(Except as otherwise indicated, parenthetical
references are to paragraphs in the Staff Study)
1. Soviet control over the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe
(Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and
East Germany2) has contributed importantly to the power
disequilibrium in Europe and to the threat to the security of the
United States. Despite economic dislocation and administrative
difficulties, the Kremlin has made considerable progress in
exploiting the industrial capacity of the satellites and expanding
their military capabilities for use as a coordinated whole with
those of the Soviet Union. (2–4, 37)
2. Barriers to the consolidation of the Soviet Union are:
3. Despite the widespread popular opposition to communism in each of
the satellites, known underground groups capable of armed resistance
have survived only as scattered remnants in a few areas, and are now
generally inactive. The recent uprisings in East Germany and the
unrest in other European satellites evidence: (a) the failure of the
Soviets fully to subjugate these peoples or to destroy their desire
for freedom; (b) the dependence of these satellite governments on
nearby Soviet armed forces; and (c) the relative unreliability of
satellite armed forces (especially if popular resistance in the
satellites should increase). These events necessarily have placed
internal and psychological strains upon the Soviet leadership.
Nevertheless, the ability of the USSR to exercise effective control
over, and to exploit the resources of, the European satellites has
not been appreciably reduced, and is not likely to be, so long as
the USSR maintains adequate military forces in the area. (3)
4. The death of Stalin created
for Soviet dominion over the satellites new problems which may lend
themselves to exploitation. Although there is as yet no evidence
that Soviet capability to dominate the satellites has been impaired
since the death of Stalin, the
possibility nevertheless exists that a greater concentration of
effort may be required to maintain control and that the new Soviet
leaders may have to moderate the pace and scope of their programs in
the satellites. Such moderation is indicated by the new economic
measures, recently announced by the satellite regimes. (7)
5. Although nationalist opposition to Soviet domination is a
disruptive force within the Soviet orbit, and even within the
communist movement itself, it does not appear likely that a
non-Soviet regime on the Tito
model will emerge in many of the satellites under existing
circumstances. The combination of basic factors which made possible
the successful Yugoslav defection from Moscow is lacking in many of
the satellites. In addition the Kremlin has taken drastic measures
since the Yugoslav defection to guard against further defections.
(6, 8–17)
7. East Germany poses special and more difficult problems of control
for the USSR than do the other satellites. The fact that the main
body of the German nation in the Federal Republic has made continued
advances in freedom and economic well-being, and the fact that West
Berlin provides a means of contact with the free world, serve to
keep alive the hope for an eventual escape from Soviet domination.
By utilizing these special advantages the West can probably continue
to exploit strong popular anti-communism, maintain East Germany as a
focal point and example of disaffection for the rest of the Soviet
satellites, make difficult full utilization of East Germany’s
economic resources, and keep alive Soviet doubts as to the
reliability of the East German population in time of war. At the
same time, U.S. policy toward East Germany must take into account
the latter’s relationship to the problem of German unification, the
integration of the Federal Republic with Western Europe, and the
importance of, and dangers inherent in, preserving our access to and
position in Berlin. (24, 41, Annex B)
8. The detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet
bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or
by war. Such a detachment would not decisively affect the Soviet
military capability either in delivery of weapons of mass
destruction or in conventional forces, but would be a considerable
blow to Soviet prestige and would impair in some degree Soviet
conventional military capabilities in Europe. (NSC 162/1, para. 5–b)
9. It is in the national security interests of the United States to
pursue a policy of determined resistance to dominant Soviet
influence over the satellites in Eastern Europe and to seek the
eventual elimination of that influence. Accordingly, feasible
political, economic, propaganda and covert measures are required to
create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, complicate
control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and
economic potential of the Soviet bloc. Decisions on such measures to
impose pressures on the Soviet bloc should take into account the
desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet
leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated
settlements. Accordingly, this policy should be carried out by
flexible courses of action in the light of current estimates of the
Soviet Government’s reactions and of the situation in the satellite
states concerned, after calculation of the advantages and
disadvantages to the general position of [Page 114] the United States in relation to the USSR and
to the free world. (37–42)
10. Long-range: The eventual fulfillment of
the rights of the peoples in the Soviet satellites to enjoy
governments of their own choosing, free of Soviet domination and
participating as peaceful members in the free world community. (2,
37)
11. Current:
12. Use appropriate means short of military force to oppose, and to
contribute to the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over
the satellites; including, when appropriate, concert with NATO or other friendly powers, resort
to UN procedures, and, if possible,
negotiation with the USSR. (23–32, 36)
13. Encourage and assist the satellite peoples in resistance to their
Soviet-dominated regimes, maintaining their hopes of eventual
freedom from Soviet domination, while avoiding:
. . . . . . .
20. Encourage democratic, anti-communist elements in the satellites;
but at the same time be prepared to exploit any …tendencies, and to
assist “national communist” movements [Page 115] under favorable conditions, making clear, as
appropriate, that opportunities for survival exist outside the
Soviet bloc. (8–16, 41)
21. Exploit the developing organizations of Western unity (NATO, OEEC, CSC, etc.) as a force of attraction for the
satellites. (22)
. . . . . . .
23. Support or make use of refugees or exile organizations which can
contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives, but do not
recognize governments-in-exile. (32)
. . . . . . .
25. Maintain flexibility in U.S. economic policies toward the Soviet
bloc, and toward individual satellites, in order to gain maximum
advantage with the limited economic weapons at hand (both
restrictions and incentives). (27, 28)
26. Continue U.S. diplomatic missions in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania as long as may be in the U.S. interest, and
keep under review the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations
with Bulgaria.4 (25)
27. Exploit the existence, and encourage the development, of the
Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish entente as a means of weakening Soviet power
in the Balkan satellites and as an example of free association of
independent Balkan nations serving as a potential alternative to
Soviet rule. (22)
28. Keep the situation with respect to Albania under continuing
surveillance with a view to the possibility of detachment of that
country from the Soviet bloc at such time as its detachment might be
judged to serve the over-all U.S. interest. (15, 31, Annex B)
29. Exploit, to the fullest extent compatible with the policies
regarding Germany as a whole and Berlin, the special opportunities
offered by West Berlin and the facilities of the Federal Republic to
undermine Soviet power in East Germany. Place the Soviets in East
Germany on the defensive by such measures as may be taken to keep
alive the hope of German reunification. (24, 41)
30. Emphasize (a) the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to
independent governments of their own choosing and (b) the violation
of international agreements by the Soviet and satellite Governments,
whereby they have been deprived of that right, particularly [Page 116] the Yalta Declaration on
Liberated Europe and the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary
and Rumania. (2, 37)
[Attachment]
Staff Study by the Planning Board of the
National Security Council
United States Policy Toward
the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe
problem
1. To determine what policies with respect to the Soviet
satellites of Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and East Germany5 will best serve the
national interests of the United States, and in particular will
contribute to the resistance to and eventual elimination of
dominant Soviet influence over those satellites. It is necessary
to reexamine and revise, where necessary and desirable in the
light of intervening developments, the conclusions of NSC 58/2.
background
Importance of the
Satellites
2. The satellites are of importance in the current balance of
power in Europe because they augment the political, military and
economic power of the Soviet Union and extend Soviet power into
the heart of Europe. The permanent consolidation of Soviet
control in this area would represent a serious threat to the
security of the United States and Western Europe. It is likewise
our traditional policy to recognize and support the right of
such peoples to independence and to governments of their own
choosing. The elimination of dominant Soviet influence over the
satellites is, therefore, in the fundamental interest of the
United States.
Soviet Domination of the
Satellites
3. Soviet domination of the satellites remains a basic fact;
there is no evidence as yet to indicate that Soviet capability
to dominate the satellites has been significantly affected by
anything that has [Page 117]
happened since the death of Stalin. However, Soviet suppression of the riots
in East Germany suggests that the satellite regimes themselves
may be unable, without Soviet armed forces available, to
maintain the population in subjection to the will of the
Kremlin.
4. The Kremlin has pushed forward with considerable success its
plans to expand the industrial and military capabilities of the
satellites and to coordinate their Sovietized political system,
military establishments and economies with those of the USSR in
a working totality. Although the Kremlin permits and encourages
programs of cultural, economic and technical collaboration among
the satellites, it appears determined to bind the satellites
individually to the USSR rather than to unify them. Whether and
when the Soviet leaders will take the formal step of
incorporating any or all of the satellites into the USSR itself
is unpredictable.
Opposition to Soviet
Domination
5. The great majority of the population in each satellite
continues to be opposed to the communist regime and resents the
lack of personal freedom and hard living conditions for which
the regime is responsible. The aggrieved religious feelings
resulting from the communist attack on religion have also served
to intensify this widespread anti-communism. The anti-communist
majorities are not in a position to carry on active resistance
which would represent a serious challenge to Soviet power in any
of these satellites with the possible exception of Albania, as
is noted hereafter. Nevertheless, by passive resistance they can
impede the process of Sovietization and afford a main element on
which must be based eventual elimination of dominant Soviet
influence. It is recognized at the same time that, if the
process of exclusive communist indoctrination and education
proceeds without interruption for an indeterminate period, it is
uncertain how strong this anti-communist sentiment may
remain.
6. In addition to anti-communism per se, nationalism is a
significant factor of opposition to Soviet control in all the
satellites. These peoples will not reconcile themselves in a few
years to the loss of national independence, a disregard of
national traditions and the enforced glorification of the USSR.
The nationalist sentiment focuses on the memory of better times
in the past, hopes for the future, and the resentment felt at
the injuries and insults experienced under the present regime.
In many respects it is the strongest leverage available for
strengthening the morale of the satellite populations,
sustaining their spirit of resistance to Soviet imperialism, and
encouraging their defiance of servile communist regimes.
Nationalism is, however, a double-edged weapon, raising a number
of operational problems, as we have discovered in our [Page 118] propaganda work and
dealings with the refugees. Besides arousing anti-Soviet
feeling, nationalist sentiment also creates divisions among
these peoples themselves. Magyars against Slavs and Rumanians,
Slovaks against Czechs, Poles against Germans and Germans
against the Slavs. A problem which will become increasingly
serious as nationalist sentiment ferments is that of the
Polish-occupied areas of Germany east of the Oder–Neisse
line.
7. The death of Stalin
created for Soviet dominion over the satellites new problems
which may lend themselves to exploitation. Although there is as
yet no evidence that Soviet capability to dominate the
satellites has been impaired since the death of Stalin, the possibility
nevertheless exists that a greater concentration of effort may
be required to maintain control and that the new Soviet leaders
may have to moderate the pace and scope of their programs in the
satellites. Such moderation is indicated by the new economic
measures, recently announced by the satellite regimes, which
give priority to increasing the output of consumer goods in
order to improve popular morale and to stimulate labor
productivity. In promulgating the new policy, the satellite
regimes have admitted that an economic dislocation has
developed, mainly because of an overemphasis on the development
of heavy industry and a neglect of agricultural development. The
satellite regimes now seek a modification of industrial and
agricultural programs to bring about a more normal balance
between industry and agriculture and to raise the level of
popular morale. The communists have rationalized that this
corrective will provide a healthier foundation for future
economic growth and for further Sovietization of the satellite
countries.
Possibilities of
“Titoism”
8. NSC 58/2 laid down a policy of
fostering communist heresy among the satellites and encouraging
the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary
administrations even though communist in nature. However, as was
noted in the third Progress Report on implementation of NSC 58/2, dated May 22, 1951, the
Kremlin and its local agents have been successful in warding off
any trend in the satellites comparable to that which led to the
break between Moscow and Yugoslavia. In fact, in none of the
satellites have there developed the capabilities such as
rendered Tito’s defection
successful.
9. Of all the European satellite leaders, only Tito achieved controlling
power. He created an impressive military force, as well as a
political organization, responsive to his own leadership which
maintained itself inside Yugoslavia during the war and which,
following withdrawal of the Nazi forces, possessed requisite
power to [Page 119] impose its
will upon the Yugoslav people without substantial assistance
from the Red Army. All the other communist regimes, with the
exception of Hoxha’s government in Albania, were placed in power
by the Red Army itself or by threat of force which the Red Army
represented. These regimes, therefore, were from the outset
dependent on Soviet military power for their very existence and
have remained so. In East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania,
the physical presence of sizable Soviet forces bears daily
witness to Soviet domination of these satellites. In Poland the
Minister of Defense is a Soviet marshal, and Soviet officers
occupy the higher posts throughout the Polish armed forces. In
all the satellites there are large Soviet military missions
which are supervising the reorganization of the satellite armed
forces, and Soviet commanders, advisers, and technicians are
located in key command and staff positions in the military
forces and in the defense ministries.
10. Thus, the ultimate basis of Soviet control in the satellites
is Soviet military domination of these countries. The Soviet
forces stationed within the satellites and in the Soviet Zone of
Austria in April 1953 consisted of 538,000 personnel from the
Soviet Army (including military missions), 24,000 security
troops, and 2,400 Soviet-manned aircraft.
11. Of all the satellite leaders of Eastern Europe, only
Tito could claim to
exercise effective control over the state security apparatus.
His security forces were built up on the basis of personal
loyalty demonstrated in the heat of battle, and Tito knew that he could trust
the overwhelming majority of the higher echelons of his command.
None of the current satellite leaders can count on this kind of
allegiance from the key personnel of their security
establishments. Soviet liaison personnel maintain close
supervision over the leading satellite officials, and it is
doubtful whether far-reaching orders issued by those leaders to
any of their respective security organs would be executed
without confirmation from Soviet controlled sources. In
contrast, it was Tito’s
steadfast denial to Soviet liaison officials of uncontrolled
access to his security organization which contributed
extensively to the friction climaxed by the break between
Tito and the
Kremlin.
12. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania have a common
land frontier with the USSR. Bulgaria has a common sea frontier.
These states are accordingly more exposed to Soviet military
intervention and hence more readily susceptible to Soviet
pressure and control than was Yugoslavia which shares no common
frontier with the USSR. Furthermore, with Yugoslavia’s long sea
coast facing the West, greater possibilities to obtain material
support from the Western powers in the event of a break with [Page 120] Moscow were available
to Tito than there would
be to the other satellites, with the exception of Albania.
13. Since Tito’s defection
in 1948, the Soviets have taken stringent and thorough measures
to guard against a similar development in other satellites.
Leaders in whom any taint of Titoism was suspected have been
either shorn of all power, imprisoned, or actually liquidated.
If any leader through long tenure in office or for any other
reason seemed to be gaining too much power, he has been
ruthlessly eliminated. The customary security safeguards have
been tightened and expanded. A series of friendship and mutual
assistance pacts have been concluded among the various
satellites (except Albania and East Germany) and with the USSR
which in effect obligate the parties signatory to go to each
other’s aid in the event of action from without. The
relationship of the USSR to the satellite regimes raises every
probability that the Soviets would in effect intervene in the
face of internal action threatening the overthrow of the
Soviet-controlled regimes, except possibly in the case of
Albania.
14. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the chances are
negligible at the present time that any existing satellite
communist regime would or could break away from Moscow under its
own power, or, with the possible exception of Albania, that any
anti-Soviet faction could seize or hold power in a satellite and
bring about its detachment from the Soviet bloc.
15. Albania is to some extent an exception in that, unlike the
other satellites, it does enjoy geographical isolation from the
rest of the Soviet bloc and access to the West by sea. Although
the other factors which rendered Tito’s defection successful are generally not
present, Soviet control in Albania is challenged by the inherent
potential of the internal anti-communist majority whose
resistance could be supported by the large Albanian population
in the neighboring Kossovar region of Yugoslavia. The necessity
of Western cooperation with Yugoslavia would of course be a
complicating factor. Albanian refugees in the West might also be
used although their disunity would seriously hamper any such
action.
16. Nationalism may, nevertheless, continue to be a disruptive
force within the communist movement open to exploitation by the
United States. Not all communists in the satellites are able or
willing to serve Moscow’s interest without any regard for that
of their own nation; the very problems of governing their
respective territories and of meeting the goals which have been
set seem to require at least a minimum of cooperation from the
people and may lead certain local communists to oppose as best
they can those Kremlin demands and policies which put too great
a strain upon their own position. In any of the satellite
communist parties there are likely [Page 121] to be personal antagonisms and other
differences which might be exploited from the outside.
17. Since the relation of Communist China to the USSR is believed
to involve considerably less subordination than that of the
European satellites, the diplomatic, trade and cultural
connections between the satellites and Communist China represent
a potentially troublesome factor in Soviet-satellite relations.
While this factor is not easily susceptible to exploitation by
the U.S., it should be closely watched for whatever
opportunities it may offer.
Significance of Yugoslavia in
Policy Toward the Satellites
18. Even though no other satellite has followed or seems capable
(with the possible exception of Albania) of following the path
of Tito’s Yugoslavia
under existing conditions, the example of Yugoslavia continues
to be a significant factor in the satellite picture. Tito’s success in maintaining
Yugoslavia’s independence constitutes a standing insult to
Soviet prestige and a challenge to Soviet infallibility. His
political and ideological counteroffensive has been a disturbing
factor within the satellite communist parties.
19. … In the political field, a Friendship Pact between Greece,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia has recently been concluded.
20. These developments point toward … the … marked enhancement of
Yugoslav defensive strength against any aggression. Their
significance in relation to the satellites lies in the extent to
which it is demonstrated that a practical alternative to
continued acquiescence in Soviet domination is being
created.
21. The relationship which the United States has developed with
Yugoslavia is of vital importance in this process of augmenting
Yugoslavia’s effectiveness in the struggle against Soviet
domination. … Moreover, the mere fact of substantial United
States economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia must have
its effect on both communists and non-communists in the
satellite countries. The exposition before the world by
Yugoslavia of its experience with Soviet domination as a member
of the Soviet bloc also provides excellent refutation of Soviet
propaganda.
Significance of Western
European International Organizations
22. While there has been considerable discussion among the exiles
of federation in Eastern Europe following liberation, no
concrete plans toward this end have been advanced. Neither have
the Western powers attempted to offer any specific proposals for
unity of the satellite peoples or their association with Western
Europe after they are freed. The growing international
organization of the West reflected in NATO, the Coal and Steel Community and similar
bodies nevertheless acts as a disruptive influence upon the
satellite orbit by helping to keep alive the hopes of the
captive peoples. [Page 122] Such
organizations hold out to them (a) evidence of developing unity
and strength of the West essential to their ultimate
emancipation, and (b) as an inviting alternative to the
compulsory dominion of the false internationalism to which they
now belong, a glimpse of an integrated Europe of free
constructive possibilities in which they may take part once they
are liberated.
means of attacking soviet
domination of the satellites
23. The means available to the United States to assist resistance
to, and the eventual breakdown of, the dominant Soviet influence
in the satellites fall into the following general categories:
(a) political and diplomatic; (b) propaganda; (c) economic; (d)
covert; and (e) military. It must be recognized that, owing to
the actual presence of Soviet power and the apparatus of Soviet
control, all these means, with the exception of the military,
are of limited effectiveness, except possibly in the case of
Albania, whose peculiarly exposed position renders it
susceptible to some measure of economic pressure and to a
greater degree of covert activities.
Political and
Diplomatic
24. The major political and diplomatic capability is to exert the
pressure of the unalterable United States position as to the
fundamental right of the satellite peoples to freedom, upon the
existing Soviet-controlled regimes. The United States can also
utilize its position of free world leadership to rally the
support of the free world to this position and thus to
strengthen and broaden the pressure on the USSR and on those
regimes. The United States can also exploit the German desire
for unity and a peace treaty in order to undermine the Soviet
position in East Germany.
25. The United States still maintains diplomatic missions in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. This is
advantageous in that it … (b) shows American concern for the
rights, welfare and eventual independence of the satellite
peoples, (c) makes possible direct contact with the government
concerned and facilitates dealing with such problems as the
protection of American citizens and property, (d) provides a
vantage point which could be useful in the event of future
developments that cannot be predicted, such as a major
defection, and . . . . The principal disadvantages are (a) the
impression created in some quarters that diplomatic relations
indicate the acceptance of the legitimacy of the communist
regimes, (b) the pressures and harassments to which American
representatives in the satellite states are subjected, to the
detriment of United States prestige, (c) the brake which the
existence of diplomatic relations may exercise on covert
operations directed against satellite governments, and (d) the
continued presence [Page 123] of
satellite missions in the United States. The possibility of
opening diplomatic relations with Bulgaria should be kept under
review.
Propaganda
26. The progressive denial to the satellite peoples of access to
truth and means of contact with the outside world has limited
the possibilities in the propaganda field almost entirely to
broadcasting, although balloons, air drops, etc., may be used
occasionally with some effect to supplement this medium. The
operation of adequate technical facilities for broadcasting to
the satellites and the preparation of effective programs assume
increasing importance in the effort to conserve and promote
anti-communist sentiment against the possible inroads of the
communist monopoly over the various media of information.
Utilization of our propaganda facilities is conditioned by the
necessity of, on the one hand avoiding any commitments regarding
when and how these peoples may be liberated and any incitement
to premature revolt, and on the other hand seeking to maintain
their faith in the eventual restoration of freedom.
Economic
27. Western controls of exports to the Soviet bloc and the Soviet
drive for self-sufficiency have reduced trade with Eastern
Europe to a relatively low level. The economic measures
available are consequently of limited efficacy as implements to
accomplish the general purposes of this paper. They might,
however, have some harassment value or could serve as
auxiliaries to a coordinated program based primarily on other
measures. Existing trade controls have already made the economic
problems of the satellites more difficult and to this extent
contribute to realizing the specific purposes of United States
policy toward the satellites.
28. Other economic measures, however, in so far as latitude is
allowed by relevant legislation and over-all United States
policies, should be considered on a case-by-case basis, bearing
in mind the balance of advantage in each instance between the
USSR and the free world. It is desirable to maintain flexibility
in U.S. economic policies toward the Soviet bloc and toward
individual satellites, in order that maximum advantage may be
gained with the limited economic weapons at hand (both
restrictions and incentives). It is also desirable to have in
reserve sufficient economic weapons to bring pressure to bear
against particular satellite regimes at particular times if
doing so serves U.S. interests. The application of such controls
on a general basis, aside from the question of whether they are
worth while in terms of general aspects of United States
relations with the USSR and our free world allies, would [Page 124] tend to facilitate the
integration of the satellites with the USSR, and would make it
impossible to maintain the desired flexibility. Only in the case
of Albania is this perhaps not true, for general economic
measures by the West could serve to emphasize Albania’s
political and economic isolation, while effective integration by
the Soviets as a countermeasure would be under present
conditions most difficult.
Covert
. . . . . . .
alternative courses of
action
The Three
Alternatives
33. One alternative is to take direct action for the liberation
of the satellite peoples from the USSR by military force, either
through direct military measures or through armed support of
revolutionary movements. Such exercise of military force would
in all probability start a global war, except possibly in
Albania. In the case of the latter the probability of Soviet
military counter action is somewhat less than in the other
satellites and the risk commensurately diminished but
nevertheless real and worthy of most careful consideration. This
alternative could not be adopted by the United States unless it
were willing to undertake a global war for this purpose, and to
wage it in all probability without the wholehearted support of
allied nations and of the United Nations.
34. The contrary alternative is to accept the fact of Soviet
control of the satellites for an indeterminate period, possibly
as a basis for reaching some kind of negotiated accommodation
with the USSR, while United States efforts are devoted to areas
beyond the present limits of Soviet control in order to block
Soviet expansion. To follow such a course, besides being
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the right of the
satellite peoples to freedom, would be to deny ourselves means
of reducing the over-all Soviet power position vis-à-vis the
United States and its allies. It may be reasonably assumed,
moreover, that our acceptance of the legitimacy of the present
satellite regimes, even if it should require Soviet assent to
some limited agreement with the West, would be the course which
the Kremlin would desire the United States to follow.
35. There is a large area between the extremes mentioned in the
two preceding paragraphs in which policy and action can be
developed with the purpose of limiting and impeding the Soviet
grip on the satellites. Policy within that field would be
determined with a view to contributing toward the eventual
elimination of dominant Soviet power over these peoples, but its
usefulness need not depend [Page 125] on its effectiveness in achieving this
purpose within any given period of time. The more immediate
criteria for judging the desirability of any particular measures
would be their effectiveness in slowing down Soviet exploitation
of the human and material resources of the satellites, in
maintaining popular resistance to and non-cooperation with
Soviet policies, and in strengthening those forces and factors
which would minimize Soviet assets and maximize Soviet
liabilities in this area in case of war. Progress in this regard
might bring the question of liberation of one or more satellites
to a status of greater actuality and immediacy; any acceleration
of or change in the United States policy could then be
considered in the light of the situation existing at the
time.
36. Adherence to this middle course, though it may preclude
reaching any general accommodation with the Soviet Union in the
foreseeable future, might contribute to the creation of
conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more
receptive to negotiated settlements in line with U.S. objectives
toward the satellites. Action of this type, when it has
reference to areas of direct concern to certain Western nations,
can have far reaching consequences to our relation with our own
allies. It is desirable that every effort be made to obtain
British and French support for this general course of action.
Any action regarding Albania, for example, which did not
adequately take into account the legitimate interests of Italy,
Greece, and Yugoslavia might well result in a net loss rather
than gain to Western solidarity and hence to our fundamental
interests. In addition to considerations of Soviet capability of
reacting in Albania itself, the possibilities of Soviet
retaliatory action elsewhere in the world must be taken into
account.
U.S. Policy
37. Soviet domination of the satellite peoples violates the
principle of freedom and self-determination of nations. It has
also, by bringing Soviet power into the heart of Europe, created
a fundamental disequilibrium on the continent and a continuing
pressure on Western Europe. So long as it remains, the task of
achieving security, stability and orderly progress in Europe
must encounter grave difficulties. The United States should make
clear by its words and deeds that it does not accept this
situation as right or as permanent and that no accommodation
with the Soviet Union to the contrary effect can be
countenanced.
38. A deliberate policy of attempting to liberate the satellite
peoples by military force, which would probably mean war with
the USSR and most probably would be unacceptable to the American
people and condemned by world opinion, cannot be given serious
consideration. The United States should, however, direct its
efforts [Page 126] toward
fostering conditions which would make possible the liberation of
the satellites at a favorable moment in the future and toward
obstructing meanwhile the processes of Soviet imperialism in
those areas. …
39. In general, full advantage should be taken of the means of
diplomacy, propaganda, economic policy and … to maintain the
morale of anti-Soviet elements, to sow confusion and discredit
the authority of the regimes, to disrupt Soviet-satellite
relationships, and generally to maximize Soviet difficulties.
Policies and action to be undertaken by the United States should
be judged on the basis of their contribution to these purposes,
limited of course by such other factors in the global policy
situation as may be pertinent. For example, such questions as
the maintenance of diplomatic relations with satellite states,
or the nature of economic pressures to be applied to these
states, should be decided strictly in terms of general
advantages and disadvantages to the United States, not of
legalistic considerations or of the degree of indignation felt
as a result of the acts of satellite governments.
40. In its efforts to encourage anti-Soviet elements in the
satellites and keep up their hopes, the United States should not
encourage premature action on their part which will bring upon
them reprisals involving further terror and suppression.
Continuing and careful attention must be given to the fine line,
which is not stationary, between exhortations to keep up morale
and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide.
Planning … should be determined on the basis of feasibility,
minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the fundamental
interest of the United States.
41. The United States should vigilantly follow the developing
situation in each satellite and be prepared to take advantage of
any opportunity to further the emergence of regimes not
subservient to the USSR, provided such regimes would have
reasonable prospects of survival. Considerations of the relative
vulnerability of the several satellites must enter into our
calculations. In the case of East Germany, such action will be
within the framework of unification under acceptable conditions.
… United States action in any individual case would have to be
determined in the light of probable Soviet reactions in the
immediate area involved, or elsewhere, risks of global war, the
probable reaction of our allies, and other aspects of the
situation prevailing at the time.
42. United States interests with respect to the satellites can be
pursued most effectively by flexible and adaptable courses of
action within the general policy of determined opposition to,
and the purpose of the eventual elimination of, dominant Soviet
influence over those peoples. Such action should be within the
limits of our capabilities [Page 127] as conditioned by our general policies.
Thus the existing power situation, the current policies of the
Soviet Government, the effect of any action on the satellite
peoples, and the attitudes of the American people and of other
free peoples must be borne in mind.
