Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/1–1154: Telegram

No. 170
The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Ankara, January 11, 1954—6 p.m.

702. Re Embtel 699, January 11.² Following are principal points emerging from long conversation with Foreign Minister in connection delivery Turkish memorandum January 11 re possible approach to Pakistan on mutual defense arrangement:

1. Memorandum contains full, frank statement of Turkish views intended only for US officials. Even Turkish Ambassadors Washington and London, while being informed of substance, are not receiving full text.

2. Re paragraph 6,³ Foreign Minister urged that US make every possible effort to bring about agreement between present Iranian Government and British on oil question. Previous British failure to act decisively at right time had led to Mossadeq adventure and repeat failure would certainly have disastrous consequence.

3. Re paragraph 7 and 8.⁴ For past two years Iraqi leaders have spoken realistically in private but Turks are uneasy about their unwillingness or inability to speak same way in public. If their convictions are sincere, as Turks are inclined to believe, they should have courage thereof. Until they do caution seems essential, but Turks are willing to try.

4. Turks stressed fundamental differences in their opinion–and particularly geographic separation–between Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav pact and nature of any arrangement which could be contemplated between themselves and Pakistan at this state.

5. Re paragraph 13,⁵ Turks are anxious for our reaction to proposed treaty of friendship with Afghanistan. Considering Afghan present and prospective weakness, inclusion in any defense arrangement is a remote prospect. However, Turks have long had close relations with Afghanistan and would not wish to risk any weakening of Afghan position. They suggest that such a proposal might take some of the heat off Pakistan and at same time provide a desirable alternative to present Afghan relation with and dependence on India.

6. Re paragraph 17,⁶ Turks desire Department’s reaction and further discussion their tactical suggestions, with particular respect to timing.

7. Re paragraph 18,⁷ I stressed that this is an entirely new approach from that represented by previous MEC and MEDO proposals. Turks expressed both understanding and agreement.

8. Turks very concerned about leaks and widespread press speculation on this subject. They request consultation before either government makes any statement in this connection and desire to establish an agreed position as to when and what might be said.

Warren

1. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Baghdad, Kabul, and London.

2. Telegram 699, repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Baghdad, Kabul, and London, contained the full text of the English translation of the Turkish Foreign Office memorandum delivered by the Foreign Minister during the meeting described in telegram 702. The Turkish memorandum was an answer to a U.S. memorandum of Dec. 28, 1953, the text of which is in telegram 686 to Ankara, Document 164.

   According to the memorandum, the Turkish Government’s reading of the U.S. memorandum of Dec. 28 gave it the impression that the U.S. Government, while hoping an agreement between Turkey and Pakistan would contribute to the formation of an organization for the defense of the Middle East, considered the immediate aim of an agreement to be the possibility of providing military aid to Pakistan without arousing adverse reactions in the international field. The memorandum stated the Turkish Government was willing to do its best to help the United States provide military aid to Pakistan because of feelings of friendship for Pakistan, and also because such aid would increase effective resistance to Soviet aggression. The Government of Turkey hoped an agreement with Pakistan might create the core for a future organization for the defense of the Middle East, and suggested that the fact an agreement with Pakistan would be followed by American aid to Pakistan might be the principal factor in the ultimate attraction of such an organization to other Arab states. (780.5/1–1154)

3. Paragraph 6 of the Turkish memorandum of Jan. 11 indicated agreement of the Turkish Government with the United States that the time had not yet arrived for asking the Government of Iran to join with Turkey and Pakistan.

4. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Turkish memorandum referred to Iraq. The suggestion was made that the Government of Iraq might be receptive to an invitation to join Turkey and Pakistan eventually, but Iraq’s adherence to the pact was not seen as an immediate possibility. Turkey desired to have the views of the U.S. Government on the matter.

   Telegram 405 from Baghdad, Jan. 14, indicated agreement that the Turkish memorandum accurately described the attitude of Iraq. The Embassy believed the participation of Iraq in a regional defense organization was unlikely until the United States established a military assistance program, the Middle East political atmosphere improved, especially in respect to the Suez Canal Base problem, and provided the Palestine problem was not stirred up. (780.5–1454)

5. Since Afghanistan occupied an important geographic position from the point of the security of the Middle East, and because Turkey had very close relations with Afghanistan, the Government of Turkey suggested it might be necessary to provide a written guarantee or even a treaty of friendship to Afghanistan, to keep that country friendly to Turkey and stop it from impulsive action which might allow expansion of Russian authority there.
6. The Government of Turkey suggested that it might be advisable to discreetly give information to countries like Iran, India, and Afghanistan before a general announcement of the Turkish–Pakistan agreement. The Government of Turkey was prepared to take the initiative and agreed that the Government of the United States should not openly do so.
7. The Government of Turkey said it had no knowledge of the views of the other sponsors of the earlier Middle East Defense Organization to the aspect of the Turkish Pakistan Agreement that might constitute a beginning for an organization to defend the Middle East.