Office of the Historian

790D.5 MSP/1–1454

No. 172
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)1

top secret
[Washington,] January 14, 1954.

Subject:

  • Military Assistance to Pakistan

Participants:

  • The President
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Admiral Davis
  • Mr. Byroade—NEA

The Secretary, accompanied by Mr. Byroade, called upon the President at 3:00 p.m. today to discuss the problem of military assistance to Pakistan. Admiral Davis joined the group near the close of the conversation.

The Secretary briefly outlined the recent exchange of cables with the Turks in which they agreed to take the initiative in the formation of a security pact with Pakistan to be formed in such a way that other nations, particularly Iran and Iraq, could eventually join. The Secretary stated we had reached the point where proceeding further would be inadvisable unless the US decision were definitely to go ahead. He stated that there were many difficult problems of tactics to work out with the Turks and the Paks and while these would be done in secret for the time being we should be sure of our ground. The Secretary gave the President again a general summary of his thinking in which he stressed the effect, now that Nehru had raised strong public objection, of not going ahead. He stated that in his opinion this one act would do a great deal to establish Nehru as the leader of all South and Southeast Asia and nations in that area would henceforth be reluctant to proceed on matters with the West without obtaining Nehru’s support. The Secretary mentioned certain instances of the past where Asiatic nations had supported our position in defiance of India, particularly in the UN and Japanese Peace Treaty.2 He felt that the attitude of these nations would certainly be affected if we should bow to India in this public issue.

In the general discussion that followed, the President stated that he felt we should proceed. There should not be any public statement, [Page 454] however, until after January 23rd in view of the Korean situation. He stated his concern at the situation in India and directed that every possible public and private means at our disposal be used to ease the effects of our action on India. He concurred in general with a draft statement3 which had been prepared for issuance by the President at the appropriate time which would explain the nature of what we were going to do, and why we were doing it, in the best possible public light. He agreed that a letter should be sent to Nehru prior to any public announcement by the US.

  1. An attached memorandum reads: “Rod: For the approval of the Secretary. J[effrey] C. K[itchen] OK with correction as noted–R[oderic] O’C[onnor]” The memorandum had been initialed by the Secretary of State. Presumably the correction referred to is the insertion noted in footnote 2, below.↩
  2. The handwritten phrase “and Japanese Peace Treaty” was inserted here.↩
  3. For information on the proposed statement by the President and his message to Nehru, see Document 174.↩