Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

Acting on the suggestion of the Board Assistants, the OCB, at its meeting of August 25, 1954, requested the Working Group to review additional possible actions to implement NSC 174,2 particularly a major coordinated effort by appropriate agencies designed to detach one of the important European satellites from the Soviet bloc. The Working Group was requested to submit a preliminary staff analysis to the Board which would point up the policy and strategic implications and feasibility factors that would be involved in such an effort. At their meeting of August 13, 1954, the Board Assistants agreed that Albania should not be considered as an “important” satellite for the purposes of this study.

2.

The Working Group first reviewed existing intelligence estimates of the political situation concerning all of the Eastern European satellites. Then a study was made of the methods that might be used to detach a satellite. U.S. capabilities for such action were reviewed and conclusions flowing from the analysis were drawn. Studies on the vulnerabilities of East Germany and Czechoslovakia were prepared especially for this review.

3.

The analysis indicates that the instrumentalities of Soviet dominion in the political, economic and cultural fields, backed by military force, continue to be effective in maintaining control over the satellites. The progressive sovietization of the political, social and economic structure of the satellites, the orientation of the local economies towards the East and the concentrated effort at indoctrination of the rising generation have served further to support Moscow’s control over the satellite areas. The Soviet orbit nevertheless has vulnerabilities which are susceptible to exploitation by the United States.

4.

It is recommended that the Board concur in the following:

a.: At present, given the strength of the Soviet position, no major Soviet satellite presents vulnerabilities of such extent that their exploitation can be expected to result in its detachment from the Soviet bloc.
b.: U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not sufficient to accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by means short of war.
c.: Unless the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little likelihood of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war except by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself to possible detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort against this satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it would require a concentration of political, economic and psychological measures directed to this end. Such a concentrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germany as the target.

5.

Without attempting to be categorical, it is the opinion of the Working Group that soft treatment cannot be expected to effect the basic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would conform to U.S. objectives; and that therefore, except when relaxations are calculated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within a short time span or to protect the people against the regime under special circumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased against any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities appear. The importance of this subject justifies study of appropriate implementing actions consistent with U.S. policy as it develops.

1.

Soviet control of the satellites is exercised through the satellite communist parties and governments, Soviet diplomatic, economic and military missions in each satellite, the Soviet and satellite security services and is based, in the last analysis, on contingents of the Soviet armed forces stationed in Eastern Europe. In addition, the USSR exercises direct administrative authority in many instances through Soviet citizens in key positions or in command of ministries, armed forces, and industries. Through this system the USSR provides the satellite governments with over-all policy guidance. When necessary, satellite leaders are called to Moscow for instructions. Although Moscow permits and encourages programs of cultural, economic, and technical collaboration among the satellites, the Soviet control system is designed to bind the satellites individually to the USSR rather than to one another. Enforcement of obedience to Soviet wishes is assured by the system’s military, economic and police power.

2.

The satellite communist parties, the leaders of which are selected by the Kremlin, constitute the principal instrumentality for implementing Soviet policy and for imposing Soviet ideological and institutional forms upon the satellite populations. These parties, subject to continuing Moscow control and supervision, provide the satellite government leadership, play a leading role in managerial assignments, regulate the local control machinery, and direct the “voluntary activities” of the people. The complete subservience of the satellite communist parties to the new Soviet rulers has been reaffirmed at recent satellite Communist Party congresses, which were attended by top-level Soviet officials.

3.

Under Soviet aegis the various satellite security services have become in effect a part of the USSR’s police mechanism in Eastern Europe. Since 1950 they have been reorganized according to the Soviet pattern, staffed by personnel deemed reliable by the Soviet security services, and brought under Soviet control through a system of advisers. Moscow gives these services over-all policy guidance and exercises direct control over liaison between one satellite service and another. As a result of this integration, the Soviet Government now has a security service of disciplined local nationals at its disposal in each satellite. This service operates as an arm of Moscow in detecting and suppressing all forms of subversion and in maintaining state authority and the stability of the satellite governments. Although some individual defections may occur from [Page 145] time to time, the effectiveness of the satellite security services has not been impaired to any material extent.

4.

The USSR continues to maintain strong combat-ready forces, totalling an estimated 531,000 army troops, 24,000 security troops and 1,800 aircraft (estimated actual strength) in the satellites, mostly in East Germany. Although the deployment of these forces is based primarily on strategic rather than internal security considerations, the mere presence or near proximity of Soviet forces has had and is likely to continue to have the effect of restraining potential resistance. The overt employment of Soviet troops in suppressing the 17 June 1953 riots in East Germany demonstrated Soviet willingness to use these forces where necessary.3 Soviet general officers possessing extensive combat and command experience have recently been appointed as Soviet military attachés in all the satellites except East Germany. In addition, the satellite armed forces, which are being developed under close Soviet supervision, now total over 1,100,000 army troops, 300,000 security troops, and 2,400 aircraft (estimated actual strength). This military development program provides the Soviet Union with important additional means of internal security, mass indoctrination of youth, and control.

5.

The Soviet Union exercises control over the economies of the satellites by fixing over-all production goals and priorities, by regulating the trade relations of these countries with the USSR, and by supervising their trade with other areas. Satellite economic plans are prepared in accordance with general policies determined by the Soviet Union. Soviet control is exercised, in addition, with varying emphasis in different countries, through a system of tight bilateral trade and financial arrangements, joint companies and long-term credits for industrial development. More subtle aspects of control in the trading system arise from increased satellite dependence upon Soviet sources for raw materials and certain capital goods, and integration of trade agreements with long-term plans. The Soviet Government also maintains large economic missions in each satellite, as well as advisers and inspectors to monitor performance by ministries and industries and, if necessary, to assume direct supervision.

6.

The Soviet pattern of intellectual, cultural, and religious institutions is being imposed upon the satellites. The satellite governments have a monopoly over the schools and mass-information media, and have endeavored to bring church organizations under the control of the state. The educational system has been reorganized [Page 146] to serve communist ends; teaching staffs and libraries have been purged and curricula revised to place new emphasis on communist indoctrination and vocational training. The formal power of the churches has been curtailed through the imprisonment of church leaders, the expropriation of church property, the severance of former administrative links with the outside world, and by progressively depriving the church of its facilities to educate the youth. Family life, which is an important bearer of traditional values, has been disrupted by physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, material want and the necessity for the mother to work, obligatory political activities, and the exploitation of small children as unwitting informers on their parents.

7.

One of the first preoccupations of the Soviet leadership following Stalin’s death was to assure the dependability of leadership groups in the satellites. Although certain shifts in key positions occurred, notably in the crucial post of Party first secretary, the upper layer of officialdom which had already undergone a long process of trial and purging has continued in office without striking realignments of influence or responsibilities. Following the pattern set in Moscow, steps have been taken in the satellites to conform to the principle of “collective leadership” and to streamline Party secretariats through a reduction in size and a more precise definition of functions. In addition, Soviet ambassadors with long experience in the diplomatic service have been replaced in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by men with extensive Party experience. These developments support the conclusion that the new Soviet regime has assigned a high priority to strengthening the Party apparatus in the satellite countries.

8.

A major obstacle to complete attainment of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe is the continuing dissatisfaction of the satellite populations with communism and Soviet domination. This dissatisfaction is compounded by the loss of personal freedom and a reduced standard of living, as well as by outraged religious and national feelings, but its expression is severely constricted by the controls imposed on every aspect of the lives of the people. There is virtually no organized active resistance and only limited unorganized active resistance. The latter consists mainly of occasional raids by small armed bands and individual acts of subversion and sabotage. On the other hand, passive resistance continues to be widespread and to constitute an obstacle to consolidation of Soviet control, efficient functioning of the administrative apparatus, reliability of the armed forces and police, and implementation of economic programs. The more prevalent forms of passive resistance [Page 147] are worker absenteeism, negligent performance, work slow-downs, crop delivery evasion, increased church attendance, listening to foreign broadcasts and whispering campaigns.

9.

The satellite governments are attempting to alleviate dissatisfaction by promising an improvement in standards of living. However, efforts in this direction have not succeeded in satisfying consumer cravings on any significant scale or in giving the individual a greater feeling of material well-being. Popular dissatisfaction therefore will probably continue to slow the attainment of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe and to limit the economic, political, and military benefits which the USSR can derive from control of the satellites. In the absence of general war, however, popular dissatisfaction will almost certainly not develop beyond the stage of passive resistance, occasional acts of sabotage and other forms of limited active resistance.

10.

The distinguishing feature of the industrialization programs imposed on the satellites by the USSR has been the emphasis placed on heavy industries producing capital goods. Over-all satellite industrial production was back to the 1938 level by 1951 and in 1953 it was about 25 percent above the prewar level. This increase may be attributed to the fact that industry was relatively undeveloped in certain of the satellites prior to World War II. Within the industrial sector the most impressive growth has been in the production of machinery and equipment, chemicals, metals, energy, and building materials, generally in that order. Output of the light and textile industries surpassed the prewar level in all the satellites except East Germany, while production of forest products and processed foods generally failed to return to these levels.

11.

In spite of failure to achieve a number of goals in the original industrial plans, satellite industrial production is a significant accretion to Soviet economic strength. Soviet authorities control allocations between producers and consumers in the satellites and deliveries to the USSR. In comparison with Soviet production, approximate satellite output for 1953 was as follows: machinery and locomotives—50% to 65%, freight cars—43%, tractors—30%, bearings—16%, finished steel—24%, pigiron—22%, lead—54%, aluminum—19%, copper—11%, lignite—250%, hard coal—50%, electric power—50%, crude oil—20%, synthetic petroleum products—600%, calcium carbide—300%, caustic soda—104%, chlorine—100%, synthetic ammonia—86%, refined benzol—53%, and sulphuric acid—44%.

12.

In contrast to the rapid growth of industry, satellite agriculture has lagged seriously since the immediate postwar phase of recovery. [Page 148] Although the yield of industrial crops returned to prewar levels between 1948 and 1950, over-all agricultural production, owing to the low output of food crops and animal products, has not yet regained the prewar level of production. Over-all agricultural output in 1951 was an estimated 14 percent below the pre-war level, but it slipped back in 1953 to approximately 21 percent below that level. The total population of the satellites in 1953 was about 3 percent below the 1938 level.

13.

Total agricultural collectivization continues to be the acknowledged long-term goal of satellite governments. However, the satellite leaders of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, in deference to peasant opposition, have publicly committed themselves to a “new course” in agriculture, including voluntary withdrawals in Czechoslovakia and Hungary from the “cooperatives.” As a result, these two counties have lost ground in their collectivization programs, the greater loss being sustained by Hungary. On the other hand, no steps have been taken by Bulgaria, Poland, or Rumania to permit the peasants to withdraw. Poland, in fact, with only about 21 percent of its arable land socialized (one of the smallest percentages among the satellites), has announced that agricultural collectivization will continue at the same tempo.

14.

Peasant opposition to the program of forced collectivization and compulsory deliveries has been the principal deterrent to increased agricultural production. Other major factors contributing to the stagnation in satellite agriculture are the reduction in size and quality of the agricultural labor forces and the low level of investment in agriculture.

15.

The rank and file of the satellite communist parties is less reliable from Moscow’s point of view than the satellite leadership, although disagreements, personal rivalry and nationalistic tendencies appear to persist within the leadership of the satellites. Confusion, dissension, opportunism and resentment of Soviet domination at the lower and middle levels, while not constituting a threat to Soviet control, are a continuing source of weakness. The compromises with communist ideology which are required for the implementation of Soviet plans are a particularly fertile source of disagreement in the top echelons of government and party.

16.

In the economic sphere, achievement of Soviet objectives is hampered by passive resistance of labor, shortages of materials, bureaucratic incompetence, widespread corruption, over-centralization, and differing views at the planning and managerial levels as to the rate of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. One of the most pressing problems for satellite leaders is the conflict [Page 149] between demands of the satellite consumer and requirements of the USSR upon productive capacity. Agricultural production continues to be 15 to 20 percent below prewar levels while average population is 3 percent below the 1938 level. The result is a lower standard of living for most of the people in the satellites.

17.

The great majority of people in Eastern Europe, many of whom have been nurtured in an anti-Russian tradition, continue to be nationalistic, anti-Communist, and opposed to Soviet domination. This dissatisfaction is compounded by the loss of personal freedom and the reduced standard of living, as well as by outraged religious and national feelings, but its expression is severely restricted by the controls of the police state. In the case of most of the satellites there are strong cultural ties with the West, particularly in those with predominant Lutheran and Roman Catholic populations. Traditional feelings of friendship for the United States are widespread.

18.

In many areas in Eastern Europe there is deeply ingrained in the nature of the people an attitude of resistance to oppressive authority which is one of the obstacles to complete achievement of Soviet objectives. In predominantly Catholic areas the people may resort to informal organization to maintain cohesion of congregations and help will be extended from outside where possible, although such measures will be severely curtailed by the secret police. Among the people there is resentment, hatred, fear, and at times desperate hope for liberation. Most people believe that liberation is impossible without general war, and some would welcome war as the only means of ending Soviet domination. Peasant opposition to forced collectivization and compulsory deliveries is almost universal, and urban workers, contrary to communist doctrine, obey the dictates of the regime only to the extent necessary to remain employed. Although communist efforts to indoctrinate the youth are intensive and may succeed in winning over many of the young people, such indoctrination is never complete. In addition to recurrent “hooliganism” and juvenile delinquency, adulation of Western culture and general skepticism regarding the communist system are widespread among the young people.

19.

The questionable political reliability of the satellite armed forces places a significant limitation upon their military usefulness for Soviet purposes. At present the USSR could not rely upon the majority of the satellite armed forces in a general war except for employment in secondary roles or in a defensive capacity. However, against traditional enemies satellite armies would probably fight well, at least if victory appeared likely. Within the ranks of these armies there is widespread apathy towards the communist regime (particularly among enlisted men), a lack of trained leaders, [Page 150] a very weak esprit de corps and a deep resentment of the presence of Soviet officers and the enforced acceptance of Soviet military doctrine. In addition, modern equipment is lacking in most of the arms.

20.

In theory there are various methods whereby the bonds holding a satellite to Moscow might be severed. These bonds are of diverse character and probably become stronger with the passage of time. Immediately after the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe they were primarily of a politico-military nature and depended in major part on the subservience of local communist parties to Kremlin dictation and on the physical presence of Soviet occupation troops in sufficient numbers to maintain the local communists in power and to frustrate any efforts to effect a political change by force. In the decade which has passed since the end of the war the progressive refashioning of the entire political, social and economic structure of the satellites along Soviet lines, the orientation of the local economics towards the East and the concentrated effort at indoctrination of the rising generation have served further to support Moscow’s control over the satellites. Nevertheless, opposition sentiments based on nationalistic feelings, antagonism to communism and the desire for personal freedom are undoubtedly still widespread among the great majority of the population in each satellite.

21.

The only example of a country which has successfully severed its connection with the Soviet orbit, after having once been actually incorporated therein, is Yugoslavia, which broke away from Moscow in 1948 after three years’ experience as a satellite. In the Yugoslav case the basic motivation was nationalistic. Tito resented the type of absolute control which Moscow was attempting to establish in his country and demanded a measure of independence and freedom of action which Moscow was not prepared to accord. Certain peculiar features of the Yugoslav situation probably both led to the decisions to break with Moscow and assured the success of the withdrawal. Geographically, Yugoslavia was not readily accessible to Soviet military pressure. Soviet troops were not in occupation and the country had a long tradition of resistance to foreign invaders which had been convincingly upheld in World War II. The Yugoslav army was largely the creation of Tito and gave its primary allegiance to him. Apart from these unfavorable factors, the strategic position of Yugoslavia on the Adriatic entailed the threat of Western intervention and the possible outbreak of general war if Moscow resorted to force. In these circumstances it was possible for [Page 151] the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to occur without successful counter-action on the part of Moscow.

22.

The Yugoslav example, while instructive, cannot be considered as controlling for any of the other European satellites. Each of these other countries is strategically more important to the security of the Soviet Union and Moscow might therefore be expected to react more vigorously to any attempt at withdrawal. Furthermore, the conditions which existed in Yugoslavia were in considerable measure unique and are not duplicated in any of the present satellites.

23.

The detachment of a major European satellite might theoretically be accomplished in the following ways, singly or in combination: by negotiation, by internal action, or by external action. With respect to negotiation as a tool for detaching a satellite, the only country to which it might conceivably apply in present circumstances is East Germany. The pursuit of Soviet objectives in Europe since the end of the war has led Moscow in Germany even to forego the chances for influencing developments in West Germany, through the Control Council, rather than to permit the Western allies any access to East Germany or influence over developments in the Soviet Zone. This isolation of the Soviet Zone not only permitted an effective exploitation of the important economic assets of Eastern Germany, but provided a place d’armes for maintaining the largest land army in Europe. Politically it has enabled the Soviets to dangle the carrot of reunification before German eyes, with the threat of war and disaster if Germany rearmed in the Western Camp. This policy has in fact kept Germany neutralized until the present time. When, with the conclusion of the EDC treaty in 1952, it became apparent that Western Germany would no longer remain neutralized but would provide a key stone for the Western defense system, the Soviets modified their tactics. Since March 1952 they have offered reunification and withdrawal of occupation troops, provided the West would do the same and in addition agree to strict limitations upon German rearmament and legal neutralization of unified Germany by treaty prohibitions against any participation in a Western defense alliance such as EDC or the present London–Paris accords. One is entitled to question the sincerity of the Soviet offer, although there are several factors which militate in favor of Soviet withdrawal on acceptable terms. The West, however, has not in the past been prepared to pay the Soviet price, and there is no indication that it will be prepared to do so in the near future. This assessment of the present situation does not lose sight of the wider possibilities which might arise to be utilized in the future through the method of negotiation. It may be assumed that a successful basis for negotiating the detachment of one or more of [Page 152] the satellites would be such strength, cohesion and pressure on the part of the West as would persuade the Soviets that it would seriously threaten their security or prestige if they would not conclude a settlement. It is possible, therefore, when the power and unity of the West are more strongly built up, the conditions may be prepared for undertaking negotiation with the end of detachment in view.

24.

The second conceivable method of detachment is by internal action within a given country. It was thus that Yugoslavia withdrew from the Soviet orbit. Withdrawal through internal action might be violent or peaceful in nature. In the latter case, issues must arise between the satellite government and Moscow of sufficient gravity to impel the local Communist leaders to renounce their allegiance to the Kremlin and to face the risks of Soviet retaliation. In the case of areas under Soviet military occupation that retaliation would presumably be immediate and the likelihood of a successful attempt at peaceful withdrawal must be rated minimal. In satellites not under Soviet military occupation, such as Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the Kremlin’s reaction would presumably be based on its evaluation of the importance of the area concerned to Soviet security versus its estimate of the likelihood of Western intervention in the event that the Soviet Union resorted to force.

25.

In view of the mass infiltration of satellite armed forces by Soviet Army officers and Moscow control of the key posts, it is difficult to envisage a situation where the Government leaders of a satellite would attempt to use their forces against Soviet troops in an effort to effect a withdrawal from the orbit. Internal action involving violence would therefore probably result only in the event that resistance forces within the country rose up, seized power and proclaimed their independence from Moscow. Soviet reactions to such a development might be expected to parallel those of an attempted peaceful withdrawal with the condition that they might be stronger if Moscow considered that its prestige were involved. There is no current evidence, however, to justify the expectation of such an uprising in force in any European satellite within the foreseeable future.

26.

The third possible method of separating a satellite from the Soviet orbit is by external action. As in the case of internal action, action from without might be peaceful or violent. Peaceful external action would include negotiation, which has already been discussed, or covert support of resistance elements within a satellite. To be an effective contribution toward detachment, such covert support would need to be on a large scale and probably to continue over a very considerable period of time. From a practical standpoint, it is doubtful whether, even if the necessary resistance potential [Page 153] within the area could be shown to exist, support on the necessary scale could long be continued on a covert basis without precipitating strong retaliatory action which in turn would require the intervention of the power providing the covert support if the resistance elements were to be saved from annihilation. Large-scale covert support of resistance elements in these countries is probably tantamount to open hostilities.

27.

The final conceivable method of detachment—by violent external action—is perhaps the only one which in present circumstances would be likely to succeed. The dissolution of all the great absolutist empires of modern times—the Czarist, the Hohenzollern, the Hapsburg, the Ottoman, and the Nazi—resulted from defeat or disaster in general war. If a Western coalition were to be victorious in a war with the Soviet Union, the detachment of the European satellites and the restoration of their independence would presumably be one of its first acts. It is highly unlikely, however, that any combination of Western powers would deliberately embark on a war with the Soviet Union to achieve this result.

28.

The capabilities of the United States to achieve the detachment of a satellite by any of the methods outlined in Section II are demonstrably limited. This section examines those capabilities which might be required should the U.S. resort to action along any of these lines.

29.

With respect to the variant of detachment by negotiation, Moscow now holds the highest card—physical possession, generally backed up by military force in occupation. If one were to attempt to negotiate the detachment of a satellite—and Moscow has only ambiguously indicated that East Germany might be a subject of negotiation—one must be prepared to deal with the terms offered. The principles of a settlement so far held out by Moscow are clear: withdrawal of occupation troops, neutralization of Germany and reunification on Soviet terms which would prevent any German participation in Western defense arrangements. The history of the past nine years, and more particularly the agreements reached at London and Paris,4 provide convincing evidence of Western refusal to pay this price. On the other hand, there is no indication that the terms offered by the West, namely, a solution of the German problem by withdrawal of occupation forces and free elections, is acceptable at the present time to the Soviets.

30.

The persistence with which the Soviet Union has pressed its offer, however, may perhaps be interpreted as something more than a desire to extend its influence to Western Germany or to prevent the participation of German manpower in Western European defense arrangements. There are certain disadvantages in the Soviet position in East Germany. Berlin, a Western outpost and observation point in the heart of Soviet controlled territory, is a constant irritant. It provides a relatively open door to escape and has inhibited application of the types of security and control measures which are normal in Soviet jurisdiction. This in turn has both encouraged the overt expression of resistance, as witness the June 17, 1953 uprising, and hampered the development of reliable Soviet security forces to deal with such a situation. Furthermore, contact with the higher living standards of the East German population has been a source of disaffection among Soviet occupation troops and a cause of concern to Red Army political officers and presumably to their superiors in Moscow.

31.

If this is an accurate analysis the question arises whether the special situation of Berlin with respect to the Soviet position in East Germany might not constitute a factor conducive to negotiation. The negotiating power of the United States and its Allies lies in a steady accretion of Western strength. The London–Paris protocols provide for the continued presence of Allied forces in Germany and for German rearmament and permit a review of the whole situation at any time with the possibility of agreed measures looking toward reunification. The United States and Allies do not consequently need to accept any Soviet offer on Germany unless it represents a solution substantially on Western terms. The terms which the Soviets have offered until now reveal no evidence that the disadvantages for them of the Berlin situation constitute a factor of such importance that they are prepared at this time to make any such concession. Nor is the United States likely to make significant concessions on other items of major interest to Moscow: relinquishment of overseas military bases, renunciation of use of nuclear weapons, removal of barriers to trade in strategic items. In these circumstances, there appears no reason to believe that the United States is currently in a position to achieve the detachment of Eastern Germany through processes of negotiation.

32.

The second method of detachment—by internal action, whether peaceful or violent, within a satellite—places heavy demands on U.S. capabilities. If the action is to be peaceful, it requires an issue between Moscow and the satellite of such intensity as to impel the satellite leadership to accept the heavy odds against success for any group under Soviet jurisdiction which challenges the authority of the Kremlin. The issue need not necessarily be of [Page 155] basic importance, but it must be so dramatic as to solidify the country behind its leadership. Given the contempt in which the leaders are held in the various satellites, it is difficult to imagine as issue on which they would dare to risk a break with Moscow. Moscow has followed a deliberate policy of “collective leadership” and of encouraging rivalry among the leaders of each satellite with the result that no single leader has absolute control over the government and party apparatus or any reasonable hope of rallying popular support. The odds against success are even greater in those satellites in which Soviet forces are still in occupation. That the United States could provide an issue which would lead to a break or, should such an issue arise, be able to exploit it to the point of combustion, is, to put it conservatively, unlikely. In the event such as issue should arise, however, the forces opposed to Moscow would be much more likely to act if they could receive assurances of moral and material support from the West. Promises of moral and economic support might be forthcoming, but the suggestion that military support be provided would inevitably incur strong opposition both at home and abroad on the grounds that it would entail the risk of total war. The United States would again hold the key to the successful action, and under current policy would clearly not be prepared to take the risks inherent in such a situation.

33.

Violent detachment from within requires a well-developed resistance organization such as currently does not exist in any one of the satellites. The development of such organizations, even if U.S. support capabilities were substantially greater than their present level, would present a very difficult problem in the face of the extent and effectiveness of Soviet security precautions. The conditions for the emergence of resistance groups which can constitute any serious threat to the regime are: (1) the deterioration of the internal situation to the point where the internal security forces have difficulty in maintaining control, and (2) a marked increase in U.S. capabilities to provide logistic support. Neither of these conditions is presently likely of realization.

34.

In the event, contrary to current expectations, a resistance organization with serious potential should develop in any of the satellites, the United States would be faced with the same decisions as in the case of an attempt at peaceful detachment from within. It would not wish to take the responsibility for setting resistance in motion unless it was prepared to provide military support in the face of Soviet armed intervention. [U.S. covert capabilities for [Page 156] action against the Soviet satellites are the subject of a separate submission.]5

35.

Since the United States does not contemplate resort to general war as a means for detaching Eastern European satellites, no effort is made in this paper to discuss U.S. military capabilities vis-à-vis the USSR.

36.

The Soviet orbit has vulnerabilities which are susceptible to exploitation by the United States. The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that these vulnerabilities are not sufficiently critical to support a reasonable expectation that any satellite can be successfully detached under existing circumstances, given the strength of the Soviet position and the limited capabilities of the United States for such action. Two detailed studies of individual satellites which have been taken as examples—East Germany as a possible subject for diplomatic negotiation and Czechoslovakia as a possible subject for detachment by other means—are attached as annexes. While any of the other satellites could have been chosen for illustrative purposes, Czechoslovakia was selected because of the particular strength of the Western tradition in that country, its accessibility on the border of the German Federal Republic to Western influence, and the absence from the area of Soviet military units.

37.

Unless the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little likelihood of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war except by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself to possible detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort against this satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it would require a concentration of political, economic and psychological measures directed to this end. Without suggesting that efforts against other satellite regimes should be diminished the Working Group believes that under present conditions East Germany is the obvious target for the following reasons:

a.: It is the satellite which may be most susceptible to detachment by negotiation in connection with future developments.
b.: It is the area against which the U.S. and the West in general is in a position to bring the strongest total pressure.
c.: It is the area in which the least progress has been made in establishing communist institutions.
d.: Western Germany could make a major contribution to such an operation.
e.: It would create conditions permitting the reunification of Germany.
f.: The possibility of reunification would prevent the isolation of East Germany.
g.: Detachment of East Germany might well produce a chain reaction throughout the Soviet orbit.

38.

A second point on which the Working Group desires to express its views concerns the policy which can contribute most to the advancement of U.S. objectives in situations where a satellite regime is suffering setbacks and faces serious internal problems. The present situation in Hungary is a case in point. In such circumstances the U.S. has a choice: it may pursue a tougher policy, stepping up harassing measures in the hope of intensifying the difficulties of the regime, or it may seek to take advantage of a moment of relative weakness to relax pressures in order to obtain concessions to the interest of the free world. Without attempting to be categorical, it is the view of the Working Group that soft treatment cannot be expected to effect the basic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would conform to U.S. objectives, and that therefore, except when relaxations are calculated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within a short time span or to protect the people against the regime under special circumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased against any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities appear. Only by maintaining a firm position based on strength can the U.S. preserve the balance which is essential to prevent war and hope to exploit to its advantage Soviet weaknesses as they develop.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

No. 61
Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on NSC 1741

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

No. 61Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on NSC 1741

No. 61
Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on NSC 1741