Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

661.00/4–2453: Telegram

No. 585
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State, at Paris¹

top secret
priority

Moscow, April 24, 1953—1 a.m.

448. Eyes only for Secretary. It had been our original intention to review and analyze all developments both internal and external since Stalin’s death but in the belief that they might be of some interest and possible value to you in connection with the discussion of this subject at the present NATO meeting I am setting down certain preliminary considerations concerning the foreign policy moves of the new Soviet Government as they appear at this time.

Understandably any evaluation of the degree of change involved in present phase of Soviet conduct of its foreign affairs vary in considerable degree depending upon the estimate of what constituted previous policy under Stalin. It has long been my belief, as Department is aware, that Soviet foreign policy was in large measure determined by the nature of the Soviet state structure and the requirements for the maintenance of Soviet power rather than by any dedication to ideological considerations or sense of mission in regard to world Communism. Against this background the present softer policy of the new government appears less of a break with the past than it may appear to those who believed that the chief preoccupation of Stalin and his associates was the implementation of a previously conceived “design” or blueprint for the establishment of world Communism or world conquest.

The Soviet Union still remains a police dictatorship with total control over every aspect of its political, economic and social life still firmly lodged in the hands of a small group of men. There has been no sign that the new leadership intends to alter any of the basic elements of the Soviet State or the fundamental policy of control from the top over all its citizens and the furtherance to the maximum degree of the growth of its industrial and military power. Therefore, whatever phase we may be entering in regard to the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs, it is still conditioned by the limitations imposed by a modern totalitarian state and any descriptions of Soviet policy such as détente, relaxation et cetera must be understood as falling within the limitations imposed by the system itself. It appears to us here natural and possibly even inevitable that the new leadership of the Soviet Union, forced to deal directly with the gigantic task of the organization of a new administration and direction of the Soviet structure without the advantages and disadvantages of Stalin’s one-man rule, would seek a period of relative tranquility during this process which is still far from complete. The record of the softer and more reasonable Soviet attitude in regard to a number of questions since the death of Stalin appears to us here to be a function of the business of establishing the leadership based on a different principle rather than any evidence of a radical departure from previous Soviet policy. The chief element in this transition seems to be an attempt to shift over from the “Fuehrer Prinzip” of one-man leadership developed to such a high point by Stalin to at least the announced principle of collective leadership by committee or council rule. The great question for the future which only time will answer is whether or not the Soviet system can be run by a committee or whether it requires the arbitrary power of final decision by one man. What has happened in foreign affairs in the direction of a détente seems a logical corollary to the efforts internally to create in the Soviet Union an atmosphere of calm and hope of better times (always within Soviet terms of reference) as contrasted with the rigors of arbitrary terror so characteristic of Stalin’s rule.

A development of interest particularly to United States in this connection is the cessation of the hate-America campaign. Although standard critical references to the United States are carried in the press, it can be stated that since the death of Stalin hate-America propaganda as an orchestrated, calculated campaign has been brought to a halt and there are at present no signs of its revival although this could of course occur at any time. (The Embassy has no information as to whether a similar halt has been called in all the satellite press.)

Since my arrival in Moscow we have not obtained any information from any source which would give any clear clue to the future course of Soviet foreign policy or the degree to which the present leadership is prepared to go in any settlement of outstanding questions on acceptable lines which could lead to a genuine rather than a fictitious lessening of the international tension. The following considerations therefore are ones which appear to us logically inherent in the situation rather than based on any information or fact and may be useful in charting our future course of action and that of our allies in relation to the Soviet Union:

1. The present leadership for reasons of its own has made a great public expression of its desire for peace. The statement of Malenkov in the Supreme Soviet has been picked up and given a prominent place in the May Day slogans and the central press continues to emphasize the theme of peace and desire of the Soviet Government for good relations with all countries. Everyone is familiar with similar statements from Soviet authorities before but there is one aspect of the present situation which in our view deserves careful consideration. It is extremely doubtful if the present leadership has the same liberty of action as Stalin and the ability to disregard as cynically as he did the contradiction between word and deed in the Soviet Union. Stalin had established for himself a position of such supreme power that he was regarded in this country as exempt from any consideration or rules other than those of his own making. It will not be as easy for the present ruling group to go back on their professions of peace as it was for Stalin.

2. It is doubtful furthermore, pre-occupied as they are with the problem of organizing their domestic rule, that the present leaders have thought through fully their future policy in the realm of foreign affairs. There are certain signs of uncertainty on the part of the new leadership. The strongest evidence to this effect is the fact that, contrary to previous Soviet practice, one week has elapsed since the President’s speech without any Soviet official reaction. In a minor key the rather nostalgic references by both Molotov and Voroshilov to me about old times may reflect on their part a certain concern before the monumental responsibilities they face in the future without the presence of Stalin.

3. There is considerable evidence in the Soviet press of a preoccupation on the part of the new leadership with their relations with China and with the European satellites.

4. It can be taken as a fact that whatever may be the real causes of the present Soviet attitude in foreign affairs that they will be quick to exploit any signs of division in the West and to attempt to frustrate adoption of the EDC and in particular German rearmament.

In the circumstances I would venture to suggest that the following points might be worth considering in regard to a coordinated position with our allies in NATO.

1. As long as the Soviet Union remains a totalitarian state, concentrating on the development of its military and economic power reinforced by its ideology, the menace it represents to the free nations of the world will remain constant regardless of the particular aspect it chooses to present to the outside world.

2. More than ever the West should continue its announced policy of developing strength and unity. Any fall back in Western effort in these directions would certainly eliminate whatever opportunities there may exist to exploit the present Soviet situation to the advantage of the free world.

3. We should continue and maintain the note struck in the President’s speech of calmness, confidence and receptivity to any diplomatic opportunity to settle outstanding questions along acceptable lines.

4. Attempts to force the issue for the sake of superficial and temporary propaganda gains to “put the Soviet Government on the spot” would in our opinion be counter productive and might reverse a trend which under certain circumstances we could turn to the advantage of the whole free world. We should consider every possibility of inducing or forcing the new leadership to commit itself more deeply to the line advanced since the death of Stalin.

It will of course be understood that the foregoing analysis deals exclusively with the Soviet situation and areas under its unquestioned control and does not attempt to enter into the Far Eastern situation which is complicated by the uncertainties of Soviet-Chinese relations at this particular juncture.

Bohlen

1. Repeated as telegram 1518 to the Department of State eyes only for the Acting Secretary, which is the source text.

   Secretary Dulles attended the North Atlantic Council Ministerial session in Paris, Apr. 23–27. For documentation on that meeting, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 368 ff.