Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

IO files, lot 71 D 440

No. 499
Department of State Position Paper¹

confidential
SD/AC.2/74

[Washington,] October 4, 1952.

Assistance to Palestine Refugees

The Problem

To determine the United States position with regard to the program of UNRWA and the financing thereof in the light of the recommendations of the Director and Advisory Commission.²

Recomendations

It recommended that the United States Delegation should:

1. Following informal discussion with representative Arab Delegations, co-sponsor, along with the U.K., France, and Turkey, and as many other delegations as possible, a resolution along the lines of the attached draft;

2. Attempt to concentrate General Assembly consideration on the economic and humanitarian aspects of UNRWA and to avoid possible entanglement with the political aspects of the Palestine problem.

[Attachment]

Draft Resolution

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January, 1952;

Having Examined the Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Special Joint Report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the recommendations contained therein;

1. Notes negotiations which have taken place between UNRWA and Near Eastern governments under the program approved in its resolution 513 (VI);

2. Urges UNRWA and the Near Eastern governments concerned to proceed as rapidly as possible with the completion of agreements and projects which will enable refugees to become wholly self-supporting and remove them from relief rolls;

3. Recognizes that the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure cannot be realized to the extent envisaged in the three-year $250 million relief and reintegration program approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 513 (VI) and accordingly authorizes relief expenditures for FY 1953 not to exceed $23,000,000, subject to such minor adjustments as may be determined by the Advisory Commission in consultation with the Director; and further authorizes the Advisory Commission to approve for expenditure during the first half of FY 1954 such amount for relief as will facilitate the objectives of the agency and requests that in the Joint Report to the 8th Session of the General Assembly recommendations be made concerning the remainder of the year;

4. Urges the governments of member and non-member states to make contributions for the balance of the $250 million three-year reintegration and relief program to enable the Agency to make commitments in that amount;

5. Requests that negotiations regarding contributions for the program be carried out with member and non-member states by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds;

6. Expresses its appreciation to United Nations bodies and specialized agencies for their invaluable assistance and calls upon all United Nations bodies and specialized agencies concerned to continue to render all possible services to insure that the assistance programs of the United Nations in the Near East be administered with maximum coordination and efficiency;

7. Expresses its appreciation to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programs have afforded invaluable supplementary assistance to Palestine refugees and again requests them to continue and expand to the extent possible the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.³

Comment

General

While it is presently contemplated that the UNRWA Report will be considered in Committee 2, we are not prepared to oppose the Arab States if they should move that this report be considered in the Ad Hoc Committee. Accordingly, recommendation 2, while indicating our desire to concentrate General Assembly debate on the economic and humanitarian aspects of UNRWA, is based on the prospect that the United States Delegation must be prepared to accept the possibility that the UNRWA report will, in fact, become entangled with the political aspects of the Palestine problem.

The action to be taken by the General Assembly on the Palestine refugee program is of secondary importance by contrast with the action taken a year ago when approval was given to the three-year $250 million relief and reintegration program (Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952). The lines of action for the Agency and the approximate sums involved were set forth in that resolution which was approved without a dissenting vote.

Our aim this year is to take the action necessary in the General Assembly to continue the program for another year and to improve the setting for the work of UNRWA. The attached draft resolution is predicated on information currently available but without benefit of the final recommendations of the Director and Advisory Commission.

Draft Resolution

Paragraphs 1 & 2: Progress has been made in negotiations with Syria, but the most recent information available indicates that negotiations, which it was hoped would be finalized to include the reintegration of 20,000 refugee families in Syria at a cost of $30 million, have been suspended following an unsatisfactory interview on October 2 in Damascus between the Director and the Foreign Minister of Syria. In Syria, the Agency and the Government appear to be victims of a vicious circle. The Agency cannot move forward with specific projects until the Syrian government has acquiesced in its general approach and indicated where agricultural and engineering experts might conduct necessary technical investigations. On the other hand, the Syrian Government has alleged on more than one occasion that while it is interested in the Agency’s proposals, specific plans advanced by the Director are non-existent and vague generalities relating to numbers of refugees and sums of money form an insufficient base for the conclusion of negotiations. In the meantime, the refugees are kept alive, but with their future undetermined. They remain the outstanding political and social problem in the Near East.

In Jordan, however, the background is more favorable, although the Jordanians remain reluctant to accept in detail the necessary prerequisite to the use of UN funds for capital projects, to wit, agreement that such capital expenditures will be directly related to specific numbers of refugees.

Agreement covering the construction of a very large reservoir and dam on the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan, is under consideration. Preliminary engineering studies indicate that construction of the dam and irrigation ditches for land reclamation both on the east and on the west banks of the Jordan could result in the establishment of as many as 20,000 new farms which could furnish the livelihood for 100,000 refugees settled directly on the farms plus an indeterminate number of other refugees who could derive their support indirectly from such an undertaking.

Paragraph 3: The Director and Advisory Commission have carefully examined the relief requirements for the fiscal period ending June 30, 1953, in the light of prospects for reducing relief rolls to the extent that reintegration projects are undertaken. They have requested $23 million for relief for this period in lieu of the $18 million estimate provided in paragraph 9 of resolution 513 (VI). The Director and Advisory Commission have not yet made a recommendation with regard to a revision of relief estimates for the fiscal year 1954. It is clear, however, that the total of $50 million for relief for the three-year period ($27 million for Fiscal 1952; $18 million for 1953; and $5 million for 1954) cannot be realized and that consequently a larger proportion of the $250 million estimate will need to be devoted to relief. The United States Delegation in commenting on this matter should insist on holding relief expenditures to a minimum in order that available funds may be devoted to the reintegration program. Relief expenditures for Fiscal 1954 are more likely to cost in the neighborhood of $15 million than the $5 million initially estimated.

Paragraphs 5 and 6: The three-year $250 million goal approved by the General Assembly was broken down by fiscal years as follows:

	195½	195⅔	1953/4	Total
Relief expenditures	27	18	5	50
Reintegration commitments	50	100	50	200
Total	77	118	55	250

Pledges thus far recorded for the fiscal years 1952 and 1953 total approximately $145 million, leaving approximately $105 million yet to be pledged. Funds so far pledged are ample for the Agency’s current needs and appear adequate to cover prospective commitments in Jordan and Syria. These funds will be inadequate however to extend the program beyond the projects in Jordan and those for the 100,000 refugees now contemplated for resettlement in Syria and further pledges will therefore be necessary in order to strengthen the hand of the Agency in negotiating such projects. It has been U.S. Government policy to pledge up to 70% of the total fund, and appropriations are in hand for 1952 and 1953 enabling us to advance up to $110 million. It is presently the intention of the Executive Branch to budget $65 million for fiscal 1954, rounding our three-years’ pledges at $175 million.

Under these circumstances the present task of the United Nations is to obtain firm pledges even though the funds for expenditures on projects may not be required within the year for which they are pledged. The task of the Negotiating Committee should therefore be to negotiate contributions for the balance of the $250 million not already pledged and leave to the Agency the question of negotiating with the contributing governments on the time of payment of their pledges, it being understood that payments might be made after July 1, 1954, since at least one or two years more will be required to execute projects after commitments have been made.

Composition of the Advisory Commission

It is possible that a question may arise in the General Assembly concerning the composition of the Advisory Commission. Under paragraph 8 of resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, the four designated members of the Commission (US, UK, France and Turkey) were authorized to add three members to the Commission from among contributing governments. Several months ago Pakistan, and currently, Syria, have indicated their interest in membership. The Advisory Commission did not accord membership to Pakistan on the grounds that it was inadvisable to increase the membership of the Commission at that time (June 1952). A recent request from Syria for membership on the Commission is now receiving consideration by the Advisory Commission. The governments represented on the Commission have indicated that they favor the admission of Syria and welcome its interest in wishing to be a direct participant with the ensuing responsibilities which it implies. What effect the admission of Syria may have upon other Arab Governments is not yet known. Nevertheless the Department’s present thinking is that governments which are directly involved in the reintegration program—such as Syria and Jordan—should be represented. The 3 vacant seats are believed to be ample to meet present requests for membership, and if changes are to be made in the number we must consider a revision of the terms of reference of the Advisory Commission. For the time being therefore we should make no proposals for changes in the number of available seats on the Advisory Commission nor in its terms of reference. In the event that contributing governments, within or without the Near East, manifest a serious interest in full participation in the Advisory Commission with the attendant cost of maintaining full-time representatives and the other heavy responsibilities entailed, the composition, and possibly the terms of reference will need to be re-examined.

Political Aspects—Arab attitudes

It is clearly necessary for proposals relating to the UNRWA to fit a pattern established by other actions of the Assembly in connection with the Palestine problem. The underlying resolution concerning the rights of the refugees was passed by the Assembly on December 11, 1948, and subsequent resolutions dealing with the UNRWA have unfailingly, at Arab insistence, made reference to the fact that their terms are without prejudice to refugee rights to repatriation or compensation established by that resolution. Further reference to this resolution is sterile, but may be insisted upon by the Arabs. Actual progress of the UNRWA is blocked on the political level by fear of prejudicing refugee rights of repatriation and on the operating level in the area by refugees’ fears that they may be waiving rights to compensation and to repatriation by participating in the UNRWA reintegration programs. Over and beyond this is the fact that the UN ration represents security to the refugee which he fears to lose. The delegation may not have to debate these issues with the Arab Delegation but it is important to note that the Prime Minister of Jordan made a forthright statement on August 23 in the local press on the following lines:

“… Certain newspapers have mentioned the problem of refugee resettlement in detail. It is my duty to state that in Jordan we do not have what are termed ‘refugees’ since constitutionally all refugees have become Jordanian citizens and none of them can be coerced to leave his country. As regards resettlement and housing, I do not perceive any contradiction between it and the principle of repatriation. Repatriation does not depend upon the lack of desire of the refugee to improve his present condition nor does it depend on whether he lives in a house or a tent. It depends upon conditions which we hope will become alleviated with the passage of time. Nothing will prevent the return of the refugee to the homeland of his fathers. The principle of resettlement in no way contradicts the right of the refugee to repatriation or his right to his properties. The duty of the press, therefore, is to enlighten refugees concerning these facts and to remove from their minds the troubled thoughts which certain irresponsible individuals are trying to plant by handling the case of the refugees wrongly in a way that leads to a greater degree of displacement and greater dependence upon international charity. Several days ago I read an opinion expressed by an Arab statesman to the effect that all refugees should be resettled in Jordan. We welcome this opinion heartily, although it is well known that our possibilities are limited and that we already have a large number of refugees…” (Amman Desp. No. 64, Aug 26, 1952).

Similarly, on August 25, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Zafir Rifai, arranged for the publication of a press interview which is recorded in part as follows:

“Question: Is is possible for you to define the present Government’s policy with respect to the settlement projects?

“Answer: Although the Syrian Government sticks to the right of the refugees to return to their homes, which would safeguard the dignity of the UN resolutions and the security of that part of the Arab homeland, it cannot, from a humanitarian point of view, uphold the principle of depriving any group of the natural right to choose shelter in any part of the Arab homeland to alleviate its miserable condition in the expectation of a settlement of the problem. The presence of the Palestinian refugees in Syria or in other parts of Arabia does not arise from the will of the existing governments or from their direct approval. On the contrary, it is a situation imposed on the previous government following the great catastrophe in Palestine. The present Government, despite its endeavors to liberate itself from the policy of extemporization and emotions which failed in all the Arab fields, cannot at present order the refugees to be repatriated from Syria or accept a similar measure which contradicts the principles of Arab brotherhood and equality.

“Question: What are Syria’s reservations vis-à-vis the projects of settling the refugees?

“Answer: The present Government sticks to Syria’s right as a host state to determine the centers of sheltering the refugees in Syria and the type of their activity and work in accordance with international traditions. No private local or international organization is entitled to detract the sovereign right of the Syrian state in the Syrian territory or to ignore the Government’s decisions on the places designated for sheltering the refugees in temporary camps and houses nor with respect to their absorption into the domestic economy and to the designation of the types and means which are most fit to alleviate their condition within the frame of safeguarding the standard of living of Syrian citizens.”

It may be possible for the delegation to use the thinking among such Arab leaders to great advantage in furthering the UNRWA program.

[Attachment]

Memorandum on Palestine Refugee Program and Related Items.

secret

[Washington ?, undated.]

This memorandum is intended to supplement the position paper on the Palestine refugee program, and has been prepared pursuant to the request of Ambassador Jessup.

1. The General Assembly session offers an opportunity, during the course of formal or informal sessions, to forward our end of refugee resettlement as well as other matters related to the Palestine problem.

2. Insofar as the refugees are concerned, we can point to a year of slow progress, but the fact that we have had substantial funds available to offer for the quid of resettlement has improved the bargaining position of UN representatives. Evidence of progress is found in recent public statements of the Jordanian Prime Minister and of the Syrian Foreign Minister which are quoted in the position paper. Further progress is indicated in a formal request of the Syrian Government to join the Advisory Commission of UNRWA. We believe that we should press home at every opportunity the rights of the refugee who chooses not to be repatriated, to shelter, citizenship, and the chance to become a productive member of society in other Arab communities. The fact that UNRWA is now able to finance refugees who choose not to be repatriated represents an opportunity not only for the refugee himself but also for other Arab countries who can be strengthened by the infusion of a new and self-sustaining group.

3. The year that has elapsed since UNRWA was supplied with ample funds is but a brief interval in the long history of the Near East. We should therefore not be unduly discouraged at the fact that little tangible progress has yet been made. We should be encouraged to persist in the financing and in the execution of the three-year program. Especially in consultations with the British and French delegations, it would be well to emphasize the need for continuing support of the three-year program while recognizing that it will doubtless be necessary to extend the term of this program probably at the next session of the Assembly. This means that we shall look to the British and the French for very substantial assistance on the financial side so that the program can be a genuine UN program.

4. We should not criticize without due reflection Arab leaders who frequently appear to be making the refugee issue a purely political matter and capitalizing on the refugee plight for immediate selfish political ends. We should inquire whether their fears of further expansion by Israel are wholly without foundation before reaching such a judgment. It may be that an Arab politician who chooses to keep the refugee issue alive and not agree to resettlement is moved by conscientious considerations of the security of his own country and his own people which might possibly take priority in his mind over settlement of the refugee question. To allay Arab fears, whether they be legitimate or not, we should take every reasonable opportunity to keep alive the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. Constant repetition of the terms of this document can serve a useful purpose whether or not it is possible for us eventually to strengthen its terms by making it an outright guarantee of territorial integrity. Again, the issue of the internationalization of Jerusalem has a direct bearing on the problem of Arab security and consequently of eventual Arab acceptance of resettlement. The presence of UN authority in the region, even if it involves reportorial functions only in relation to the holy places in Jerusalem and elsewhere, would serve as a steadying influence in the area. The UN authorities would be a manifestation of continuing interest and their presence would furnish the world with a listening post supplementary to the MAC’s.

5. Evidence at hand indicates that the Israeli Government is reacting against plans now under foot to impound the waters of the Yarmuk River at a point on the border of Jordan and Syria some 40 miles from the mouth of the Yarmuk which joins the Jordan about 4 miles south of Lake Tiberias. These plans for the Yarmuk hold great promise. Officially, we are not yet prepared to take a position on the feasibility or legality of this project. It is under careful study and the UNRWA is presently contracting to obtain the best legal and engineering advice obtainable on the proposal. Until more information is at hand, it is not desirable to pursue the subject, except with our colleagues on the Advisory Commission in confidence.

6. Insofar as plans for the US financing are concerned, budget hearings relating to the area will take place early in November. In the meantime, the Department and DMS appear in agreement that we should seek an appropriation for 1954 for the UNRWA program in the amount of $65 million which will round out total contributions at 70% of the $250 million fund proposed for the three years ending June 30, 1954. The attitude of the Executive Branch appears to be united on meeting any reasonable request of the Arabs which will make it easier for them to accept the principle of using these funds for the rehabilitation of the Palestinians in countries prepared to cooperate to this end, and to sell this idea, so unattractive in the past, to their public.

7. Compensation is a thorny subject. While we are pressing the Israelis for payment to Arabs for property left behind in Israel, we must temper our moves with these considerations in the background:

(1) Israel cannot, for lack of funds, make any really substantial payments in the reasonably near future.

(2) The U.S. can hardly be expected to pay compensation for Israel over and above resettlement costs through UNRWA, and even if the US does so, the political effect of compensation would be neutralized if it were clear that the burden did not fall on Israel.

(3) Estimates of PCC experts indicate that on any reasonable estimates of total compensation, over half the refugees would receive little benefit, certainly not enough to reestablish their livelihood elsewhere. Contrarywise, a small group would probably be entitled to very substantial sums per capita.

1. For the instruction of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) submitted an annual report covering the period July 1, 1951–June 30, 1952 (U.N. doc. A/2171) and a special report containing recommendations of the Director and the Agency’s Advisory Commission (U.N. doc. A/2171/Add. 1), with respect to future assistance to Palestine refugees. These reports were referred to the Ad Hoc Political Committee, which discussed them at its 3d to 7th meetings between Oct. 23 and 30.
3. For the text of a draft resolution submitted jointly to the Ad Hoc Political Committee by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.1. That draft resolution was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on Oct. 30 by 50 votes to none, with 7 abstentions, and was adopted by the General Assembly at its 391st plenary meeting on Nov. 6 as Resolution 614 (VII); for text, see Document 508.