Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

357.AC/10–952: Telegram

No. 500
The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State¹

confidential
priority

Tel Aviv, October 9, 1952—5 p.m.

569. Embtels 438,² 542,³ 551.⁴ Gen Riley advises Israel Govt has not yet complied with his request re Mt. Scopus and has taken no position on subj in any communication to him. He believes disagreement may lie in his interpretation of July 7, 1948 agreement to effect UN observer is in command of demil zone Mt. Scopus, and in his view, validity maps dated June 16, July 7, and July 21, 1948 in delimiting demil zone.

He states sitn becoming increasingly embarrassing and fears continued failure IG comply with his requests may oblige him to inform Jordan of exact nature of his correspondence with IG (see Embdes 265, Sept 17),⁵ which he feels wld have serious consequences. It wld give Jordan pretext for refusal continue abide by July 7 agreement, which Gen Riley has been at some pains to keep in effect pending implementation Art VIII armistice agreement or conclusion of peace. Without that agreement, Jordan may refuse to permit further convoys to proceed thru HKJ terr, which wld almost certainly be regarded as hostile act by IG.

Gen Riley believes accordingly that tripartite representation on Scopus might be timely and useful, especially if made under instrs from representative govts and not at his instance. Have requested appointment with Fon Ministry tomorrow with view to inquiring about status of relations with Jordan in general and Mt. Scopus matter in particular.⁶

Davis

1. Repeated to Amman, London, Paris, and Jerusalem (for Riley)
2. Telegram 438 from Tel Aviv, Sept. 15, described General Riley’s allegations of Israel’s failure to comply, in the Demilitarized Zone of Mount Scopus, with his requests of Aug. 17 in accordance with the Mount Scopus Agreement of July 7, 1948. Riley requested the withdrawal of a check post, the elimination of an observation post, the filling in of semi-foxholes and slit trenches, and the destruction of a suspected mine field. (357.AC/9–1552)
3. In telegram 542 from Tel Aviv, Oct. 6, Ambassador Davis reported in part that the British Foreign Office, concerned with a potentially explosive situation, had asked the British Ambassador to assess jointly with the French Chargé and Davis (1) Israel’s case for her present attitude, and (2) the arguments for and against tripartite representation before the situation got out of hand. (357.AC/10–652)
4. In telegram 551, Oct. 7, Davis reported that he had met on Oct. 6 with the British Ambassador and French Chargé to discuss the alleged failure of the Israeli authorities to comply with Riley’s request. (357.AC/10–752)
5. Despatch 265 from Tel Aviv, Sept. 17, forwarded the texts of correspondence dated Aug. 17 and Sept. 12 from Riley to the Israeli Government. (357.AC/9–1752)
6. On Oct. 10, the Department stated that it was authorizing Ambassador Davis at his discretion to join with the British and French representatives at Tel Aviv in an effort to minimize the importance of the apparent Israeli violation and to endeavor to prevent a repetition of the unfortunate situation created by the recent barrel incident. (Telegram 374 to Tel Aviv, Oct. 10, 7:36 p.m.; 357.AC/10–1052)