Attached is a draft memorandum to the President (Tab A) on the
“normalization” of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and its implications for US
programs vis-à-vis Yugoslavia which has been prepared in EUR at your request.2 The first three
paragraphs of the memorandum dealing with developments in the
“normalization” process and analyzing their import for US policies have
been informally coordinated in substance with the Office of National
Estimates, CIA, through R.
[Tab A]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State3
Memorandum for the
President
Subject:
- Effect of the “Normalization” of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations on
US-Yugoslav Relations.
The intense and bitter Soviet-directed campaign from June 1948
through 1952 to subvert the Tito regime in Yugoslavia and to have it replaced by
one subservient to the Cominform has been gradually dying out since mid-1953.
This diminution of overt Soviet hostility has also been accomplished
by a slow build-up of positive gestures pleasing to Yugoslavia from
the Soviet orbit. These Soviet moves to curry Yugoslavia’s favor
have taken place in many fields and their temp has accelerated
markedly in recent months. The only positive Yugoslav
counter-gesture, however, has been to allow some Soviet-orbit planes
to overfly Yugoslavia to and from Albania.
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To Tito the switch in Soviet
tactics is welcome both as a sign that he has won out over Russia’s
efforts to unseat him and also as a portent of more normal Yugoslav
relations with neighboring states in the Soviet bloc, which could in
time perhaps lead to a substantial easing of Yugoslavia’s difficult
economic picture. Tito
believes that the so-called “new look” in Soviet foreign policy has
been forced on the Russian leaders by the compulsions of their
domestic problems. In his view, this has very greatly lessened the
danger of Soviet-sponsored aggression in Europe. It thus opens the
way for further concrete steps to reduce East-West tension and for
additional efforts to evolve new forms of collaboration among
Western European countries to build a strong region acting more
independently of the US than formerly.
Tito’s reactions appear partly
sincere and partly an attempt to provide him with a little leverage
in his dealings with the West. At the same time, he has explicitly
stated that many important substantive issues from the past are
still unsettled between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc, that
relations cannot be restored to their pre-1948 status, that there is
no sign that basic Soviet strategic objectives have changed, and
that, in any event, he does not intend to sacrifice Yugoslavia’s
ties to the West established since 1948.
Although we must recognize that the situation calls for continuous
close watching, the foregoing developments to date do not justify
questioning the US policy assumption that Yugoslavia will prove an
element of strength in Western plans for the defense of Southern and
Southeastern Europe. Continued US action along established lines
would avoid any sign either that we have allowed Moscow’s unilateral
gestures to stir up our suspicions of Tito and to cause us to reassess our policies
towards Yugoslavia or that we are increasing our beneficence to
Tito to purchase his
future cooperation with the West. At the same time, it is important
that following the Trieste settlement we pursue our planned programs
vigorously lest any doubt enter Tito’s mind that firm ties to the West are essential
for the security and prosperity of Yugoslavia.
In the military sphere, the settlement of the Trieste dispute has
removed the chief obstacle to the further integration of Yugoslavia
into Western defense planning. At present, active consideration in
the US Government is being given to pleas for bringing the NATO into closer association with the
Balkan Alliance, in which Yugoslavia is the only member not also
belonging to NATO. This framework
should permit a greater degree of working level cooperation in
military planning for the area of Southern and Southeastern
Europe.
In the economic sphere, discussions of US-Yugoslav economic relations
are scheduled to start in Washington on November 12 between
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Governor
Stassen and Under Secretary Hoover on the one side and General
Vukmanovic, Vice President of the Federal
Executive Council, on the other. These talks will cover a wide range
of Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign economic problems including the
imbalance in its foreign payments, its heavy debt repayment
obligations, and current and future US assistance. Our chief talking
point during the discussions will involve the possibility that we
may be able to offer to ship the Yugoslavs sufficient quantities of
wheat under the Agriculture Trade Development Act to meet the
requirements which they are expected to set forth.
While the foregoing line of action should provide convincing evidence
for Tito of the positive US
interest in maintaining close relations with his regime, we hold, as
a reserve trump card, an invitation to Tito to visit the US. As we know from abundant
indications from the Yugoslavs, this, more than anything else, could
cement official relations between the two countries for a
substantial period. Because such a trip, following Tito’s journey to London in 1953,
would mark his full acceptance into the councils of the Western
world as an equal, it would also raise problems in the US due to the
opposition of many Americans to according him any such recognition.
Apart from the question of his personal safety thus engendered, his
visit might well bring to a boil all of the relatively quiescent
hostility felt in this country for a Communist dictator whose
authoritarian and avowedly Communist regime is still repressing
civil liberties and persecuting many clerics.
To justify the risks implicit in an invitation to Tito, very tangible advantages for
the US would have to lie in prospect. Since in the present
intermediate stage of US programs vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, when the
outcome of military and economic discussions on future programs is
not known, there are no top-level problems crying for solution, we
do not face any urgency in reaching a decision on a Tito visit. However, as a move of
lesser import to establish greater personal rapport between the two
Governments, I am considering a visit to Belgrade as a follow-up to
the highly successful visits of Governor
Stassen and Mr. Murphy. In addition to discussing any major problems
which might have come to the fore by the time of my visit, I would
also be able to broach the subject of a trip by Tito to the US, if it then seems on
balance to provide net advantages to the US.
