Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

783A.00/10–252: Telegram

No. 498
The Chargé in Lebanon (Lobenstine) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Beirut, October 2, 1952—1 p.m.

673. In hour’s conversation with Pres Chamoun at Beit Ed-EdDine, we reviewed pending problems between two govts in atmosphere utmost cordiality. I was prepared to restate our position along lines taken with ex-Pres Khoury (Embtels 32 [320] August 19 and 512 September 12). Pres disarmed me immed by stating there are no problems between us that cannot be settled, not sometime in future but right now.

1. On local political situation Pres admitted new cabinet was “his cabinet” after he had put up with bickering politicians in Chamber Deputies long enough. Our meeting was cut short as he said the four Ministers were waiting outside for a meeting to outline details Pres program presented in his acceptance-inaugural address. As soon as this completed, they wld present it to Chamber with request Chambers grant them decree-law powers to execute it. Pres had no faith in working with present Parliament—on the electoral law revision alone, he said, they wld and cld filibuster for months. However, he had no intention of dissolving Parliament now. Dissolution remains a possibility if Chamber does not grant Cabinet decree-law powers,. . . .

2. Pres asked me where we stood on Point Four, but gave me time to cover only problems of unsigned projects agreement and customs problems. On latter after hearing explanation he said he wld instruct Min Finance Hakim to call me today and promised a solution this week. He agreed it wld take another decision of Council Mins to reverse decision of August 21 subjecting TCA shipments to muncipal taxes, but viewed favorable action as foregone conclusion. (I did not mention that Moubarak is now in key position of FonMin, one of only four Cab Mins, and that it was he not then a member of Cabinet who swung entire Cabinet to his point of view on August 21.)

3. On project agreements he saw no problem on grounds if the individual projects were good of course the new Mins wld sign them.

4. I mentioned that one gap in Pres reform program we had noted was omission of tax reform. In reply to his questions I mentioned over-dependence on regressive indirect taxes and small use made of direct income tax. Pres replied, correctly that this was question of enforcement of existing law. After present income tax rates had been effectively enforced for some time, they cld better assess need for further revisions in tax structure.

5. President then said if pending problems settled, next question was economic aid from US to finance projects after Point IV surveys completed. I tried to disabuse him of idea Point IV consisted of nothing but surveys, pointing out some other aspects of program. Even where limited to survey, e.g. Litani, object was to prepare document which IBRD wld accept without further technical study. For local currency costs and for other types of projects, I stressed importance of creating climate which wld attract private financing, mentioning water resource development Regie (Embdes 163, Sept 12)² as example of what might be done. He obviously got the point, but immed inquired when US wld give Leb kind of economic aid we have freely given to even less friendly European countries and Turkey (he did not mention Israel). I replied I cld not answer that one, but said Leb’s chances wld be much greater if it made effective use of large amount of aid already offered.

6. Pres then rapidly shifted to arms. “We need arms, we need them badly, we need them now.” US knows well, he said, Leb with its small army wld never be an aggressor. But Leb must have one tough and heavily armed division to protect itself. US has given large quantities of arms to Europe and Turkey, to say nothing of others. Leb is willing to pay cash. But even limited quantities of arms Leb requested were inexplicably delayed in Wash and London. Why? I said I knew of no instance when we had forwarded a request from Leb Army Wash had not acted reasonably promptly. Pres replied Gen Chehab told him we were delaying a request for 155 and 105 mm guns. I said I wld check with MilAtt and report details to Dept.

7. During discussion on arms, Pres said: “Of course, we have had our differences—over Israel, refugees, etc. But you know that if it ever came to war with Soviet Leb is 100 percent on side of West, . . . , whether or not we have any kind of treaty or agreement in writing.” I replied that we had always known the sympathies most Lebs lay with West, but was glad to hear this from him, the Pres. He repeated his words, said we need never fear where Leb’s ultimate loyalties lay. But the hope of planes and ships from the West was no substitute for a small but tough Leb Army to defend Leb soil. All he asked was a little bit of initiative and imagination in Wash in considering Leb’s minor requests for arms. He added he wld insist on the same attitude from the Brit.

At reception for Diplomatic Corps Saturday, Pres had looked worn and tired. With the Cabinet crisis off his shoulders he seemed a new man yesterday. He had regained his old spark and vitality, and was almost itching for the battles awaiting him in the Chamber.

To the extent Pres Chamoun’s views are imbued in the members of his Cabinet, we can now expect to move ahead rapidly on several fronts. At the top level there is now a will which was formerly lacking. However, we shld not raise our hopes prematurely. The reaction of Parl to the forthcoming demand for decree-law powers is no foregone conclusion. While reform is the order of the day, most of the forces which frustrated our efforts before still remain entrenched.

Lobenstine

1. Sent by pouch to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and the Arab capitals.
2. Despatch 163 from Beirut, Sept. 12, described proposals to establish a corporation for water resource development in Lebanon. (883A.2614/9–1252) The Government of Lebanon on Aug. 19 had adopted by decree the “Gemayel–Naccache” plan for the unified development of Lebanon’s water resources, and had appointed a committee to draw up statutes under which the new corporation, to be called a Régie, should operate. The plan was based on studies made by the Lebanese engineer Albert Naccache, subsequently publicized by Maurice Gemayel in his book La planification des eaux (Beirut, 1951).