Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 174 Series

No. 56
Report by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on NSC 174 to the National Security Council¹

top secret

Washington, July 7, 1954.

Progress Report on NSC 174, United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe²

(Policy Approved by the President December 23, 1953)

i. summary

A. Actions in Execution of Policy

In implementing NSC 174 the following major actions have been taken:

1. The Berlin four-power conference afforded the Secretary of State opportunity to reaffirm U.S. opposition to Soviet domination over the satellites and the Baltic States which was exploited by USIA and other media.

2. CAST, a one-megawatt transmitter, was established in Germany and affords the opportunity of increasing the listening audience behind the Iron Curtain.

3. The NATO nations conferred in January on ways and means of coordinating propaganda broadcasts to the USSR and satellites and prepared recommendations to this end which are now under consideration by the respective governments.

4. The Phase A Escapee Program³ was examined by an OCB working group which made recommendations to improve services for rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees. These recommendations are now being implemented.

5. In line with the policy of providing a clear contrast between the East and West Zones of Berlin, FOA continued operation of food, refugee housing, escapee, and investment programs in West Berlin at approximately the same levels as in the past.

6. The Department of State consulted with the Kersten Committee of the House of Representatives concerning the committee’s plans to investigate Communist seizure and rule in Europe.

7. Messages and statements on appropriate occasions in connection with national days of the Eastern European and Baltic States were issued and exploited.

8. USIA maintained the same level of broadcast hours to the USSR and the satellite states tailoring its special feature programs and regular newscasts to the new requirements set forth in the Courses of Action.

9. A separate report on covert operations will be made to the Board.

B. Evaluation of Policy

Effective implementation of certain of the courses of action stipulated in NSC 174 is inhibited by the cautions and limitations written into that document, by the practical difficulties of operating effectively on any scale in or into the denied areas and by the fact that the results of aggressive action to carry them out would seriously risk producing results in conflict with other U.S. policy objectives. Thus, while the policy objectives of NSC 174 remain valid as long-term goals, the ability of the U.S. to take direct action towards achieving those objectives is limited.

C. Major Problems

In the implementation of NSC 174, there are a number of factors which limit the actions which can be undertaken by the Government. There are policy problems, e.g., the objective is to restore freedom and roll back Soviet power in the satellites, but at the same time to avoid provoking war with the USSR, to ease international tensions, cooperate with our allies and avoid premature revolt. The Soviets showed plainly at the Berlin Conference how vital to their own interests they consider the maintenance of control over Eastern Europe. There are practical problems seriously limiting U.S. capabilities, including the tightness of border controls, radio jamming, and a ruthless police regime within the satellites. In the light of these difficulties, action and planning must be largely confined to overt diplomatic action, encouraging passive resistance, trying to keep alive the hopes of the satellite peoples, and propaganda and information sent into the area by radio, . . . .

D. Future Plans

An OCB working group is completing Operational Plans⁴ for the six-month period. May 1 through October 31, 1954, to include projects and special undertakings within the current capabilities of the departments and agencies. Due to restrictions in policy and limited capabilities, these plans will primarily involve actions which will permit propaganda exploitation to the peoples of the satellite states and several diplomatic moves.

ii. detailed report

[Here follows Section A, a statement of actions by paragraphs of NSC 174.]

B. Evaluation of Policy

NSC 174 states the ultimate U.S. objective of seeing the captive peoples of the satellite countries free and independent of Soviet Communist domination. This objective is shared in varying degrees by all the free world. The desire for liberation from Soviet domination is undoubtedly strong among the captive peoples, many of whom would welcome militant Western action to liberate them, even to the extent of resort to a war of liberation by the West. Neither the U.S. nor other free world countries are willing to take such extreme steps, nor is the U.S. prepared to undertake or foster activities which it would not back up with military support in the event of ruthless Soviet suppression and reprisals. Furthermore, our European allies are strongly against taking what they estimate to be provocative action. Consequently, the U.S. must limit its activities to a scope which is considered inadequate by at least the activists among the captive peoples and some of the émigrés. The limitations which overall U.S. policy places on the means utilized in the direct pursuit of the broad objective of freedom for the satellites (quite aside from practical limitations arising from the meagerness of U.S. capabilities) are the reason for the inhibitions written into NSC 174 and made manifest in U.S. actions.

The implementation of the courses of action set forth in NSC 174 is restricted by the fact that U.S. capabilities behind the Iron Curtain are limited, due to the physical obstacles and tight controls imposed by the Communists. U.S. capabilities are considerably greater in those areas of Eastern Europe which are contiguous with the Western world. In Eastern Germany, by virtue of our position in Berlin, they are in some respects greater.

The foregoing limits the U.S. field of action in the satellites largely to the encouragement of passive resistance, supported by any diplomatic measure which can be devised to strengthen the negotiation position of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or to create conditions within the Soviet bloc which will permit a more effective exploitation than is currently possible.

In summary, while the policy objectives expressed in NSC 174 are valid long-term objectives, the U.S. can make only minor progress towards their attainment under present conditions.

C. Major Problems

1. The Soviet Union has shown that it considers the continued domination of Eastern Europe essential to its own security and that it would take strong measures to prevent the detachment of any satellite (except possibly Albania). The Soviet control mechanism continues to operate effectively. It is probable that only military intervention by the West or internal collapse in the USSR could disrupt the control mechanism, and neither seems likely in the foreseeable future.

2. Due to the effectiveness of the Soviet control mechanism, and the ruthlessness with which any dissidence is suppressed, it cannot be expected that the people of any satellite will take positive actions towards revolt or towards seriously affecting Soviet control except such actions as can be taken clandestinely and with relative safety. It is probable that only a prospect of relatively near liberation, through military action or Soviet disintegration, would call forth active resistance by the satellite peoples.

3. While the satellite peoples at first hoped for and probably expected some change in their status as a result of Stalin’s death and the consequent rearrangement of the Soviet power mechanism, the effectiveness with which power has been transferred and the continuing intransigence of Soviet actions have depressed such hopes. With the possible exception of the East Germans, the satellite people probably have concluded that their only hope of liberation is war, which they naturally also dread. In East Germany, there is probably a belief that national reunification may be able to be achieved short of war.

4. The émigrés naturally consider liberation of their homelands as of overriding importance. Because of their relative lack of concern with other U.S. policy objectives, they tend to find it difficult to accept the limitations on U.S. action.

5. Actions can be taken and are taken to maintain the hopes of the captive peoples, through diplomatic, propaganda and other information activities. The maintenance of the strength and unity of the free world has a real impact behind the Iron Curtain; every successful resistance to Communist expansion has its effect. These are, however, mainly in the nature of holding actions so far as the satellites are concerned and the hard facts of the situation make it unrealistic to expect that conspicuous progress towards achieving the long-range policy objectives of NSC 174 will be made under present circumstances.

D. Future Plans

As indicated above, the type of actions which can be taken in support of U.S. policy toward the satellite states are restricted although the opportunities in Eastern Germany are greater than elsewhere. The Operational Plans prepared by the working group to cover the six-month period, May 1 through October 31, 1954, are consistent with these restrictions in policy and limited capabilities. Consequently, they primarily involve actions which will permit propaganda exploitation to the peoples of the satellite states and several diplomatic moves.

Continuous efforts will of course be made to develop additional assets and capabilities and to make them as effective as possible.

1. In addition to the paper printed here, the Progress Report on NSC 174 included a cover sheet and a memorandum by Morgan to Lay, July 13, which noted that the OCB had approved the report on July 7.
2. For text of NSC 174, see Document 51.
3. For text of the President’s Escapee Program, PSB D–18/a, see Document 63.
4. Not printed. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Soviet Satellites, 1953–54”)