Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

33.1100 ST/11–154

No. 711
Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 1, 1954.

Subject:

• Yugoslavia Trip—October 24–26, 1954

I. From my conferences with Marshal Tito² and other officials of the Government of Yugoslavia, which have been reported in Embassy cables from Belgrade, and from my talks with the United States country team in Belgrade, I have the following impressions:

A. The Trieste settlement is looked upon as opening the way for cooperation with Italy in economic, cultural, military, and other matters on a mutually advantageous basis, moving step by step beginning with a November economic conference.

B. There is a deep conviction in the present government that the break from Soviet domination in 1948 has proven to be in the best interests of Yugoslavia, and that its neighbors, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, have not fared well under Moscow.

C. Yugoslavian agriculture is rapidly being de-collectivized and returned to private property, and the regime intends to continue to move in that direction with gradual liberalization of small business employing no more than three employees, and some easing of opposition to religion, all the while maintaining a status as a “Communist regime” working toward a “Socialist system.”

D. Tito looks upon the apparent reversal of Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia as an admission of error by the Soviet under Stalin in 1948 and considers that this will increase Yugoslavian influence among the Balkan satellites, which influence he feels is already strong and underestimated by the West.

E. Yugoslavia has at this time a strong defense position in the mountains of central Yugoslavia, has located new defense industries in these remote areas, and will never adopt any defense plan which does not include the central mountains fortress concept, the area of successful resistance in World War II.

F. Yugoslavia will be reluctant to take any step which would be interpreted to the East as reducing Yugoslavian independence and sovereignty and reducing Yugoslavian claimed influence to the East.

G. If the Western European Union develops economic objectives or programs, Yugoslavia would support a relationship of the Balkan pact group (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia) to this Brussels pact group in such economic matters, but not, at least in the near future, in military matters.

H. The Yugoslavian objective might be described as a “Third position through national strength,” which, although different from India’s “Third position through softness,” nevertheless attracts Tito to visit India and talk with Nehru.

I. Tourist travel from the West is expanding and will be increasingly welcomed by the government which now recognizes its foreign exchange earning potential.

II. From these observations, I suggest informally for such consideration as may be deemed appropriate the following courses of United States action:

A. That the United States encourage Yugoslavian-Italian bilateral military talks on joint defense, with United States MAAG officials of the two countries sitting in, and perhaps with United Kingdom and perhaps French military attachés also present, and that the first such talks should not be under NATO auspices.

B. That the joint planning include both the Ljubljana gap defense and the central Yugoslav fortress defense with the development of plans for Italian units to enter Yugoslavia in the gap under certain circumstances and with Italian resupply of the central fortress from the Adriatic by sea and air.

C. That those elements of the Yugoslavian economy which are freed be assisted by the United States, through its regular assistance program, in being successful, and that the total Yugoslavian economy be assisted in a successful development in contrast to the neighbors to the East.

1. For this purpose, extend United States good offices toward the refunding of Yugoslavian debt to Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland on a long term basis, and toward the extending of additional development credits by these countries on a long term basis.

(The balance of resources and population in Yugoslavia is favorable, and an economically sound long term program can be carried out on a loan basis over a long term of years.)

D. Steady but not sharp or heavy United States pressure be applied on granting internal religious freedom.

E. The exchange of persons program for technical information be maintained and be oriented toward the significant leadership potentials within the country.

F. Regular visits to Yugoslavia by United States officials such as Robert Murphy for the purpose of continually informing, drawing out, influencing, and satisfying prestige urge, of Marshal Tito and his principal associates.

G. Tourist travel should be encouraged.

III. General Comment.

A. Two major dangers from a United States standpoint are suggested.

1. Tito and his regime may become overconfident of the strength of their position, may gradually relax their vigilance and lower their guard, and a successful violent internal blow may be struck by the Kremlin in a sudden reversal of their current “sweet words” tactics.

2. A change in Soviet leadership which removes from influence those responsible for the original policy leading to the break, and an invitation by such new leadership to Tito to take one of the top world Communist leadership positions along with Mao Tse-tung, and to revise Soviet economic policies along the lines of Yugoslavian policy, might attract Tito more than anything the West would offer.

B. There is one major favorable prospect.

1. A successful gradual evolvement of the Yugoslavian economic, political, social, and religious system in the direction of freedom, accompanied by increased flow of information and ideas from Yugoslavia to the Soviet and the Soviet bloc, might become an important factor in a favorable evolvement of the entire Soviet system over a period of years, without a world war.

C. The percentage chance of the dangers and of the asset are all considered to be small, but the implications are so far-reaching that they should be kept in mind nevertheless.

HES

1. Also addressed to the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman and Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board. Stassen also visited Italy Oct. 26–27 and Spain Oct. 27–29. For memoranda reporting on his visit to Italy and Spain, both dated Nov. 1, see vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1707 and 1993, respectively. Stassen summarized the conclusions in each of the three memoranda in a separate memorandum to President Eisenhower, which he personally gave to the President on Nov. 1. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)
2. Stassen’s conversation with Tito, Oct. 26, is summarized in telegram 335 from Belgrade, Oct. 26. (768.11/10–2654)