Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 53”: Telegram
No. 584
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Bohlen) to
the Department of State
niact
1504. Following presentation of credentials1 as is customary Voroshilov and Pushkin, interpreter and I retired to private room. After the usual amenities including certain personal recollections, I asked Voroshilov if he had had an opportunity to read the President’s speech of last Thursday2 which outlined very sincerely and clearly the position of my Government as well as the hopes and aspirations of the US Government and people for an improvement in the world situation compared to what had gone before.
Voroshilov said he had only read what had been published in the press at which point I informed him that the Embassy had sent to the Foreign Office on the evening of delivery a full and accurate text of the speech. Voroshilov then gave me the opening to bring in the points set forth in Department’s 780.3 After stating that the Soviet policy was consistently one of peace, good relations with all countries and amicable settlement of disputes, he stated that he hoped that better days lay ahead. As is characteristic of Voroshilov’s mode of expression, he stated that he hoped and expected that the rigors of winter with its immobility and ice and snow was giving way in the world to the warmer climate of spring and especially between our two countries.
I replied that I was sure that the peoples of the world shared that wish and that insofar as the people and Government of the United States were concerned, the success or failure of the truce talks in Panmunjom would be a real test of whether this was possible. I added that the Soviet Government was not a participant in [Page 1156] these negotiations but that in view of Mr. Molotov’s support of Chou En-lai’s4 statement that it was appropriate for me to mention this matter to him. I said that it was earnestly to be hoped that the North Korean and Chinese negotiators fully understood that [garble] key issue of the POWs under no circumstances could [garble] or be party to any agreement which would [garble] the forcible repatriation of any POW who did not [apparent omission] erring to the theme of the acid text [test?]. [Apparent omission] I told Voroshilov that in the unfortunate event that the present attempt at an armistice failed that it could be taken as a sign by the American people that the hopes for a more favorable world situation which he Mr. Voroshilov had just referred to were not to be realized; that it must be apparent to all serious people that an honorable truce in Korea was an essential prerequisite to any future improvement in the world situation; and that as a [garble] he could understand how deeply people of the United States felt on this point. I did not attempt to go into any of the details of General Harrison’s letter as the moment did not seem appropriate and Voroshilov was clearly not familiar with the POW issue.
Voroshilov did not disagree with any of my remarks and Pushkin who was present expressed complete agreement with my view that a truce in Korea was essential, without however touching on the POW issue. Our talk was amicable and I found interesting the promptness and even eagerness with which Pushkin supported my statement in regard to the importance of an armistice in Korea.
- In a one-sentence telegram 1503, Apr. 20, Bohlen reported that he had presented credentials to Voroshilov in the customary ceremony at the Kremlin at 1 p.m. (Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 1953”) A photograph of the ceremony is in Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 370.↩
- See supra.↩
- Telegram 780, Apr. 17, instructed Bohlen to take up the Korean truce negotiation problems, “ostensibly casually”, following presentation of credentials or some other early opportunity. For text, see vol. XV, Part 1, p. 914.↩
- Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.↩