761.00/3–853: Telegram
No. 558
The Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Beam) to the
Department of State1
priority
1272. Following our preliminary impressions on the consequences of Stalin’s death and character new government.2
While representing a radical departure in outward form from organization at 19th congress, present rearrangement seems attempt to mobilize forces by enhancing and concentrating functions probably performed under Stalin’s leadership.
Replacement Stalin’s authority apparently being sought in gathering for the present of recognized individual abilities and prestige. Entry of new phase seems underlined in precedence given younger men over Molotov who continues nevertheless in highest sphere and whose importance increased by elimination Stalin’s foreign affairs experience. Natural and perhaps best balance has been created in assigning government and party leadership to Malenkov, security to Beria, foreign policy to Molotov and army affairs to Bulganin. [Page 1104] How long this balance will last in view traditional power rivalry Communist leaders we simply do not know, but it may be presumed government constitutes team used to working with each other.
The very speed, however, with which Malenkov was able to take over need not mean possible differences are permanently settled but may have been forced by need of filling vacuum of authority as far as possible and discouraging any tendencies toward “disorder and panic” to which revealing reference made in communiqué. In meantime any myth Stalin is indispensable seems to be counteracted by relative haste with which he is being disposed of and by government’s stated determination to proceed under the emblem of national and party unity.
Interesting to note that Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin have advanced through hierarchy as technicians and competent administrators. Molotov and Kaganovich sole remaining revolutionary Bolshevik links. Stalin’s successors not necessarily less ruthless but they may apply different methods. Whether or not reduction of party secretariat means decrease party influence, latter’s role may undergo some adjustment tending toward further fusion with state structure. Zhukov’s public reappearance as Deputy War Minister after long period relegation may be significant attempt to add weight professional army to political balance. Changes in organization of strategic industries and foreign office seem attempt to intensify control over both war potential and foreign policy.
Obvious Stalin’s death strikes blow to Soviet international Communist leadership against which Russians ill prepared. Determined steps will doubtless be taken to maintain present holdings in satellites. Early change foreign policy unlikely, particularly as new regime would find it difficult make conciliatory divergencies. Question of course is whether Mao Tse-tung will be less tractable to direction of syndicate which has yet to prove its ability to survive. While Mao Tse-tung may feel more able to treat with Soviet Union on basis ideological and political equality, he will, of course, depend on Russia for support in Korean war and on still longer term basis for assistance in carrying out basic Chinese industrialism program. His importance has been clearly recognized in precedence and special attention accorded Chinese over all other Communist associates.
- Repeated for information to Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and Belgrade.↩
- On Mar. 7, a joint announcement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet described a set of sweeping changes in the Soviet Government and party leadership. The most apparently significant change was the designation of Georgiy Maksimilianovich Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.↩