associated boundary problems. (783.00/11–1952)