Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Ankara Embassy files, lot 57 F 72, 400 MED, 1953–54

No. 173
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

top secret
priority

Washington, January 16, 1954—4 p.m.

773. Part one of two part message. Eyes only Ambassadors.

1. Department appreciates excellent reply to questions Department raised concerning joint Pakistan–Turkish defense agreement and is especially pleased see cooperative spirit reflected.²

2. Department in full agreement Turkish statement re objectives and significant proposed mutual defense arrangement.

3. Turks agreement Department’s views on Iran noted.³ As to Iraq, Department believes Turk analysis sound, and endorses course proposed paragraph 8. Turks should know that information has just been given Hamali in great confidence that U.S. will shortly reply and most probably favorably Iraq request limited military assistance. Although no conditions re participation defense arrangements will be attached U.S. reply, it will be made clear that amounts provided will necessarily reflect progress in development effective area defense.⁴

4. As to character proposed Turk–Pakistan arrangements, agree Turk view paragraph 10 it will differ from Ankara Pact in several essential points. Believe Turk view correct that proposed agreement should be initially limited to cooperation on matters of general character listed paragraph 9, and that it should be loosely drawn and capable of elaboration as developments warrant.⁵ Agreement so limited would have desirable effect avoiding implication of mutual assistance guarantee which might extend obligations NATO countries under Article V NAT. Believe it also desirable that agreement should be so drawn as to indicate it is not concerned with local disputes such as those of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan.

Part two of two parts.

5. Department agrees with Turk view as to importance of tactics. Following actions appear desirable to complete series moves ending with announcement U.S. intention to provide arms Pakistan:

A. Advance coordination US-Turk–Pakistan plans.

B. Diplomatic preparation for announcement Turk–Pakistan intention hold discussions concerning mutual defense problems.

C. Public announcement such intention.

D. Following closely, on “C”, Pakistan request for U.S. arms assistance.

E. Diplomatic preparation for U.S. announcement intention provide arms Pakistan.

F. Public announcement such intention.

6. Timing these moves most serious problem. Delay in any public announcement while extensive discussions involving a number of countries carried on would almost certainly result unfortunate leaks with damaging effects. To accelerate procedure to maximum extent following suggestions made:

A. Turkey to approach Pakistan in secret earliest to suggest talks with view reaching cooperative defense agreement of consultative and joint planning character. The result of this approach would be (1) to agree to meet for this purpose and (2) to agree on a joint communiqué announcing this fact. With so much preparatory work already done and seemingly there being agreement on what is desired a very few days should suffice for above to be accomplished.

B. We should be informed in advance in order that we could also discuss with Pakistanis the steps to be taken. At this time we would inform Pak PM secretly and in utmost confidence that decision had been taken to extend military aid within framework of a joint Pak–Turk agreement. Because of need for secrecy we would hope that Pak PM would not find it necessary to inform all his ministers of this fact. (U.S. desire for secrecy due to desire keep distorted press speculation to minimum in interval prior to issuance statement by President mentioned para 7, E below.)

C. Diplomatic preparation for announcement Turk–Pakistan intentions consult of course matter primarily for those countries. Iran, Iraq, India, Afghanistan should be informed impending Turk–Pakistan discussions. Department hopes that Turkey and Pakistan will be able to agree some appropriate form of assurance which Turkey might provide Afghanistan. Although Department would expect be informed as to what it is proposed say, does not wish to be consulted in advance. Also hopes that Pakistanis will feel it possible offer non-aggression pact India. Turks would approach Iraq along lines suggested paragraph 8 their memorandum. Might also be desirable for U.S. follow up this approach by discussing with Iraq implications our offer military aid. Will obviously be desirable for US as well as Turkey and Pakistan to inform the British generally of developments. At appropriate stage also desirable provide information the French. Believe it essential that Turks make statement NAC. U.S. will be prepared support such statement, and will endeavor enlist similar support from British and French. Except for consultation British and French, various approaches should all be made in very brief period, preferably same day.

D. Public announcement intention Turks, Pakistan consult should follow immediately above moves. Department hopes Turkey could give their Ambassador Karachi full power agree text of communiqué along general lines mutually agreed U.S. and Turkey in Ankara. Department prepared so authorize U.S. Ambassador Karachi. Department’s views as to points proposed communiqué should include will be forwarded separate message.

E. Timing Pakistan public request for aid not fully determined, but should follow shortly after joint communiqué and U.S. public statement. Interval could be utilized for any necessary coordination on remaining steps.

F. Interval between Pakistan request for U.S. assistance and U.S. reply should be minimum consistent with appearance of reasonable deliberation. U.S. would plan diplomatic preparation with India, Afghanistan, and possibly certain other countries of area. Expect send Nehru personal message from President explaining action, giving such assurances as are possible and stating readiness give sympathetic consideration any Indian request military aid.

7. To carry out schedule indicated above will be desirable have consultation between U.S., Turkey, Pakistan on certain texts and between two of three powers on certain others. In Department’s view, these as follows:

A. Turk statement on impending Turk–Pakistan announcement to hold talks on joint defense problems. (Turkey, US, Pakistan)

B. Joint Turk–Pakistan communiqué stating intention hold talks. (Turkey, Pakistan, US)

C. U.S. statement welcoming this decision. (US, Turkey, Pakistan)

D. Pakistan’s public announcement of its request for U.S. arms assistance. (Pakistan, US)

E. President’s statement of intention supply arms to Pakistan. (US, Pakistan)

In addition, steps in diplomatic preparation including possible Turk assurances Afghanistan and U.S. assurances India of mutual interest, and there should be exchange of information this subject.

8. Discuss above with Turks and advise their reactions soonest.⁶

9. Department now preparing texts for suggested points to be covered all above topics where U.S. listed as a principal. These will be forwarded soon.⁷

10. While preparations listed this cable probably automatically preclude, we feel it essential there be no publicity or public statements prior to January 23 in view of Korean situation.

11. Embassies Karachi and Delhi cautioned to take no action at this time on this message.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, London, and Paris. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that on Jan. 19 the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Foreign Office, and an advance copy was given to Birgi; on Jan. 21, the Ambassador handed the original to the Foreign Minister.
2. This reference is to the Jan. 11 memorandum of the Turkish Government, transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 699 from Ankara, Jan. 11. Telegram 699 is not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 170.
3. See footnote 3, ibid.
4. See footnote 4, ibid.
5. Paragraph 9 of the Turkish memorandum stated that the Government of Turkey did not consider a binding military alliance with Pakistan feasible or advisable, but expected to have an agreement providing for consultations, exchange of military information, and cooperation in the field of technical progress. In paragraph 10, it was observed that Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia constituted a cohesive geographic unit, whereas Pakistan did not constitute a geographic entity or strategic unit with Turkey.
6. See telegram 747 from Ankara, Document 175.
7. See the editorial note, infra.